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The aim of this dissertation is twofold:
1) To add to a meaningful conversation on financial markets by using less conventional, yet 
empirical, methods, which differ from the dominant statistical empirical methods;
2) To provide a case study of an application of the less conventional methods, i.e. 
methodological pluralism.
While the various chapters may appear somewhat unrelated, the thread throughout is the 
interplay of theory and practice in financial markets.
Theory and practice have also played a constitutive role in the conception and production 
of the dissertation. It is the product of the author’s experiences of the past thirty years in 
and around financial markets. More specifically, it has arisen from ten years of studying 
economics, finance and philosophy of science in academia, ten years of working experi-
ence in the sector itself (trading and asset management) and many years of policy-oriented 
research, mainly focused on the financial sector and the great financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
Combining these various levels of observation is somewhat unusual. I do not pretend to 
provide an exhaustive analysis on each level. Further elaboration on each of the levels is most 
probably possible, especially because both the practice of and academic thinking on financial 
markets have evolved and because I haven’t always been part of the particular conversations 
on theory and practice. 
1.1 Why?
Financial markets are markets where financial products are traded: i.e. claims to assets such 
as stocks, bonds, currencies, derivatives, etc. Today’s image of financial markets is one of big 
banks housed in skyscrapers, crowded exchange floors and yes, greed, crisis and turmoil. The 
perception has become negative because of the Great Financial Crisis in 2007-2008 and the 
ensuing recession. Yet such markets are a deeply ingrained part of modern society and serve 
a number of valuable functions: borrowing and lending, price determination, information 
aggregation and coordination, risk sharing, provision of liquidity and increasing (cost) ef-
ficiency by reducing transaction costs. The functions ultimately boil down to dealing with 
the problem of intertemporal consumption: how much to consume today and how much to 
save and/or invest for future use. The issue is relevant on all economic levels. An individual 
has to decide what to spend on items such as food or clothing today and how much to save 
for later, for instance for education or retirement. Corporations have to decide what to do 
with their profits: pay dividends to shareholders now or invest in order to create future 
profits. Governments face the budgeting question of how much taxes to raise and how to use 







opportunity to transform the use of economic means with regard to purpose, location and 
time. Thus one can choose to buy insurance against certain events, borrow and lend money, 
consume, save and invest. Put differently, financial markets provide economic agents with a 
means to deal with risk, time, and uncertainty.
Financial markets are also very much a necessary institution to maintain and improve 
economic well-being on a macro-level. It would seem inconceivable for underdeveloped 
areas in the world to improve without, amongst other institutional characteristics, some 
form of financial means, for instance in the form of development aid, foreign investments 
and credit to local entrepreneurs (see Rajan and Zingales, 2003). Though financial markets 
affect pretty much anyone, even those who do not want to have anything to do with this 
trademark capitalist institution, the public at large commonly has taken their existence and 
functioning as a given. Only in times of crises when things that were taken for granted 
come under threat, do the markets make the headlines and get widespread public attention. 
That attention is negative most of the times because crisis breeds discontent. Thus financial 
markets are often regarded as a necessary evil, despite their importance and necessity.  Their 
existence is continuously questioned, at least by important parts of the public.
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that competitive markets can be seen as a form of a public 
good. No one can be excluded from using them and use of them does not affect availability 
to others. But their existence and well-functioning are not a given. This applies to financial 
markets as well. Incentives and pressures are there that threaten their well-functioning. The 
threats arise from various sources. First of all there is a more or less natural process of compe-
tition. Market participants try to perform better than their competitors; if they do they may 
gain some form of market power. As less performing market participants are weeded out and 
if for some reason barriers to entry exist, successful market participants may develop a degree 
of monopoly power. Similarly, politicians and policy makers may have incentives to reduce 
competitiveness in a market, for instance for electoral purposes or in serving special inter-
ests instead of the common good. Attention needs to be paid to market structure because 
financial markets need to be liquid and transparent to function properly. This is where policy 
makers and regulators come in. Because, even while the very real possibility of distortion of 
competitiveness by politics and policy makers exists, at the same time Rajan and Zingales 
argue: “markets cannot flourish without the very visible hand of the government, which is 
needed to set up and maintain the infrastructure”. In other words, unregulated markets are 
by no means always preferable to regulated markets, and vice versa. 
That implies that the provision of public goods may require some form of collective ac-
tion and that applies to financial markets as well. Usually governments are counted on to 





















global public goods, for instance the global climate and levels of pollution. In these cases 
some form of supranational coordination is necessary to ensure efficacy. The same applies 
to financial markets, simply because these are ultimately global markets. The great financial 
crisis of 2008 has it made painfully clear that the well-functioning of financial markets is an 
international matter, not a national one. 
Within economics a significant subfield that deals with financial markets only started to 
develop after World War II. Subsequently the subfield, called finance or financial econom-
ics, went down its own path. Meanwhile, within the wider realm of economics financial 
markets were seen as a complementary institution to the real economy, which they were 
originally. The opinion was broadly shared by economists of varying schools which in turn 
influenced economic policymakers and politicians. The view was that economic processes 
are primarily driven by what happens in the real economy; what happens in the financial 
sector is a consequence of events in the real economy. This view has been formalized in most 
economic planning models that policymakers use and thus became embedded in actual 
economic policy. However, the financial crisis of 2007-2008 and the resulting fallout for the 
real economy serve as prime evidence that the relationship between the real economy and 
the financial sector is way more complicated and that turbulence in the financial can have 
serious repercussions on the real economy.
Finance became in the 1970s a hugely successful academic discipline within economics in 
terms of publications, journals and prizes, numbers of faculties, staff and students, and funds 
directed towards the field. It became the dominant conversation with regard to financial 
markets. Fuelled by some major breakthroughs, however, the focus of finance increasingly 
shifted away from looking at the functions of financial markets and towards investigat-
ing how the markets functions. Their existence, the primary function and its place in the 
economy were also taken as a given by financial economists and so they committed the same 
mistake in decoupling financial markets from the broader real economy.  The dominant 
conversation was thus only dealing with a part of the phenomenon, although an important 
part.
The academic discipline of finance did more than analysing and theorising. It did signifi-
cantly impact the markets themselves, in shape, size and structure. Theoretical developments 
such as the development of pricing models and new instruments such as various derivative 
products profoundly altered the markets and the world. In combination with the advance 
of technology the result has been that the market for money and capital is the largest, most 
international and most globalized market on earth. Money and other financial products fly 
all over the world in staggering amounts, twenty-four hours a day, transcending countries 







kets in a sense ungraspable for the public, for policy makers and perhaps also academics. An 
institution which in essence was complementary to the real economy, has become an 800 lb. 
Gorilla, a wild and dangerous beast which is nevertheless crucial to our well-being.
So on the one hand financial markets would seem a somewhat hard to grasp phenomenon 
which nevertheless affects us all, yet on the other hand our knowledge about these markets is 
fragmented and the attention devoted to it outside of its specific academic and professional 
realm limited and often ill-aimed. I aim to connect some of these fragmented thoughts and 
to provide some focus on how we can look at various aspects of financial markets using 
different tools from the toolbox of economics and other sciences. The goal is broadening 
and improving the conversation about financial markets, beyond what mainstream financial 
economics already has to offer.
1.2 hoW?
Financial markets can be looked upon in various frames. Sheila Dow (2016) has argued 
that these various ways of framing financial markets provide an argument for a pluralist 
or multidisciplinary or interdisciplinary approach beyond what financial economics has to 
offer. Moreover, financial markets, like most economic phenomena, are essentially an open 
system (ibid.). The links with other systems and entities (the real economy, firms, individu-
als, governments, etc.) are numerous and the boundaries not clearly marked. An employee 
with a pension plan is part of the financial sphere because his retirement savings will be 
the proceeds of some investment decision, individual or collective depending on legislation 
and regulation. At the same time the pension plan forms part of the labour compensation 
package of the employee and the operational budgeting considerations of the employer.
All economic phenomena are to a large extent social phenomena, depending on a multitude 
of interactions between various agents. That implies that the phenomena are not easily 
captured by covering laws like the iron laws of nature. Rather there are causal mechanisms 
at work which may give to rise to tendencies which are not necessarily permanent or persis-
tent and can be affected by other mechanisms and may evolve as context and environment 
change. Much of economics is an attempt to depict causal mechanics (rather than covering 
laws). The issue is than whether these mechanisms are correctly described or whether the 





















Besides the goal of an improved understanding of financial markets I offer a pluralistic (with-
in economics) approach (and to some extent also multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary)1. 
Finance in fact has pluralist origins. It is by no means a simple offshoot of economics. When 
one looks at the background of the main characters involved, one finds quite a colorful 
variety: mathematics, physics, medicine, law, French, and indeed economics, to name some. 
Much of the ground-breaking work has been done outside economics faculties at business 
schools, and even outside of academia at think-tanks, consultancy firms, banks and invest-
ment firms. Theory and practice in finance have had striking proximity, which has been a 
catalyst in the rise to prominence of financial economics. I said that academic finance has 
had a profound impact on the financial markets. The opposite is also true: the markets 
provide researchers with input: an incredible amount of empirical material in the form of 
asset prices and other market data. When thinking and theorizing about financial markets it 
is very much worthwhile to look at the practice and the practitioners. 
Various types of pluralism can be identified (Dow, 1997) so some elaboration is needed on 
what is meant here, where pluralism applies and where not. Earlier in this chapter the func-
tions of financial markets at the most basic level were set out: transformation of economic 
means for several different purposes, locations and times. Financial markets, even when 
being an open system, have emerged, exist and persist and they do so for a reason. In that 
sense the analysis here is ontologically monist, not pluralist. For example, as will be discussed 
in chapter five, derivatives markets do not exist because of the discovery of how to price 
derivatives but because they provide an economically efficient means to deal with risk, time 
and uncertainty. 
However, monism on the ontological level does not imply that the ways to gain knowledge 
about financial markets, the methodological perspective used, and the specific methods to 
analyze are restricted. Put somewhat differently, the idea is that there can be many theories 
relating to one phenomenon (Mäki, 1997), different methodologies may add value (Dow, 
1997) and diverse methods may shed light on varying aspects of the phenomenon (Groe-
newegen and Vromen, 1996). 
John Davis (2019a) makes a useful distinction in this regard between methodological as-
sumptions and substantive assumptions. Ontological claims involve substantive assump-
tions, he argues, and these assumptions involve ideological differences between research-
ers. He adds that these “ideological” differences between researchers may be considered 
irreconcilable”(or may be perceived as such), whereas conciliation is possible in regard to 
methodological assumptions. It is the latter type of conciliation that is mainly explored here. 








However, conciliation on the methodological level may also hint at the possibility of some 
reconciliation on the ontological level where it concerns substantive assumptions. Perhaps, 
at least in finance, the differences and disagreements between various economic schools of 
thought and other disciplines actually do not run as deep as they are often portrayed in a 
polarized academic arena. 
Epistemological pluralism thus concerns methodological assumptions and is a matter of 
what different schools of thought (inside or outside of economics) have to say about financial 
markets. The idea is that different economic schools of thought provide meaningful insights, 
be it in terms of knowledge, justification, truth, adequacy, etc. With regard to financial 
markets the dominant paradigm is financial economics, in particular what has been labelled 
by Ross (2005) as neoclassical finance. Its key claim is that financial markets, if properly set 
up, will tend to efficient outcomes. Behavioral finance has become the main challenger to 
this paradigm. Because agents act less than fully rational in their decision making, deviations 
from efficiency will arise and persist and suboptimalities at the collective level can and do 
happen. The dispute between these two seemingly competing paradigms is further explored 
in chapter three. While these theories may appear rival they need not be in that different 
questions may be concerned which may relate to different subjects. The idea that behavioral 
and neoclassical finance are not rival but to a large extent complementary, is further explored 
in chapter four where another school of thought, Austrian economics, is used to bridge the 
apparent gap between neoclassical and behavioral finance.
Chapter four is an example of methodological pluralism: the use of different methodologies 
in relation to a phenomenon. Neoclassical and behavioral finance to a large extent share 
the same methodology2. Theories are presented as formal models. The models are then 
(often statistically) tested by examining hard data which leads to a verdict of either right or 
wrong. The Austrian School does share the tenet of methodological individualism with both 
neoclassical and behavioral economics but does have a fundamental distrust of quantitative 
methods and formal modelling as a means of capturing human action. The case is made 
in chapter four that their descriptive methodology can complement narrowly empiricist 
approaches.
2 Dow (2016) uses the label “logical positivism” to characterize this methodology. Whether that is a fortunate 
characterization can be debated, given the extensive philosophical discussions of the past on the subject of 
logical positivism (see for instance McCloskey, 1985). Dow identifies three key elements of what she labels 
logical positivism in economics. Besides empirical testing and the right/wrong demarcation she mentions the 
axiom of rational behavior. Following Ross (2005) and others, I do not subscribe to this in the case of finance. 
As Ross mentions, finance has taken a step back from this axiom in that in a well-structured and functioning 






















That different methodologies can complement each other in that they relate to different 
aspects of a phenomenon does not say anything about the use of different methods for 
one and the same aspect of the phenomenon. Pluralism in method may actually be always 
be present. McCloskey (1990) has argued that while economists may extensively use the 
formal method of mathematics and modelling, in reality they are telling a story. McCloskey’s 
point that economists should be aware of, and pay attention to, their narratives, is taken up 
throughout the following chapters. Statistical significance and neat regressions are not the 
only “facts” that matter. Financial markets lend themselves particularly well to this kind of 
testing: many of the processes are highly visible and financial markets produce an unrivalled 
amount of numerical data. The narrow empirical approach may however be well served by 
adding qualitative analysis of possible underlying mechanisms and institutional arrange-
ments, and illustration by case studies and real-world examples3. That becomes even more 
important if indeed, as many hold (see for instance Bernstein, 1992, MacKenzie, 2005, 
Soros, 2013), theory and practice massively influence each other with regard to financial 
markets. In connection to this, it is interesting to observe what scientists actually do, in their 
scientific work but also beyond when they try to put their theories to the test in the market 
or in the arena of policy-making.
The argumentation in the analysis presented here makes use of quite different methods. A 
large part consists of historical data sampling and statistical investment analysis. As such, 
these can be regarded as a contribution to the quantitative turn in economic methodol-
ogy and the history of economics (see for instance Düppe & Weintraub, 2018, Edwards, 
Giraud & Schinckus, 2018 and Cherrier & Svorenčík, 2018). But  descriptive accounts 
and philosophical reflection are also employed.. The common denominator here is that all 
analysis is empirical or makes use of empirical observations4. Besides hard data, observations 
from the practice of the financial markets are used5. With regard to the realm of academics 
it is observed what scientists actually do, in their scientific work but also beyond, when 
they try to put their theories to the test in the market6. The interplay between theory and 
practice plays an important role throughout this dissertation. Many advocates of theoretical 
pluralism, me included, greatly stress that pluralism does not imply that “anything goes”, 
to use the famous phrase of Paul Feyerabend (1975). However, with regard to pluralism in 
3 Colander (2000) has argued that the label “neoclassical economics” in fact covers the descriptive, institutional 
brand of economics from the 1940s and the more formal modelling approach from the 1950s. A similar move, 
which is described in chapter two, can be found in finance.
4 Most of the research in modern financial economics is empirical but usually restricted to statistical data analy-
sis.
5 These observations include experiences from the author’s ten year career as a trader and manager in the financial 
markets.







method there is no reason why certain methods or ideas should be excluded a priori as long 
as a serious confrontation with reality can be conducted.
1.3 What?
In chapter two an extensive historical analysis is presented of the dominant discourse about 
financial markets, that of finance. The diversion between economics and finance is discussed 
and the development of finance through time, away from a more general macro-oriented 
perspective towards analysis of firms, markets and specific assets on the micro level, is dis-
played. Epistemically and methodologically the impact of the ground-breaking theoretical 
advances in the 1960s and 1970s becomes clear, in particular in the domains of asset pricing, 
efficient markets and agency theory. The lack of similar novel ideas since the 1970s combined 
with technological advances which have massively enlarged the possibilities for working with 
data, have resulted in predominantly quantitative empirical work.
That is not say that thinking about financial markets has gone stale. On the contrary: the 
breakthrough of behavioral economics, based on insights from psychology, has been largely 
fuelled by research on and data from financial markets. Chapter three explores the divide 
between the traditional neoclassical view that financial markets are to a large extent efficient 
and this most prominent challenger to that paradigm: the behavioral view that there are 
persistent deviations from efficiency because agents act less than optimally rational. It does 
so by looking at a very specific data set: the results of professional money management 
operations with which leading neoclassical and behavioral finance scholars are associated. 
The data do not provide crystal clear winners in terms of risk and return. In addition, there 
is no trace of exceptional performance when top academics are involved.
In chapter four it is argued that neoclassical and behavioral insights can be reconciled to a 
large extent by means of the Austrian theory of the market process (Kirzner, 1992). At the 
core, the behavioral claim of less than optimal rationality pertains to individual agents, while 
the neoclassical claim of efficient markets pertains to outcomes of interactions between many 
agents. The question then becomes if and how these interactions of less than perfect agents 
result in efficient outcomes. In the neoclassical account it is assumed that arbitrage —quick 
elimination of opportunities for excess profits—will ensure market efficiency. How realistic 
is that assumption? By looking at arbitrage as a dynamic market process where entrepreneur-
ial discovery and learning take place content is given to that assumption. The upshot is that 
it may be more appropriate to talk about markets tending towards equilibrium, allowing for 





















asset prices often display more volatility than is logical from an efficient markets standpoint, 
an important observation made by behavioral finance (Shiller, 2003).
The Austrian account, by focusing on “entrepreneurial skills” does not assume a fully rational 
homo economicus, rather a rational but not omniscient operator. The entrepreneur looks for 
opportunities and explores those. He or she may err at times, perhaps learn from mistakes 
and will adapt his or her behavior. Thus outcomes, prices, markets can be inefficient but 
these will correct at some point and ultimately will find their way back in the “right” direc-
tion. Radical uncertainty (Knight, 1921) plays an important role in this account. For if we 
acknowledge that economic processes are inherently uncertain, the outcomes and develop-
ments of such processes cannot be completely anticipated by calculation or precise estima-
tion. Behavior of agents will be a matter of best-guessing, trial-and-error and opportunism. 
The market is nothing more than a device which brings together these imperfect agents with 
different mindsets and opinions to come to a collective outcome.
There are other scientific disciplines than (financial) economics which have paid attention 
to financial markets. Originating in sociological and philosophical circles in the 1990s the 
social studies of finance have sprung up. The aim is multidisciplinary application of social 
science disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, human geography, gender studies, socio-
legal studies, and science and technology studies to the study of financial markets (Preda, 
2007). One of the most interesting results has been the so-called performativity thesis: the 
idea that theory can enact the reality that theory aims to describe (Callon, 1998) Stretched 
to the limit this results in the provocative claim that theories can enact reality even when the 
theory is lacking in some form.
In chapter two the powerful influence of a few breakthrough theoretical advances for think-
ing about financial markets is shown, This influence went way beyond the academic realm: 
theories profoundly changed what actually happened in financial markets, in some cases 
actually creating new practices. Option pricing theory and the congruent development of 
derivatives markets is a particular noteworthy example in this regard; one that has been 
used to illustrate “performativity”7. Chapter five examines these performative properties of 
option pricing theory. It is concluded that option pricing theory indeed has had a profound 
effect on financial markets, because people actually started using the theory in practice. But 
it is not the case that this happened even when the theory itself was defective. Here once 
again the importance becomes apparent of distinguishing between what a theory does and 
does not claim, as well as identifying the accompanying assumptions and how realistic these 
assumptions are. On the other hand the nature of economic reality should be kept in mind. 







Economic phenomena are social phenomena which are subject to complex interactions in a 
wide and changing context instead of following some iron law of nature. Such phenomena 
are not easily captured in one grand theory of everything.
Having said that, I argue, in particular in chapter four with regard to the behavioral-
neoclassical dispute that apparently rival theories may turn out not to be rival at all but 
rather complimentary to one another. The behavioral camp makes its claims largely based 
on psychology and experiments. The neoclassical camp making equally credible claims about 
collective outcomes on the level of the market where many agents interact, largely based on 
micro-economic concepts. The point of departure of both schools of thought thus differs: 
behavior of individuals versus collective outcomes. In other words, behavioral and neoclassi-
cal finance use different mechanisms of explanation (explanans).
Regarding the object to which the explanans is applicable (explanandum), the solid claims 
of behavioral finance pertain above all to the level of individual agents/persons. From there, 
it is inferred that collective market outcomes can be less than efficient. On the other hand, 
neoclassical finance postulates, given certain assumptions that collective outcomes should be 
efficient because of the no-arbitrage theorem .
The question then arises how the different levels are related: which mechanism links the 
level of the individual economic agent to collective outcomes in financial markets? In the 
case of neoclassical and behavioral finance an inter-theoretic bridge is suggested, inspired by 
the originally Austrian market process account, which gives actual content to the principle 
of arbitrage.
Since 2007 financial markets and the thinking about financial markets have profoundly 
changed with the events that will be labelled here as the great financial crisis. The crisis 
would appear to provide a harsh clash between theory and practice of financial markets. 
Some of the issues for finance and economics that have emerged from the crisis are examined 
in chapter six. The issues are numerous and quite different in scope and content. The multi-
plicity and diversity makes an argument for a broader, more comprehensive way of thinking 
about financial markets. Chapter six contains a proposal for a broader, enriched conversation 
on financial markets, a new institutional finance. The basic idea is that a plurality of partial 
accounts can accommodate a variety of claims and thoughts about financial markets on 
various levels of aggregation and identify interactions between varying claims. Because the 





Ketchup Economics: The Methodology of Finance
This chapter contains an empirical investigation of the methodology of 
finance. An extensive sample, covering the entire history of the two leading 
journals in the field, the Journal of Finance and the Journal of Financial 
Economics, has been investigated in order to sketch 1) the development of 



























Back in 1985 Larry Summers employed the metaphor of “ketchup economics” to illustrate 
the relationship and differences between economics and finance. He distinguished two 
groups of researchers: general economists who study the ketchup market as part of the 
broader economic system and so-called ”ketchup economists”, located in the Department 
of Ketchup where they receive much higher salaries than do general economists8. “General 
economists focus on fundamental determinants of price and quantity of ketchup, the various 
supply and demand factors, and try to explain price fluctuations by examining various types 
of data and using models. Ketchup economists, on the other hand, reject this approach and 
its results. They point out that the aggregate data, used by general economists, are almost 
meaningless accounting entities which are not even accurately measurable in the first place. 
Instead they focus on studying the hard observable data of ketchup transaction prices and 
possible excess opportunities in the market. The lack thereof and the resulting efficiency 
of the ketchup market is regarded as the best established fact in empirical economics by 
ketchup economists” (ibid.)9. Translated, Summers states that general economists tend to 
focus on fundamental determinants of price and quantity, that is the various supply- and 
demand factors such as costs, wages, substitutes, income, etc., General economists do this in 
an attempt to explain price fluctuations, and they do so with mixed results. Financial econo-
mists reject the approach since it is based on useless accounting information and fraught 
with measurement problems. Instead they focus on observable transaction data. Financial 
economists are interested in the interrelationships of various prices and the existence of 
possible excess profit opportunities between those prices10. 
Others have made comments about the relationship and differences between economics and 
finance (Gibbons, 1987; Ross, 1987 & 2005; Campbell, 1994, Harrison 1997, Jovanovic 
2008 & 2012). Peter Bernstein (1992, 2007) argued from a historical perspective that finance 
has changed through the years from a descriptive, qualitative endeavor into a formalized 
quantitative one. This move, he claims, was fueled by theoretical innovation11. The stories 
and comments mentioned above are to a large extent a claim about methodology: how the 
same phenomenon can be approached from various angles and with different methods.
8 Note that Summers’ remarks date from a period before the Nobel Prize in economics was to be awarded to a 
finance scholar. The first would be Harry Markowitz, William Sharpe and Merton Miller in 1990, followed by 
Robert Merton and Myron Scholes in 1997, Eugene Fama, Lars Peter Hansen and Robert Shiller in 2013 and 
Richard Thaler in 2017.
9 Summers’s remarks date back to the time period before the rise to prominence of behavioral economics and 
finance; a development in which Summers himself played a significant role.
10 Summers seems to focus mainly on asset pricing here. Of course finance is comprised of more subjects such as 
corporate finance and governance and banking.







But, given that there might be methodological differences between finance and economics in 
general, while a large literature exists today on the methodology and philosophy of general 
economics, there is not really such a thing in finance12. Besides the scattered remarks above, 
there are papers and chapters on method and ways of doing research. These include the 
viability of certain statistical procedures, the proper use of data, and how (un)realistic certain 
assumptions are, but these are usually confined to a technical treatment (see for instance 
Cochrane, 2001, Harvey, 2017). Which least squares calculation is most appropriate? What 
distribution of returns fits best13? How are data collected and used? 
Some literature exists on what has had impact in finance in terms of specific papers, specific 
scholars, and specific academic institutions (see Arnold et al., 2003, Keloharju, 2008). The 
research is based on citations and is usually limited to a particular time frame: Arnold et 
al. (2003) cover the 1990s while Keloharju (2008) investigates the new millennium. Kim, 
Morse, and Zingales (2006) have performed a similar study on economics at large, covering 
the period from 1970 till 2000.14
There would appear to be space for a thorough, fundamental treatment of the methodology 
of finance, which includes but is not limited to its connections with economics at large.15 A 
first step would be to investigate the ways of argumentation in finance. A sample from the 
entire history of editions of the Journal of Finance and the Journal of Financial Economics, 
the two leading journals in the field, has been examined in order to answer two basic ques-
tions. First, what are people writing about, and, second how do they write about it? In other 
words, what have been the subjects of the papers and what approach is used in tackling these 
various subjects: empirical, theoretical, or a mixture of both?
The aim is to empirically check the scattered notions that have been sketched above and 
gain insight from the bottom up in the ways of argumentation in finance. A longitudinal 
perspective is taken in order to track the developments through time, since scientific fields 
are hardly ever static and thus methodological remarks are bound to be context-sensitive. An 
attempt will be also made to connect the findings to familiar concepts in the methodology, 
philosophy, rhetoric, and history of economics.
12 For instance Reiss’s 2013 textbook “Philosophy of Economics: a Contemporary Introduction” is an accessible 
and worthwhile example.
13 In the words of McCloskey: “small-m methodology”.
14 Edwards, Giraud and Schinckus (2018) argue that similar attempts have had a long tradition since the 1960s.
15 De Scheemaekere (2009) has published a paper titled “The Epistemology of Modern Finance”, which would 
suggest such an attempt. While interesting in many regards, De Scheemaekere’s analysis is limited to the 
presence and use of mathematical models in finance. It will be shown that mathematical modelling is only a 

























The method of analysis employed in this chapter is inspired by the works of Deirdre McClos-
key and Arjo Klamer. Klamer (2006) has described economics as “a bunch of conversations”. 
This chapter can be seen as an attempt to operationalize that notion in that it tries to map 
one of those conversations: finance. There are also similarities with McCloskey’s seminal 
work on the rhetoric of economics (1986, 1998) and on the use of statistics (1996, 2008), 
coauthored with Ziliak. While the analysis in this chapter is simpler and more superficial 
than McCloskey’s, it does have in common that what is considered, is what particular schol-
ars actually do, not what they should do. Besides minimizing the normative bite, there is also 
no epistemic appraisal or deep reading in the “quick and dirty” approach used here. This may 
present advantages with regard to criticism of perceived subjectivism in interpretive studies. 
At the same time, I’m claiming that the bottom-up approach still brings out the grand plots 
and the crucial moves and twists, based on an empirical foundation.
2.2 VarIous PersPeCtIVes on the Methodology of fInanCe
Let’s start by examining the claims about the methodology of finance in a bit more detail. 
Summers (1985) starts out with the observation that, while economics and finance are 
clearly allied and the latter undoubtedly has its roots in the former, increasingly two different 
cultures and unconnected literatures have emerged, even when the same issues are addressed. 
He claims that general economists ask the right questions but that they lack adequate data, 
theory, and empirical methods. Financial economists forego these more important questions 
on the fundamentals of asset prices in general, by exclusively focusing on hard pricing data16. 
In Summers’ opinion: “The increasing disjunction of the fields of economics and finance are 
obviously inefficient” (ibid.). It would appear then that Summers’ main point resides in a 
distinction in the level of detail in the analysis. The various differences in data, theory, and 
method can then regarded as a result of that difference in focal points.
Stephen Ross (1987) was in agreement with Summers that important differences have sur-
faced between finance and economics, despite the apparent interrelations, but he insists that 
there is nothing wrong with that. He pinpoints the distinction as essentially a methodologi-
cal one. His considerations are the following, many of them not unlike those of Summers. 
First, in finance data are huge in quantity and of high quality. Second, “there is a strong and 
subtle pressure to build models that utilize the data within the financial database” (ibid.) 
leading to a focus on relative pricing based on risk-return characteristics. Third, the bulk 
of the data are price data rather than volume data: “finance theory is a theory of inelastic 
supply, and of price determination”. That may sound pragmatic but it is not the whole story. 








For the purpose of price determination financial markets are assumed as good as perfectly 
competitive with unlimited liquidity available. Whether that is always the case in practice, 
and to what extent, can be debated, but it is true that money and capital fly over the world 
instantaneously twenty-four hours a day. Economics, according to Ross, is characterized by 
“the apparatus of demand and supply and the attendant notions of equilibrium” and that 
also applies to game theory. In contrast, “the focus of finance is micro theoretic and the 
intuition of finance is the absence of arbitrage”. Arbitrage can be defined as the possibility 
of simultaneous buying and selling of goods (securities, currency, commodities, etc.) in dif-
ferent markets or in derivative forms in order to take advantage of differing prices for the 
same asset17. 
Demand curves in financial markets are horizontal because of the plethora of substitutes; 
supply curves are either perfectly elastic or inelastic depending on the situation (i.e. investing 
or financing). Their interplay is therefore only meaningful at the highest aggregate level 
and not in the analysis of specific assets and markets. Finance is characterized by the simple 
intuition that information is reflected in prices and that arbitrage opportunities are short-
lived. Those intuitions have brought the field to great heights. According to Ross, different 
focus will give different insights, for example on a macro level, or on the level of agent 
behavior. Although Summers and Ross do not agree on the desirability of a disjunction 
between economics and finance there are some striking similarities in their assessments, in 
particular the top-down perspective used in economics versus the bottom-up approach used 
in finance.
Michael Gibbons (1987) provides an empirical perspective to the interrelations of econom-
ics and finance. As a starting point, for Gibbons finance is a field within economics that has 
borrowed from other fields in economics just as the rest of economics has borrowed from 
finance. The sharing of econometric methods is one case of such two-way traffic. Another 
is a common interest in certain asset prices, such as bond prices and interest rates. Here 
the difference in focus shows up again: macroeconomists are interested in policy issues and 
effects on the real economy while financial economists are interested in the market picture as 
a whole and price determination. Finance also provides an excellent laboratory for a number 
of other fields within economics through its huge database. Examples are economics of 
regulation and economics of information. Financial data are also frequently used for the 
measurement of unobservables, such as expectations about inflation, interest rates and earn-
ings, which are of importance to economics and the economy in general18. And finally there 
are the empirical anomalies in finance which cast doubt on rational behavior and efficient 
17 The notion of absence of arbitrage can be traced back to the Marshallian tradition in economics.
18 A famous example is the market in frozen orange juice. The expectations about the weather that are implicit to 

























markets. A famous example of these observed deviations from theoretical benchmarks is the 
so-called January effect: evidence that stock prices rise disproportionally in January (Thaler, 
1987). Much of the impetus that behavioral economics has enjoyed has been fed by finance 
data.
Of more recent date are John Campbell’s remarks about the New Palgrave Dictionary of 
Money and Finance (1994). His starting point is interesting in this context: why a separate 
Palgrave for money and finance besides the familiar one on economics, which dates back 
to the 1890s? Obviously there are commercial reasons given the size and importance of 
the financial services industry. But the question remains whether financial (and monetary) 
economics are somehow different from economics in general. Campbell points at the history 
of finance, developing from an obscure, lowly regarded subfield of postwar economics into 
a prominent, highly visible field with its fair share of Nobel accolades. Despite the contri-
butions of “general” economists (for example Modigliani, Tobin, and Samuelson) modern 
finance has developed itself somewhat independently of the rest of economics. Campbell 
cites the distinct literatures on rational expectations in macroeconomics and finance as a case 
in point. Ross’ arbitrage argument plays an important role in the distinctness of the two as 
well. But, like Gibbons, Campbell also argues that finance has been particularly successful in 
employing broader economic concepts: equilibrium theorizing in theoretical asset pricing, 
econometrics in empirical asset pricing, and game theory, agency theory, and information 
economics in corporate finance. As such, there is enough coherence and substance in finan-
cial economics to justify a separate standing (and thus a separate Palgrave).
Peter Bernstein has authored a couple of books (1992, 2007) about the subject. In his 1992 
book he describes the coming about of the main theories in academic finance, what he calls 
the “Capital Ideas”, and the enormous impact they had on the practice of financial mar-
kets19. Bernstein told the story of finance, growing from a descriptive, institutional discipline 
into a formalistic, quantitative one fueled by the breakthrough contributions provided by 
Markowitz, Tobin, Modigliani, Miller, Samuelson Sharpe, Fama, Black, Scholes, Merton, 
and others. In his 2007 follow-up book, Bernstein argued that these “Capital Ideas” still 
form the heart and soul of finance. Current research in finance is still mostly concerned with 
some form of application of those core theories. 
Merton Miller has reflected (1999a, 1999b) on the history of finance as well. He sees a 
difference in perspective between finance and economics. Finance has a “micro-normative” 
19 The latter is in itself interesting since it relates to the performativity issue of financial economics, as most 
extensively treated by Donald MacKenzie (2006). This issue is extensively treated in chapter 6, containing a 







approach, which he traces back to the business school roots which finance has20. Economics, 
on the other hand, uses a “macro-normative” approach. Miller also confirms the change 
that Bernstein described from descriptive and institutional to formalistic and quantitative. 
He adds that “the typical paper in the Journal of Finance consists of two sections: the first 
presenting the model, the second an empirical part with real-world data which are usually 
consistent with the model” (which, in his opinion, is not surprising because had that not 
been the case, the author would not have submitted the paper in the first place, and the 
editors would never have accepted the article for publication!) (ibid.). He later adds that 
“the profession, from the outset, wholeheartedly adopted the Friedman positivist view: 
that what counts is not the literal accuracy of the assumptions, but the predictions of the 
model” (ibid.). This Friedman positivist view (see Friedman, 1953) translates in a primary 
concern with testable hypotheses (see for example Fama, 1998). However, the same is true 
for economics, in his opinion.
The claim that finance is characterized by positivism is also made by Sheila Dow (2016) 
although she may not mean the exact same thing with that label21. Predictions rather exist 
than explanations, empirical testing against “facts”, and a formal mathematical represen-
tation can be considered as the staple marks of this methodology (ibid.). She adds that 
behavioral finance is no different in this regard than neoclassical finance.
The point of departure for Paul Harrison (1997) is economics in general. He argues that 
arbitrage was the crucial concept that allowed economics to revolutionize finance. But it also 
ensured that finance became prominent within economics (and at the same time legitimized 
financial markets both in society and as an interesting research subject). Finance provided 
economics with rigorous methods and hard empirical research and thus became one of the 
pin-up girls of the neoclassical paradigm.
Based on the above there appears to be some general agreement about what finance is about 
and in what sense it differs from economics in general:
1) Finance focuses on the micro-level analysis of financial markets in a broad sense: it is 
mostly concerned with markets and firms, not with aggregate entities or individual 
behavior. Economics, on the contrary, uses more of a macro approach, even when the 
same subjects are analyzed, such as a particular financial market, or the same concepts are 
used, for example rational expectations.
20 Miller himself was at the University of Chicago’s Graduate Business School.
21 Friedman’s 1953 paper “The Methodology of Positive Economics”, popularly known as F53, has been and 
probably still is the most hotly debated paper ever written on economic methodology. Many varying interpre-

























2) Finance can be characterized as a thoroughly positivist discipline in the sense that testing 
of hypotheses and meaningful predictions matter; rigorous use of data is basic and theory 
follows. In comparison to economics, finance is more empirically inclined.
3) Finance, like economics, has changed and evolved over time, in particular fueled by a 
handful of major breakthrough contributions. Other methods and approaches have been 
the result.
2.3 researCh desIgn
The Journal of Finance (JoF) is published by the American Finance Association (AFA), which 
describes itself as “the premier academic organization devoted to the study and promotion of 
knowledge about financial economics”. First published in 1946, the JoF has grown into one 
of the most prominent journals in the field of business, finance, and economics. In terms 
of impact factor, it has been ranked consistently in the top ten of any ranking of economics 
journals, both in impact and number of citations. It is by far the highest ranked specialized 
journal. Nowadays six issues per year appear, growing from three editions in its first year of 
publishing.
The sample consists of the entire history of the journal, starting with volume one, issue one, 
form August 1946 running up to volume 72, issue four, August 2017. From each year one 
issue has been surveyed, starting with volume one, issue one from 1946. Next is volume 
two, issue two (1947), then volume three, issue three (1948), etc. There are two reasons 
for using this procedure. First, in this way the papers from the annual meeting of the AFA, 
which appear in a separate issue, are also included in the sample. Since those meetings are 
an important outlet for finance research, it was considered valuable to include these special 
issues. Second, to avoid “seasonal” effects: frequently papers with a similar subject are being 
published in one and the same edition. In total seventy-two years were covered, comprising 
873 papers.
In order to categorize the papers according to subject, the JoF’s own categorization, which 
corresponds to the familiar household Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) classification, 
has been followed as much as possible. Between 1978 and 1999 the JoF published the 
distribution of sent and accepted papers among subjects in the annual report of the editor22. 







To complicate matters, this classification has been changed on at least five occasions. The one 
from 199923 was used in the sample. The five main categories are:
- Global Financial Markets, which includes asset pricing, derivatives pricing, information 
and market efficiency, investor behavior and market microstructure;
- Corporate Finance & Governance, which includes capital budgeting and investment 
policy, financing policy, capital and ownership structure (incl. agency issues), financial 
distress, mergers and acquisitions, and dividend policy;
- Financial Institutions, which includes banking, insurance and other financial institu-
tions and financial intermediation;
- Money and Interest Rates, which includes determination and term structure of interest 
rates, monetary policy and public finance and other macroeconomic and policy aspects 
of financial markets;
- Other, including academic institutions, academic publishing and academic education.
This categorization is of course not clear-cut. For example taxes and international finance can 
apply to more than one category. In the sample each paper has been assigned one or more 
tags after which it was assigned to one of the five categories. In the case of the first category, 
Global Financial Markets, the subdivision has also been analyzed, since there appeared some 
significant shifts there over time.
In order to categorize the papers according to approach, two questions were asked. First, is 
the central research question mainly theoretically or mainly empirically inspired? Second, are 
the arguments and evidence mainly theoretical or empirical? Based on the answers to these 
two questions, an article was either categorized as theoretical, empirical or a mixture of both. 
The last category comprises mainly papers that have a strong theoretical component in the 
research question and a strong empirical component in the nature of evidence. Well-known 
exemplars of purely theoretical papers are the ground-breaking papers of Sharpe (1964) 
which lays out the Capital Asset Pricing Model and Jensen & Meckling (1976) on agency 
theory.
Purely empirical are for instance many of the papers of Eugene Fama and Kenneth French 
on asset pricing (e.g. 1992, 1993). Examples of papers which were considered as belonging 
to the mixed category are Lee, Shleifer & Thaler (1991) and Fama (1998).
23 Newer versions of the JEL classification do exist in which Global Financial Markets is changed to General 
Financial Markets. Money and Interest Rates has been removed from the Financial Economics chapter and 

























In categorizing observations were made on specific method: formalistic or not, quantita-
tive or not, theorem proof, statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence, experimental evidence, 
simulation, case study, survey, questionnaire, interviews. 
In order to examine if the results of the JoF analysis carry over to the whole field of finance a 
look has also been taken at the Journal of Financial Economics (JFE). The JFE is the second 
highest ranked finance journal and in itself quite a prominent publication, also ranking 
consistently in the top ten of any ranking of economics journals, both in impact and number 
of citations. The same research procedure has been applied: one issue from each calendar year 
is analyzed in descending order starting with the most recent issue. Note that the sample is 
much smaller: 313 papers in total as compared to 873 for the JoF. The reason is that the JFE 
has only been in existence since 1974 and it publishes more issues per year with in general 
less articles per issue. The results for the JFE are analyzed by themselves and in comparison 
with the JoF for the matching period, i.e. the period between 1974 and 2018.
Finally, it has to be emphasized that epistemic appraisal of the papers itself has no part 
whatsoever in this analysis. Besides the enormous amount of time required to do so for 
almost twelve-hundred papers, this paper is strictly confined to methodology.
2.4 eMPIrICal results subjeCt of researCh
Figure 1 shows the data from the JoF on subject, summarized over five year intervals, in 
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Most striking in the graph is the shift from typical subjects of general economics, money and 
interest rates, towards financial markets and corporate finance. Starting out on the left side 
of the graph, papers on money and interest rates gradually decline from over forty percent 
towards a level of around five percent in 1983 when it stabilizes. In that same time period, 
papers on corporate finance and on financial markets both grow from ten percent to the 
thirty percent range. After 1983, the share of corporate finance & governance stabilizes but 
the share of global financial markets increases even more towards the forty and fifty percent 
range. Contributions on financial institutions remain relatively stable, although in the first 
interval period its share was quite high. This could reflect attention for rebuilding a variety 
of institutions in the immediate post-war era.
What becomes clear from these data is the impact of the major theoretical breakthroughs 
in finance. It is not a stretch to assume that the work of Modigliani and Miller, dating back 
to the late fifties, and the work on agency theory by Jensen & Meckling (and Ross, 197324), 
have spawned an enormous amount of new research and the accompanying publications 
on corporate finance & governance. In the middle 1970s there appears to be a significant 
impetus which may well be attributable to the impact of the Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
JFE paper. Likewise for the area of global financial markets: Markowitz’s work on portfolio 
theory in the fifties, but especially the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) by Sharpe and 
others, and the efficient markets ideas by Fama and others, both in the sixties, followed by 
option pricing theory in the seventies have propelled this area of research to a dominant 
position.
24 There has been some debate about who actually pioneered agency theory. In economics Ross (1973) is often 
acknowledged as the first one to explicitly adress the principal-agent problem. In the same year political 

























Modigliani-Miller Theorem: states that the market value of a company is calculated 
using its earning power and the risk of its underlying assets and is independent of the 
way it finances investments (equity or debt) or distributes dividends. The reason being 
that investors are diversified and make adjustments to accommodate for varying risk 
and return characteristics. Given certain assumptions (most notably efficient markets) 
the implications are twofold:
1) in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and asymmetric information, 
and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is unaffected by how that firm is 
financed.
2) When taxes are present and interest on debt is tax-deductible, using debt actually 
increases the value of the company.
The “M&M” theorem is one of the cornerstones of capital structure and corporate 
finance theory.
Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT): a theory on how risk-averse investors can construct 
portfolios to optimize or maximize expected return based on a given level of market risk, 
emphasizing that risk is an inherent part of higher reward. Based on statistical measures 
such as variance and correlation, an individual investment’s return is less important than 
how the investment behaves in the context of the entire portfolio. Put very simply, MPT 
embodies the idea that one shouldn’t put all one’s eggs in one basket.
Capital Asset Pricing Model: a model (commonly known as CAPM) that describes the 
relationship between the expected return and risk of investing in a security. It shows that 
the expected return on a security is equal to the risk-free return plus a risk premium, 
which is based on the asset beta of that security, i.e. the volatility of the security relative 
to the market as a whole. Put very simply, the model implies that in order to achieve 
higher expected returns on an asset, one should expect more risk. Market efficiency is 
a core assumption.
Efficient Market Hypothesis: the hypothesis that states that asset prices reflect all avail-
able information. A direct implication is that it should be impossible to outperform 
the market consistently and systematically on a risk-adjusted basis since market prices 
should only react to new information. Closely related is the random walk concept: 
market prices evolve according to a random walk (so price changes are random) and 







If one distinguishes within the category global financial markets between asset pricing and 
other subjects the impact of novel theory becomes even more clear: see figure II. “Other 
subjects” includes topics such as market structure, market analysis and investor behavior, 
including tests of market efficiency and rationality.
thus cannot be predicted. In an efficient market prices should follow a random walk. 
However, while a random walk pattern can be seen as evidence for market efficiency, it 
is not a definite proof.
Agency Theory: a principle that is used to explain and resolve issues in the relationship 
between principals and their agents. For instance, the relationship between sharehold-
ers, as principals, and company executive, as agents. Principals delegate decision-making 
authority to agents. Because many decisions that affect the principal financially are 
made by the agent, differences of opinion and even differences in priorities and interests 
can arise, which can lead to conflicts of interest and may induce moral hazard. This 
is sometimes referred to as the principal-agent problem. Agency theory (also called 
Principal Agent Theory) is a core concept in the area of corporate governance, corporate 
finance and the theory of the firm.
Option Pricing Theory: the theory which enables theoretical valuation of options and 
other derivatives using various variables (underlying value, exercise price, volatility, 
interest rate, time to expiration, dividends, etc.). The breakthrough insight of option 
pricing theory is that the value of options and other derivatives is independent of risk 
and return characteristics of the underlying asset. Rather, the value of an option other 
derivative crucially depends on the volatility (standard deviation) of the underlying as-
set. Within Option Pricing Theory there are various models, which can be used for cal-
culation of the value of a particular option or derivative, for instance the Black-Scholes 








































Global Financial Markets subcategories
Asset Pricing Other
Fig.2. Journal of Finance subject 1959-201825 
From the 1960s onwards the share of papers on asset pricing rose steadily to approximately 
two-thirds of the total number of papers within the category global financial markets during 
the 1970s25. Fueled by CAPM, the variety of successors it has spawned, and numerous 
empirical tests on those models, the share of asset pricing contributions peaked during the 
turn of the century, followed by a noticeable drop-off. This drop-off coincides with the rise 
to prominence and recognition of behavioral finance. Most of the behavioral finance papers 
fall in the subcategories investor behavior and market analysis. A final observation can be 
made on a possible impact of the 2008 great financial crisis. The impact of the crisis on 
finance will be discussed more elaborately later on in this chapter, but it would appear that 
the crisis, amongst other things, has resulted in renewed interest in asset pricing. Given the 
fact bubbles in certain asset prices are seen as one of the causes of the crisis, that should not 
come as a surprise.
What about the Journal of Financial Economics? Figure 3 displays the graph for the JFE for 
its entire period of existence, i.e. from 1974 up until 2018.
25 For the sake of clarity, option pricing theory was included in the category of asset pricing . Developed in 1973, 
option pricing theory has been a highlight of theorizing in finance. For a relatively short period there has been 
considerable research interest in it which explains some of the spike in the share of asset pricing. Nowadays 
pure theory of valuation of options has become a specialized and highly quantitative and mathematical en-








In order to compare the two journals, in figure 4 the graph for the JoF is shown for the 
corresponding period 1974-2018.
In both journals the categories corporate finance & governance, and global financial markets 
are dominant. But whereas in the JoF the share of GFM steadily rises with time, initially it 
falls in the JFE at the expense of CFG. This might have been just a matter of division of terri-
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involvement of Michael Jensen with the JFE, having been one of the founders of the journal 
and its managing editor for close to twenty-five years. His work is mainly concerned with 
corporate finance and governance26. The share of papers on financial institutions is compa-
rable, as is the minor share of entries on money and interest rates. 
If we delve a bit deeper inside the categories for the JFE, once again asset pricing, market 
analysis, and corporate finance are the most prominent subcategories, displaying roughly the 
same tendencies through time as the JoF. What is different from the JoF, is the significant 
share in the more recent periods of papers on corporate governance. This is not surprising 
given the increased attention this topic has received in the form of public debates about the 
interests of various stakeholders, sustainable and responsible business, and compensation 
issues. The JFE, specialized on corporate finance and governance, is clearly the preeminent 
academic outlet for these topics.
Some observations can be made. First, the revolutionary developments in theory have clearly 
changed the field and shaped finance’s somewhat distinct identity. The resulting increased 
attention for corporate finance and financial markets has come at the detriment of tradi-
tional economics. Moreover, the breadth of the range of subjects has changed dramatically 
as well. In the early days one could find papers on disarmament, post-war reconstruction, 
urban development, real estate, even philanthropy. Much of the work was explicitly relevant 
to economic policy making. The macro and welfare perspectives have given way to micro 
analysis. Nowadays it is about specific markets or asset categories, compensation, tax and 
dividend issues, or even narrower, about isolated phenomena such as the (in)famous anoma-
lies. That is not to say that finance has removed itself further from economic reality. Rather 
it is concerned with a different, and perhaps narrower, part of economic reality. Academic 
finance has not been an isolated intellectual endeavor, but has clearly been shaped by the 
world out there, from thinking about the challenges for the financial system that the world 
faced after WW II, to the questions that society poses more recently, for instance with regard 
to governance.
The great financial crisis can be regarded as a gamechanger in the financial markets: an 
event which affected and altered thinking on financial markets as well as establishing and 
providing a set of new, unique data. Below is plotted how the division of subjects developed 
in three year intervals in the period 1997-2017, i.e. ten years before the crisis started and 
ten years onwards.







The impact of the crisis appears to become somewhat visible in the JoF from 2011 onwards. 
Since then every journal from the analyzed sample contains crisis-related articles. Given that 
the average time between acceptance and publication for the JoF is almost twenty months 
(Holden, 2017), that’s is not surprising. Regarding the subject categories some renewed 
interest in the categories FI and MI is visible since the crisis, mostly at the expense of CFG.
In the JFE crisis-related articles appear a year earlier, in 2010. That corresponds to the average 
time between acceptance and publication for the JFE of almost ten months (Holden, 2017). 
From 2010 onwards, a large majority of the journals from the analyzed sample contain 
crisis-related articles, the first one being a special issue entirely devoted to the crisis (Vol. 
97:3 “The 2007-8 financial crisis: Lessons from corporate finance”, dated September 2010).
In the JFE initially there is also some additional attention for the categories FI and MI, 
though less pronounced than in the JoF and subsiding recently. One could conjecture that 
the fallout of the financial crisis on the economy (and economics) at large has given rise 
to this renewed attention for the categories FI and MI, which relate more to economics in 
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Fig. 6. Journal of Financial Economics subject 1997-2017
2.5 eMPIrICal results researCh aPProaCh
Below in figure 7 are the data on the approach used towards the various subjects, again 
























Most striking in this graph is the rise in theoretical work in the late sixties, seventies up 
until the middle eighties. The early majority of empirical inquiry gives way to a majority of 
theoretical research, only to become dominant again at the end of the 1980s. Once again 
the consequences of the major theoretical breakthroughs can be inferred. In particular the 
formal, mathematical approach, initiated by Markowitz in the 1950s, picking up steam 
with all the groundbreaking work on CAPM by Sharpe, Lintner, Mossin, and Treynor, 
culminating in the development of Option Pricing Theory by Black, Scholes, and Merton. 
In contrast, the Modigliani-Miller propositions on capital structure and the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis lend themselves better to empirical investigation. The formal and mathematical 
approach spurred on theoretical research until the late 1980s. What happened after that was 
not that the theory was simply finished, although there is a good case to be made that the 
major theories developed in the 1960s and 1970s still form the backbone of finance (see 
Bernstein, 2007). But besides that, it was the proliferation of information technology and 
computers which made both gathering and analyzing data so much easier, thus stimulating 
empirical work and methods like bootstrapping and (Monte Carlo-)simulation.
Today’s empirical work is vastly different from that of the late 1950s, 1960s and even early 
1970s. Whereas the current strand consists for the overwhelming majority part of statistical 
data analysis, going back in time from 1980 we find more and more varying and non-
quantitative forms. Empirical research in those days used a host of different methods to 
provide arguments: anecdotal and historical evidence, case studies and illustrative examples, 
surveys, questionnaires and interviews, and plain verbal logic. These methods are of course 
familiar to other social sciences. Today’s empirical work is predominantly statistical with 
some occasional experimental research.
As far as theoretical work goes, a distinction can also be drawn, but it is less pronounced. 
Up until the middle 1970s non-formalistic theoretical papers show up occasionally. There 
is also made use of geometry in the form of graphs in the Marshallian fashion, for instance 
in Jensen & Meckling (1976). After that period, but also overlapping, we can distinguish 
between a brand using axioms, lemmas, and theorem proof (e.g. Merton, 1973) and a form 
of model building using simulation which often is game theoretical by nature (e.g. Gross-
man & Stiglitz, 1977).
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Fig. 9. Journal of Finance approach 1974-2018
As far as approach goes, the shift from theoretically inclined to empirically inclined work 
is even more pronounced in the JFE than in the JoF. The JFE in general seems to be more 
empirically oriented which shows not only in a higher percentage of purely empirical work 
but also in a larger number for mixed papers. This may be partly attributable to the JFE’s 








Did the crisis have an impact on the approach contributors to these two journals employ? 
Like it was done for the subject categories the two following graphs display the type of 
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Besides a slight dip in the percentage of empirical work around the time of the crisis, there 
do not appear to be significant changes in the approach taken by both contributors to the 
JoF and the JFE. It was however noticeable in the editions used in the sample, in particular 
within the JFE sample, that since the crisis within the empirical part other methods than 
the traditional statistical data analysis show up more. Examples of what may be deemed 
historical (Calomiris & Carlson, 2016), sociological (Tahoun, 2014) and institutionalist 
(Eun, Wang, & Xiao, 2015) approaches were found.
The shift from theoretical to empirical work is not unique to finance. Kim, Morse, and 
Zingales (2006) try to map what has impacted economics in general between 1970 and 
1999 by taking the most cited articles and then identify field, author, institution, and type 
of contribution. The last item is particularly interesting in this context. They report a steadily 
falling amount of theoretical contributions from over 75 % in the 1970-1974 interval to a 
little more than 10 percent in the period between 1995-1999. At the same time empirical 
work rises from some 10 % in the 1970s to 60 % by the end of the millennium. And more 
recently Backhouse & Cherrier (2017) conjectured a shift towards applied work in general 
economics at the expense of theoretical work form the 1970s onward. Others have also 
noted the so-called “empirical turn” in economics (see for instance Davis, 2019b). That 
would match the findings in this chapter.  
Assessing the type of claim being made (prescriptive, descriptive, normative, explanatory, 
predictive, etc.) was problematic. That shouldn’t come as a surprise since the aims of social 
scientists are plural and it is often not possible to draw a clear-cut line between those various 
aims27. A few observations can be made though. Most claims can at the least be characterized 
as explanatory. A typical empirical paper where a hypothesis is formulated, data are analyzed 
and the significance, statistical and economic, is determined, is saying something about 
the past. It shows ex-post how X was related to Y. In many cases the result is then used to 
postulate the relation as relevant for the future. So in such cases we can add “predictive” as 
a characteristic. The importance of predictions as outcome of academic research has been 
mentioned earlier as a hallmark characteristic of finance. But the predictions are usually 
non-quantitative28. Still, the typical modern empirical finance paper makes explanatory and 
qualitatively predictive claims.
Older empirical work from the 1950s and 1960s was quite different, as was explained above. 
Institutional finance, as it was called, made use of qualitative methods in addition to the 
27 See Reiss (2009) for an extensive treatment.







quantitative ones, which were much less sophisticated anyway29. The lack of “hard numbers” 
led to a different kind of argumentation and a different type of claims being made. Explana-
tion is again present but here it is often accompanied by description instead of prescription. 
And in the case where the analysis was concerned with policy making this would often 
translate in a kind of normative claim as well.
Theoretical papers were also deemed mostly explanatory: a stylized representation of an 
assumed causal relation between certain variables. Sometimes predictions are derived, but 
these generally have a normative character since a theory is usually constrained by assump-
tions. So, a typical theoretical paper in finance can be deemed to make explanatory and 
normative claims.
2.6 ValIdIty and robustness
There are at least two question marks to be put behind an exercise such as performed above. 
First, an analysis like this has some degree of subjectivity. The author has made the call on 
how to categorize and how to characterize a total of 1186 papers with wide-ranging subjects, 
spanning more than seventy years. Second, like in any sample the question has to be asked 
if it is a representative one.
As I see it, an advantage of the approach taken in this chapter is that it is not solely interpre-
tation30. The assignment of papers in the sample to categories according to subject matches 
well for the period between 1978 and 1999 when the JoF published the distribution of 
received and published papers according to JEL categories in its annual report of the editor. 
These numbers and the numbers of the sample compare quite well to each other. However, 
there will remain some overlap and grey areas between categories. This is also acknowledged 
by studies on impact and citations (see Arnold et al., 2003, Kim, Morse, and Zingales, 2006, 
Keloharju, 2008).
Regarding the assessment of papers as theoretical or empirical, two questions were asked: one 
about the approach taken towards the central research question, and one about the nature 
of the arguments provided. Of course, deep down, all research, at least in the social sci-
29 As indicated earlier in this chapter, there are signs that a kind of institutional finance, or heterodoxy in general, 
is on the rise again.
30 In the recent literature on the use of quantitative analysis in methodology and history of economics, most 
contributors advocate quantitative analysis next to and in addition to qualitative approaches (Düppe & Wein-
traub, 2018, Edwards Giraud & Schinckus, 2018, Cherrier & Svorenčík, 2018, Jovanovic, 2018). Jovanovic’s 


























ences, starts with the goal of saying something about a phenomenon, and is thus empirically 
grounded. But there is a big difference between data analysis and axiom building. Sometimes 
the demarcation is less clear cut, reason why some articles are classified as mixed. In other 
cases either the theoretical or the empirical part clearly dominates31. Fortunately, the authors 
themselves indicate frequently if theirs is a theoretical or an empirical paper. Kim, Morse, 
and Zingales (2006) use a similar approach, basing their judgment on “the authors’ collec-
tive familiarity with the articles or a quick reading”. 
Two issues need to be addressed here, regarding representativeness. First, is the sample 
representative of the population, i.e. all JoF and JFE articles? Second, are the JoF and JFE 
representative for the bulk of finance research? The sample consists of about twenty percent 
of all JoF articles since 1946, and slightly less than fifteen percent of all JFE articles since 
1974. Moreover, the problem of clustered articles on the same subject in one issue was 
addressed by summing up over longer intervals of five years which accidently is the same 
interval length that Kim, Morse and Zingales (2006) use. Finally, the correspondence of the 
distribution of subjects between the sample and the JoF’s own data between 1978 and 1999 
suggests that at least for that time period the sample provides an accurate picture.
Regarding the second issue – representativeness of the JoF and JFE –,  a caveat is in order. 
Financial economists have also published in general economic journals, producing research 
of broader economic interest. Examples are Black and Scholes seminal 1973 paper which 
was published in the Journal of Political Economy and Modigliani-Miller 1958, published 
in the American Economic Review. The results of the studies of Arnold et al. (2003, and 
Keloharju (2008) are useful in this regard. Arnold et al. (2003) find that, while a significant 
amount of the most highly cited papers in finance has come from non-finance journals like 
the American Economic Review, Econometrica, and the Journal of Political Economy, “the 
JoF and JFE have unambiguously had the most impact on finance research”. Keloharju 
(2008) reaches a similar conclusion.
2.7 dIsCussIon
Back in paragraph 2.2 three characteristics of finance, in relation to economics in general, 
were formulated: 1) focus on micro-level analysis in finance, 2) “positivism” and 3) de-
velopment through time fueled by breakthrough theorizing. How do the empirical results 
measure up? The first observation was concerned with the level of analysis. It would indeed 
seem that most attention has been increasingly directed toward market and firm behavior, 
31 Good examples here are the two seminal papers on option pricing. Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) 







looking at the dominance of the categories Global Financial Markets, and the subcategories 
market analysis and asset pricing in particular, and Corporate Finance & Governance. But 
it is also clear that this hasn’t always been the case. The focus of analysis in finance, at 
least in the journals analyzed here, has gradually moved through time towards an increasing 
micro-perspective. Originally macro issues, such as public policy and welfare implications, 
were high on the research agenda. Moreover, such issues were typically of a more economic 
nature: monetary policy, public finance, fiscal policy. When the focus became narrower, the 
subjects were to a large extent lost or migrated to other branches of economics. 
So Summers’ complaint that finance is not concerned (anymore) with the bigger picture and 
issues seems to have substance. Ross, Campbell, and Miller have made a similar assessment 
but for them it is simply a natural consequence of the progress made in finance. An impor-
tant part, maybe the most important part, of that progress has been the development of the 
hallmark finance theories: Modern Portfolio Theory, the Modigliani-Miller propositions, 
CAPM, Efficient Market Hypothesis, Agency theory, Option Pricing Theory. Indeed, the 
impact of these major theoretical breakthroughs is clearly visible in the analysis.
Of course something has changed since the time of Summers’ remarks, but it has not been a 
move back towards the grander issues of the olden days. The advent of behavioral economics 
has brought a strand of research in finance where the focus of analysis is even narrower. In-
stead of aggregates such as markets and firms in behavioral finance the emphasis has turned 
towards the behavior of individual agents. In the graph this can be tracked by the rising share 
of papers on market analysis and on investor behavior. Since the debate between neoclassical 
and behavioral finance is far from settled, there is no telling what the future will look like.  
The narrowing of focus is also visible in the rise of the amount of applied, empirical work, 
as mentioned by Bernstein (2007). He suggests that the core body of theory, dating back to 
the 1960s and 1970s, still forms a fundament in finance. Today’s research, both in academia 
and on Wall Street, therefore is aimed at looking at the fringes of established theory in the 
quest to find something new and interesting. That includes possible behavioral biases but 
also institutional issues such as inefficiencies arising from transaction costs and liquidity 
constraints.
That leads to a second observation. The analysis of hard price data indeed has a very 
important place in modern finance. Summers’ suggestion in that direction was only the 
beginning; the move has proliferated since 1985, as can be seen in the graphs. This has 
led to a bottom-up approach in finance as suggested by Ross and Campbell: first check 
the data, then work out the theory. The word “theory” may have become an inappropriate 

























and behavioral, states a hypothesis which is then checked by the data32. This approach can 
lead to an ad-hoc character of the hypotheses. Indeed, Fama (1998) condemns much of the 
criticism on established finance theory for this reason. It takes a theory to beat a theory, he 
says, not a loose collection of observations and anomalies.
The abundance of available data has been frequently mentioned as an advantage that finance 
researchers enjoy over other economists. Indeed, if a comparison is made between the results 
here and those of Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2006) similar patterns show up in the type 
of contribution. The numbers differ however: finance has always been more empirically 
oriented than economics in general (with perhaps some exceptions such as economic history 
and labor economics)33. But there is a drawback to all that empirical work: the danger of 
data-snooping. In other words, if one looks carefully he or she may find data on a specific 
market in a specific market to match any hypothesis about prices and/or market behavior 
(see Lo & MacKinlay, 1998). Especially when the level of detail in the analysis increases 
more and more, this may lead to trivial and meaningless results.
So finance can indeed be regarded as a positivist discipline in that it occupies itself with 
testing, rigorous or not. What about that other trait of Friedman inspired positivism: 
meaningful predictions? It was mentioned above that these predictions were overwhelmingly 
qualitative in the sense that no precise numbers are predicted but rather a tendency or a 
cause-effect relation. But shouldn’t one expect from research on financial markets that it 
leads to a form of forecasts which can then be used in the market itself and found valid or 
not34? This is what McCloskey (1990), tongue-in-cheek, calls the “ultimate persuasive test” 
for a theory. Predictions in such sense are very rare, at least in the sample. It must be said 
that much of this kind of research does address the question whether the results are not only 
statistically but also economically significant, i.e. the monetary effect is checked. But hardly 
ever is an author tempted to postulate that money can be made on the basis of his hypothesis 
or model35. That also applies to those who do not take market efficiency for granted, such 
as many behavioral economists. So what is actually done is back-testing: testing a predictive 
model on historical data. Back-testing is common practice in the real world of money and 
investment management, but there successful back-testing usually leads to implementation. 
In the academic arena there is apparently less place or interest for this ultimate test of reality: 
real-life application of predictive models.
32 Which is slightly different from Miller’s assertion of a typical JoF paper; see paragraph 2.2.
33 Keloharju (2008) finds that the most-cited papers in finance show a larger percentage of empirical contribu-
tions, compared to the numbers of Kim, Morse, and Zingales.
34 De Scheemaekere (2009) treats this issue in a somewhat philosophical manner.
35 Many finance scholars do have links to, or are themselves active in professional money management. Their 







The second observation, “positivism” then seems to have been confirmed, with qualifica-
tions, by the analysis. But also in this case things have been different in the past. After WW 
II, finance had a distinct institutional flavor, the analysis being broader, more qualitative 
and descriptive, using a whole range of methods of the social sciences. Then in the 1960s 
the formalization and quantification of finance took place bringing about the present ortho-
doxy.36 Formal theory and quantitative empirical testing of that theory took center stage. 
This fundamental change is also documented in a paper in the JoF by Robert Kavesh: “(D)
isciplines change, new thinking evolves, controversies flair. In finance one can almost sense 
the shifts by leafing through the volumes. The early years were filled with descriptive articles, 
with a heavy “institutional” flavor—largely reflecting the type of research being carried out 
in those days” (Kavesh, 1970). Kavesh’s article includes an exchange from 1967 between 
old-school financial economist Harry Sauvain and a new-school financial economist J. Fred 
Weston. Both emphasize that there ought to be space in finance for both the mathematical 
model-building approach and the institutionalist perspective. It turned out otherwise, al-
though, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, recently there have been some signs of renewed 
room for institutionalism and heterodoxy.
In the 1980s finance really developed into the modern version, facilitated by the growth of 
information technology and computing power, enabling easier and more extensive gather-
ing, treatment and analysis of data. Theoretical work took a backstage position again com-
pared to empirical work. Harrison (1997) has noted this as well: “The pace of innovation 
in finance, for instance, seems to have slowed and the new sparks now come more from the 
tinder of inductive observation than from deductive “core” theorizing”. Again, this move-
ment is not unlike what might have happened in economics at large. Davis (2019a) raises 
the question if, as a result of increased specialization and fragmentation within economics, 
the field has become increasingly data-driven and more agnostic about underlying theory. 
While that might be regarded as a undesirable “less-scientific” development, it might also 
have led to creating a bit more space for heterodoxy, for instance behavioral, experimental, 
institutional, and evolutionary elements. So indeed a lot has changed in finance over time 
as was suggested.
2.8 ConCludIng reMarks
The major findings were a shift in the subjects of the writings over time and two major 
changes in approach. The former can be categorized best as a narrowing of the scope of 
analysis. From a broad, descriptive, qualitative perspective, the analysis has become ever 

























more focused, first towards market and firm behavior and now increasingly towards behavior 
of agents and single phenomena. The first move can for a large part be attributed to the 
development of groundbreaking theory in the 1960s and 1970s, which enabled a more 
precise and detailed analysis. The second move was due to the firm embedding of that theory 
and the increasing availability of ever more fine grained data and ways of working with those 
data. There have been no such spectacular advances in theory since the 1980s. Researchers 
were led to a more applied, empirical approach, working on the periphery of that established 
theory, looking with ever more detail to certain assumptions, institutions, anomalies, etc.
In terms of “Big-M Methodology” one could regard the first move as the establishment 
of a Lakatosian hardcore, followed up by increasing work in the protective belt (see also 
Harrison, 1997, for a similar line of thought). Lakatos’ idea was that the identity of an 
individual research program could be understood in terms of core and periphery elements, 
where the former is stable and relatively unchanging and the latter is adjusted to accommo-
date explanations of phenomena in terms of that set of core elements. Inspired by the work 
from and on Lakatos, Davis (2008, 2019a) has attempted to apply this idea to specific fields 
and disciplines, economics in particular, and it appears to be applicable to finance as well.
The changes in approach cannot be seen separate from the developments described above. 
In fact it is quite conceivable that the changes in approach have enabled the breakthrough 
theoretical work in the first place. Two things stand out. First, there is formalization and 
quantification which takes place in the 1950s and 1960s leading to the development of 
that hardcore body of theory. It is the rise of the mathematical model-building approach 
in economics that made the development possible of modern portfolio theory in 1952 (see 
also Kavesh, 1970). The Modigliani-Miller propositions, while not so much the product 
of a quantitative approach, were the result of rigorous formal logic. On these two pillars 
the remainder of the body of main theories in finance was built. Second, there are the 
technological advances of the middle 1980s that propelled the rise of empirical data analysis. 
This gave rise to a frenzy of testing and inspection of ever more detailed cases; in other words, 
an increasingly micro-oriented perspective. To use the terminology of big-M Methodology 
again, it is these two changes in approach that can be labeled as the true scientific revolutions 
in finance.
How do these developments compare to economics in general? Is finance profoundly dif-
ferent from economics? Milton Friedman appeared to think so in the 1950s when he said 
he had problems with granting Harry Markowitz his PhD in economics, stating during the 
defense that his work was “not economics, not mathematics, not even business science!”37 It 
37 Transcript interview with Harry Markowitz. Jacob Marschak, Markowitz’s thesis advisor subsequently added: 







is evident that the fields are linked. Finance came relatively late to the wave of formalization 
in economics, but when it did, it used those tools well. Arguably, the various asset pricing 
models are the most practically relevant applications of equilibrium theorizing that can be 
found in economics. Nowhere is econometrics used more than in applied, empirical work in 
finance. On the other hand, finance may have led the way with its micro-focus38. Fueled by 
game theory and experimental work, today economics also engages more and more in the 
kind of detailed applied work that has characterized finance for a while. Finance, Harrison 
(1997) writes,  “has become the “proving ground” for new price theory and econometric 
technique. Innovations in finance found their way back to the “rest” of economics,  in 
particular statistical and computer techniques”.
Finance may also provide some insights for a more pluralist type of economics (Davis, 2007, 
2008). While the core of finance is arguably staunchly neoclassical, the field has incorporated 
somewhat heterodox strands of thoughts, such as agency theory and behavioral economics. 
In fact, these hardly can be labeled heterodox anymore in this context and have more or less 
become part of the hardcore. One of the striking advantages that finance perhaps enjoys over 
economics in general is the incredibly strong monetary incentives that are provided by the 
financial markets. Given that proximity of theory and practice and the empirical prowess 
of finance, it is quite conceivable that finance will function as a battle ground for new ideas 
again.
38 Take for instance the clearly related ideas of the Efficient Market Hypothesis and rational expectations: Fama 
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Chapter 3
Putting your Money where your Mouth is: Neoclassical 
and Behavioral Investment Management
This chapter explores one of the main divides in thinking about financial 
markets: do financial markets behave in a more or less efficient manner 
which would imply that excess returns are unachievable in the long 
run, or are there systematic and enduring deviations which can be 
exploited to provide superior returns? Some of the leading protagonists 
on both sides of this debate happen to be involved in professional asset 
management operations. The real-world performance of these operations 
is compared in terms of risk and return in order to provide a new 



























Two streams of thought dominate the thinking on how financial markets function. On the 
one hand there are those who adhere to some form of the Efficient Market Hypothesis: 
prices respond to available information and the resulting price is the best current estimate 
of the “right” price. The implication is that, in the long run, no excess returns can be made 
without taking on a corresponding risk; in other words, there are no persisting free lunches 
in financial markets. On the other hand there are those that believe that systematic and 
enduring deviations from market efficiency exist which can be exploited: the market can be 
beaten.
Both parties have extensive empirical support to back up their claims and counterarguments 
towards one another. Ironically, the abundance of data in financial markets and the ways to 
deal with those data (Lo & MacKinlay, 2001) are such that perfectly legitimate evidence 
can be found on both sides. Indeed, finance has always been proud of its empirical prowess: 
nowhere in economics are theories and models tested so thoroughly thanks to the prolific 
amount of data that the financial markets provide.
This chapter presents a different kind of empirical analysis. Deirdre McCloskey (1989) once 
posed what she labelled as “The American Question” to economists: “If you’re so smart, why 
ain’t you rich?” According to McCloskey, the one ultimate persuasive test for an economic 
theory claiming to predict the future is whether there is money to be made with it39. For 
financial economics the obvious place to take that test is the financial market which has 
provided the input on which the various ideas about price information in such markets is 
based.
What follows is a comparison of the actual performance of a set of mutual funds from 
asset management firms with strong connections to leading academic figures in neoclassical 
and behavioral finance. The analysis presented here does not pretend to come to a final 
verdict on who’s right and who’s wrong with regard to market efficiency and asset pricing 
models. Actually, I believe both can be reconciled, which will be argued in the next chapter. 
Necessarily the sample only exists of four funds; meaningful comparisons with more funds 
was not achievable because of a lack of other comparable funds. Also, varying microfounda-
tions and underlying ontological commitments of behavioral and neoclassical finance are 
not explored. Rather, it is an investigation of what difference, if any, in actual practice is 
observable, resulting from the two different approaches. In addition it might be possible to 
infer if there is any added value coming from strong academic pedigree.








There have been related studies. The investment professional Larry Swedroe published a 
short article in 2015 comparing the results of the same funds, solely focusing on returns. The 
analysis here is more elaborate and also focuses on risk, besides return. In 2008 Wright, Ba-
nerjee and Boney published an article called “Behavioral Finance: Are the disciples profiting 
from the doctrine?”, where they examine fourteen self-proclaimed behavioral funds. Their 
focus was not solely on performance but also on how much capital behaviorally inspired 
funds attract, compared to “regular” funds. In that way they hoped to be able to infer if 
behaviorally inspired investing really adds value or if the “behavioral” label helps to attract 
investment capital, i.e. that it has marketing value. The analysis here can be considered 
complementary to the study of Wright et al.
3.2 researCh desIgn
Involvement of economists in financial markets can be traced back to classical economists 
like Richard Cantillon and David Ricardo, running through Maynard Keynes and Irving 
Fisher (Raines & Leathers, 2000) to Fischer Black, Michael Jensen, Myron Scholes and Rob-
ert C. Merton Ricardo started working as a stockbroker and did well in the bond markets 
while Cantillon was a banker and managed to make money on one of the most notorious 
investment disasters in history: the South Sea Bubble. Maynard Keynes, never one with a 
firm belief in the importance of financial markets and the efficient working of those markets, 
still was an active investor whose fortunes varied. Fisher, finally, was financially ruined by 
the Great Depression of the thirties (Blaug, 1997). Both Keynes and Fischer managed large 
funds for their universities.
Nowadays that is still the case: some of the main protagonists on both sides of the neoclassical-
behavioral debate happen to be involved in professional investment management operations. 
2013 Nobel laureate Eugene Fama, one of the fathers of the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(Fama, 1965, 1970,1998) and Kenneth French, who together with Fama has provided vari-
ous ground-breaking contributions to asset pricing (Fama & French, 1992, 1993), sit on 
the board of Dimensional Fund Advisers (DFA) which as of June 30, 2018 manages $582 
billion in assets (September 30, 2010: $187.9 billion in assets under management (AuM)). 
Affiliated at some point in one way or another have been Robert Merton, Myron Scholes, 
Merton Miller, George Constantinides, Roger Ibbotson and John Gould. All of these are 
or were amongst the most distinguished scholars in the field of finance (including three 
more Nobel laureates in Miller, Merton and Scholes), coming from institutions like the 
University of Chicago, Harvard, Stanford and Yale. DFA’s links to the University of Chicago, 

























million by DFA co-founder and long-time executive David G. Booth, the business school 
was named after him: University of Chicago Booth School of Business.
DFA’s investment philosophy can clearly be labelled neoclassical:
At Dimensional, our investment approach is based on a belief in markets. Rather than 
relying on futile forecasting or trying to outguess others, we draw information about 
expected returns from the market itself—letting the collective knowledge of its millions 
of buyers and sellers set security prices.
Letting markets do what they do best—drive information into prices—frees us to spend 
time where we believe we have an advantage, namely in how we interpret the research, 
how we design and manage portfolios, and how we service our clients. It means we take 
a less subjective, more systematic approach to investing—an approach we can implement 
consistently and investors can understand and stick with, even in challenging market 
environments. 
The means by which this philosophy is implemented are multiple-factor models, based on a 
version of the multiple-factor models developed by Fama and French (e.g. 1992, 1996). The 
models can be regarded as a variation of William Sharpe’s single factor Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) (Sharpe 1964, but also Lintner, Treynor, Black)40. Factors in addition to 
the CAPM beta, can be historic excess returns of smaller cap stocks over larger caps stocks 
and the historic excess returns of value stocks over growth stocks. Given its investment 
philosophy and investment process, it is no stretch to label DFA a neoclassical investment 
management firm.
Looking at the behavioral side of the spectrum provides interesting asset/investment man-
agement operations as well. 2017 Nobel laureate Richard Thaler, also from University of 
Chicago (though definitely not a Chicago School economist) and perhaps currently the 
best-known behavioral economist, is on the board of the firm he co-founded in 1993 and 
which bears his name: Fuller & Thaler Asset Management. Not only has Thaler been on 
the forefront of the behavioral challenge to the dominant paradigm of efficient markets 
academically (e.g. De Bondt & Thaler, 198441, Barberis & Thaler, 2003) but he has also 
played a leading role in popularizing behavioral economics outside academic circles with his 
book “Nudge” (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008). Daniel Kahnemann from Princeton, 2002 Nobel 
laureate and the pioneering figure of behavioral economics together with Amos Tversky 
40 Although one could argue that multifactor models are “less neoclassical” than CAPM because by adding factors 
apparently not all information was priced in in CAPM. 







(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), is on the board of Fuller & Thaler as well, while prominent 
behavioral economics and finance scholar Nicholas Barberis from Yale has been a member of 
the academic advisory panel. The firm has as of June 30 2018 in excess of $9 billion in asset 
under management, having grown impressively (September 30, 2010: approximately $1 bil-
lion in AuM). Its philosophy becomes quite clear on the webpage. On the front page it says:
Investors Make Mistakes. We Look For Them. At the individual stock level, we search for 
events that suggest investor misbehavior.
Founded in 1993, Fuller & Thaler Asset Management has pioneered the application of 
behavioral finance in investment management.
Primarily focused on U.S. small-cap equities, our strategies have historically delivered 
exceptional results. More importantly, our process differs significantly from traditional 
equity managers.
We believe our unique perspective and unconventional approach can provide meaning-
ful diversification to our mutual fund and separate account clients.
More specifically Fuller & Thaler appears to look for investors’ behavioral biases that may 
cause the market to overreact to old, negative information about a company and underreact 
to new, positive information. The premise is that markets frequently overreact and under-
react (cf. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). Underreaction occurs when a positive event 
for an asset, such an earnings surprise, is not immediately and fully priced in but rather 
gradually within a couple of months. In other words, positive news signals outperformance 
in the short term after the announcement. Overreaction is displayed in that companies that 
have made sequential negative announcements in the past tend to be undervalued while 
companies which have a good track record can be overvalued.
There is also LSV Asset Management where LSV is an acronym for Josef Lakonishok (Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign), Andrei Shleifer (Harvard University) and Robert 
Vishny (University of Chicago). All three of them have been leading scholars, in particular 
with regard to behavioral finance (Lakonishok, Shleifer & Vishny, 1992, Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). LSV was founded in 1994 and currently manages approximately $118 billion in 
assets under management (September 30, 2010: approximately $59 billion in AuM). Lakon-
ishok is still active in managing the funds while Shleifer and Vishny have retired from the 

























The fundamental premise on which our investment philosophy is based is that superior 
long-term results can be achieved by systematically exploiting the judgmental biases and 
behavioral weaknesses that influence the decisions of many investors. These include: 
the tendency to extrapolate the past too far into the future, to wrongly equate a good 
company with a good investment irrespective of price, to ignore statistical evidence and 
to develop a “mindset” about a company.
LSV uses a quantitative investment model in what would be considered a bottom-up 
approach to choose out-of-favor (undervalued) stocks in the marketplace at the time of 
purchase and have potential for near-term appreciation. LSV believes that these out-of-
favor securities will produce superior future returns if their future growth exceeds the 
market’s low expectations.
The competitive strength of this strategy is that it avoids introducing the process to any 
judgmental biases and behavioral weaknesses that often influence investment decisions.
LSV uses a proprietary asset pricing model but their investment process appears to have a 
lot in common with the strategy of Fuller & Thaler: looking for stocks that are undervalued 
because of a bad track record in the past and which haven’t reacted properly to more recent, 
more relevant good news. Given the stated investment philosophies and the implementation 
methods, both Fuller & Thaler and LSV can be regarded as behavioral investment manage-
ment operations.
For both the “behavioral” and “neoclassical” funds it is assumed that actual investment 
operations are in accordance with their stated investment philosophies42.
3.3 data sets
DFA, Fuller & Thaler and LSV all offer a range of varying products. For the purpose of this 
chapter only mutual funds have been considered for comparison.43 That means that many of 
the products that are offered by these three firms are excluded. Mutual funds come in many 
guises: US only or international, small, mid and large caps, value versus growth orientation. 
For the purpose of this chapter the popular Morningstar methodology is the starting point. 
Morningstar classifies funds along two dimensions: size and nature of the investments made 
42 While the cynical among us could be wary of this assumption, supervisors (and to some extent auditors) are 
supposed to check if business models match company statements.
43 A mutual fund is a professionally managed investment fund that pools money from many investors to purchase 







by the fund. Size is differentiated in large, mid and small cap investments while for the 
nature of the investment a distinction between and a value and growth orientation is made 
with a blend of both in between. resulting in nine possible categories. Only funds that fall in 
the same Morningstar category and thus seem comparable, have been examined.
That leaves two sets of comparisons between behavior-style mutual funds and neoclassical-
style mutual funds. DFA’s US Small Cap Value fund and Fuller & Thaler’s Undiscovered 
Managers Behavioral Value Fund both fall in the category small cap/value44. DFA’s US Large 
Cap Value fund and LSV’s Value Equity fund are both large cap/value types of funds. All 
these funds invest exclusively in American stocks. Table1 shows some core characteristics 
of the funds like ticker symbol, size, turnover, category and associated expenses such as 
management fees and transaction costs45:
While all these funds have grown considerably over the years, looking at assets under man-
agement, the difference in the size of total assets between the DFA funds on the one hand 
and the F&T and LSV funds on the other hand is noticeable. This probably accounts at least 
partially for the differences in expenses between the funds: asset management is a business 
which displays economies of scale.
44 Technically the Undiscovered Managers Behavioral Value Fund of Fuller & Thaler was offered by JP Morgan. 
F&T function as the sole subadvisor of these funds and can thus be regarded as responsible for the investment 
decisions.
45 Data from Morningstar. 
Table 1. Fund characteristics
Fund Ticker Total assets Expenses Turnover Category
DFA US Small Cap Value DFSVX $ 16.2 billion 0.52 % 24.0 % Small Value
F&T Undiscovered Managers 
Behavioral Value
UBVLX $ 6.0 billion 0.99 % 24.0 % Small Value
DFA US Large Cap Value DFLVX $ 31.2 billion 0.27 % 15.0 % Large Value

























3.4 ratIngs & returns
Comparison of performance should not be limited to looking solely at returns but should 
also include appraisal of the risk involved. Morningstar issues ratings to each mutual funds 
ranging from one to five stars, one being the worst and five starts being among the best. 
These rating are relative to the distribution of the performance of the whole population of 
funds within a category. The 10% of funds in each category with the highest risk-adjusted 
return receive five stars, the next 22.5% receive four stars, the middle 35% receive three 
stars, the next 22.5% receive two stars, and the bottom 10% receive one star. The star rat-
ings take both return and risk into account. The basic concept is relatively straightforward: 
it assumes that investors have loss aversion and prefer steady returns above volatile ones, 
all else being equal. Ratings are computed for three, five and ten year periods. An overall 
rating is calculated using a (frontloaded) weighted average, taking into account the period of 
existence of the fund. Table 2 show the Morningstar ratings for the funds considered here46:
Most striking is the difference between the two small cap funds. The “behavioral” F&T 
small cap fund scores consistently excellent, while the “neoclassical” DFA small cap fund 
scores average ratings. Both large cap funds score average to slightly above average, with a 
slightly better rating for the “neoclassical” DFA fund over the “behavioral” LSV fund. With 
the exception of the “behavioral” F&T small cap fund, it would appear that funds that are 
heavily influenced by leading academics do not perform exceptionally well. Not bad, but 
also not great.
Having made those observations, there isn’t yet very much to conclude with regard to how 
good or bad the neoclassical and behavioral approaches perform. In order to do so, the 
specific returns and various risk parameters have to be examined. One, three, five, ten and 
46 Data from Morningstar.
Table 2. Morningstar ratings
Fund Ticker 3-year 5-year 10-year Overall
DFA US Small Cap Value DFSVX *** *** *** ***
F&T Undiscovered Managers Behavioral 
Value
UBVLX **** ***** ***** *****
DFA US Large Cap Value DFLVX **** **** *** ****







fifteen year returns are plotted below in tables 3 and 4 for the small cap value funds and large 
cap value funds47. Returns from relevant benchmarks such as the Morningstar category, the 
Standard & Poor’s 500 index (US large cap stocks) and the Russell 2000 index (US small 
cap stocks) are also included.
The returns clearly reflect the Morningstar ratings: outperformance by the “behavioral” F&T 
small cap fund, average performance by the “neoclassical” DFA small cap fund. Looking at 
returns it would appear we have a clear winner, which has also been able to consistently 
outperform the benchmarks.
For the large cap value funds the returns are given in table 4:
47 Data from October 22, 2019.
Table 4. Returns large cap value funds
Fund Ticker 1-year 3-year 5-year 10-year 15-year
DFA US Large Cap Value DFLVX 5.28 % 11.16 % 9.72 % 13.98 % 9.40 %
LSV Value Equity LSVEX 0.24 % 9.37 % 9.11% 12.75 % 8.73%
Benchmarks
Category Large Value LV 5.03 % 9.91 % 8.52 % 11.67 % 7.79 %
S&P 500 index SPX 10.13 % 13.13 % 11.95 % 13.81 % 8.97 %
Table 3. Returns small cap value funds
Fund Ticker 1-year 3-year 5-year 10-year 15-year
DFA US Small Cap Value DFSVX 0.48 % 9.09 % 6.68 % 12.94 % 9.20 %
F&T Undiscovered Managers
Behavioral Value
UBVLX 1.88 % 10.02 % 9.17 % 16.25 % 10.37 %
Benchmarks
Category Small Value SV -0.26 % 8.84 % 5.83 % 11.99 % 8.35 %
S&P 500 index SPX 10.13 % 13.13 % 11.95 % 13.81 % 8.97 %

























While the differences aren’t enormous, DFA outperforms LSV in every time period consid-
ered. However, the performance of LSV seems affected by a bad recent year (2018), which 
also translates in a somewhat subpar 3-year return. The average Morningstar ratings for both 
funds are confirmed by the returns.
Looking at returns for value funds in general (both small cap and large cap) compared to 
the performance of the S&P 500 index, one can conclude that value has been an inferior 
investment category in terms of returns.
3.4.1 Risk-return performance small cap value funds
As noted before, comparisons of performance have to involve risk appraisal in order to draw 
a fair and complete picture. There is a number of ways to do so. Classical mean-variance 
analysis uses the volatility of the returns. The lower the standard deviation the less volatile 
the results of the fund are and, presumably, the less risky the investment. 
The “neoclassical” DFA fund displays slightly higher volatility than both the “behavioral” 
F&T fund and the benchmarks. The low 3- and 5-year volatility of the “behavioral” F&T 
fund is remarkable, especially given the good returns the fund has provided.
Combined with the mean return the Sharpe ratio can be calculated by subtracting the risk-
free rate of return from the return of the portfolio and dividing that result by the standard 
deviation of the portfolio’s excess return. This can be regarded as an indication for in how far 
taking on more or less risk, as measured by the standard deviation, results in better returns. 
The higher the Sharpe ratio the better the risk-return tradeoff.
Table 5. Standard deviations small cap value funds
Fund Ticker 3-year SD 5-year SD 10-year SD 15-year SD
DFA US Small Cap Value DFSVX 14.50 % 14.33 % 21.67 % 19.72 %
F&T Undiscovered Managers 
Behavioral Value
UBVLX 11.56 % 11.19 % 20.61 % 19.20 %
Benchmarks
Category Small Value SV 13.76 % 13.62 % 19.73 % 18.24 %
S&P 500 index SPX 9.18 % 9.55 % 14.40 % 13.19 %







Using Sharpe ratios the quality performance of the “behavioral” F&T small cap fund 
becomes apparent. In all time intervals the “behavioral” fund scores better than the “neoclas-
sical” DFA small cap fund. In addition, F&T outperforms both the Morningstar and Russell 
2000 benchmarks in every single time-interval. The performance of the neoclassical” DFA 
small cap fund, as measured by Sharpe ratios, can be characterized as average.
Besides standard deviation and Sharpe ratio there are other measures to assess risk and return 
such as alpha, beta and R-squared. These have in common that performance is measured 
relative to the market as a whole, using CAPM.R-squared, the coefficient of determination, 
is a measure of the correlation between the returns of an asset and a relevant benchmark rep-
resenting the market as a whole, generally the S&P 500 index. A coefficient of determination 
of 100 means that all movements in the price of the asset can be explained by movements 
of the market as a whole. A coefficient of determination between 85 and 100 is considered 
high; below 70 is considered low. The coefficient of determination is measured with refer-
ence to the S&P 500 index, the most commonly used broad market proxy.
Table 7. Coefficients of determination small cap value funds
Fund Ticker 3-year R² 5-year R² 10-year R² 15-year R²
DFA US Small Cap Value DFSVX 42.79 49.53 79.86 76.94
F&T Undiscovered Managers 
Behavioral Value
UBVLX 57.53 62.30 80.42 78.69
Benchmarks
Category Small Value SV 44.89 49.17 76.92 74.09
Table 6. Sharpe ratios small cap value funds









DFA US Small Cap Value DFSVX 0.93 0.65 0.57 0.53
F&T Undiscovered Managers 
Behavioral Value
UBVLX 1.22 1.02 0.74 0.60
Benchmarks
Category Small Value SV 0.95 0.63 0.41 0.53
S&P 500 index SPX 1.69 1.36 0.84 0.67

























DFA’s coefficient of determination is very much in line with the Morningstar benchmark for 
small value assets. F&T displays clearly higher correlation than both DFA and the Morning-
star category. F&T’s coefficient of determination deviates from the benchmark, which could 
indicate a different investment approach compared to typical small cap value funds. The 
DFA fund looks more like a typical small cap value fund. R-squared is not an unambigu-
ous yardstick in that a higher or lower number is not simply better or worse. It does say 
something about the uniqueness of a fund compared to the market as a whole or a particular 
market segment. An interesting side note is the dramatic drop in the overall coefficient of 
determination of small cap value funds in general, compared to the broad S&P 500 index.
Beta is another measure to assess risk and return. It is a measure of the volatility, or systematic 
risk, in comparison to the market as a whole. Beta is calculated using regression analysis. A 
beta of 1 indicates that the security price will move in line with the market; a beta of less 
than 1 means that the security will be less volatile than the market; a beta of greater than 1 
indicates that the security’s price will be more volatile than the market.
Both funds in general have higher betas than the Morningstar benchmark, while F&T’s 
low volatility in the 3 and 5-year intervals, as measured by standard deviation, appears to 
translate in lower betas for those time intervals.
An interesting performance measure is alpha. Alpha measures a fund manager’s effective-
ness. It displays the difference between a fund’s actual returns (after fees) and its expected 
performance (based on CAPM), given its level of risk as measured by beta. Alpha can be 
considered as representing the value that a portfolio manager adds to or subtracts from a 
fund’s return (Bernstein, 2007) Continued and sustained high alpha can be seen as a an 
indication that a particular investment manager or team has special skills or some other 
form of edge.
Table 8. Betas small cap value funds
Fund Ticker 3-year beta 5-year beta 10-year beta 15-year 
beta
DFA US Small Cap Value DFSVX 1.03 1.06 1.34 1.31
F&T Undiscovered Managers 
Behavioral Value
UBVLX 0.96 0.93 1.28 1.29
Benchmarks







For both funds alpha is negative in all but one of the observations. However, overall alpha 
for the Morningstar benchmark is negative, which implies that small cap value funds haven’t 
provided the best opportunities to beat the market. The behavioral F&T fund still outper-
forms the benchmark. The neoclassical DFA fund more or less performs in line with the 
benchmark.
At first sight it would appear that in the case of these two small cap value funds the behavioral 
fund is superior to the neoclassical one: similar risk, better returns. Moreover, Fuller & Tha-
ler’s Undiscovered Managers Behavioral Value fund also beats the benchmarks consistently 
in both return and risk. DFA US Small Cap Value fund performs very much along the lines 
of the benchmarks. Perhaps that shouldn’t come as a surprise. If the investment philosophy 
is that the market eventually processes all available information and can’t be beaten in a 
consistent way over time, there is no edge to look for except good execution. However, it 
does mean that in the case of the DFA fund there is no “academic alpha”. In the case of 
the F&T fund it is not possible to simply attribute its excellent performance causally to 
academic insights, i.e. behavioral finance/economics. What is clear though is that the F&T 
fund does something differently than the broad market, which might have provided better 
results.
Having said that a couple of important caveats need to be made. That superior performance 
is more visible in the shorter time intervals. If one observes the numbers for the 15-year 
interval, the differences are much less pronounced48. Keeping in mind an old adage in asset 
management: “past returns are no guarantee for the future”, we still have to conclude that 
in the case of these two small cap funds, the behavioral one wins out. Another caveat is the 
fact that access to the F&T fund has been restricted since 2016 in the sense that no new 
48 The author has conducted an earlier review in 2010, using the exact same research design. The conclusion in 
2010 was that there wasn’t much to choose between the neoclassical and the behavioral fund.
Table 9. Alphas small cap value funds
Fund Ticker 3-year alpha 5-year alpha 10-year alpha 15-year 
alpha
DFA US Small Cap Value DFSVX -2.59 -4.38 -3.89 -1.03
F&T Undiscovered 
Managers Behavioral Value
UBVLX -0.72 -0.59 -0.18 0.12
Benchmarks

























investors can participate in the fund anymore. While the reasons for this so-called “soft 
closure” are not known to me, one could conjecture that the supply of profitable opportuni-
ties might somehow not be unlimited. Taking on additional investment capital would then 
create downward pressure on returns. Could it be then that, yes, there are anomalies that can 
be profitably exploited, but, no, they are not abundant or endless? Which brings me to the 
possible impact of fund size. There appear to be advantages and disadvantages related to the 
size of investment funds. On the one hand expenses should relatively go down as a fund (or 
investment firm) grows bigger. That is clearly visible in table 1: DFA’s expense ratios being 
lower than those from F&T and LSV. On the other hand there is evidence that performance 
suffers from a growing number of the assets under management. Chen et al. (2004) find 
that for small cap funds smaller funds indeed perform better than larger ones. The analysis 
of the two funds analyzed here seems to confirm those findings somewhat. First , the smaller 
behavioral fund seems to perform slightly better than the neoclassical on. Second, the F&T 
fund has shown exceptional growth from $36,2 million AuM in 2010 to $6 billion AuM 
in 2020 (DFA fund: $7.4 billion AuM in 2010, $16,2 billion AuM in 2020). That growth 
might have given rise to the soft closure of the fund49.
3.4.2 Risk-return performance large cap value funds
A similar analysis has been done for the large cap value funds:
Looking at standard deviation/volatility there isn’t much to choose between the two funds. 
Both though display slightly higher volatility than the benchmarks.
On a 5-, 10- and 15-year basis both funds provide very similar Sharpe ratio’s which are more 
or less in line with the benchmark values. Looking at the 3-year periods, DFA stays in line 
with the benchmarks but LSV lags somewhat.
49 The expense ratio for the F&T fund also dropped with the growth of the fund: from 1,6% in 2010 to 0,99% 
in 2020 (DFA: 0,54% in 2010, 0,52% in 2020).
Table 10. Standard deviations large cap value funds
Fund Ticker 3-year SD 5-year SD 10-year SD 15-year SD
DFA US Large Cap Value DFLVX 10.84 % 10.95 % 18.50 % 16.68 %
LSV Value Equity LSVEX 10.75 % 10.80 % 16.93 % 15.44 %
Benchmarks
Category Large Value LV 9.82 % 10.03 % 15.24 % 14.09 %







In the case of correlation with the S&P 500 index the “neoclassical” DFA fund displays a 
higher coefficient of determination than the benchmark for large cap value funds, while the 
metrics of the “behavioral” LSV fund are more in line with the benchmark. As was the case 
of small cap value funds, for large cap value funds the coefficient of determination drops, 
though less dramatically. 
Both funds display higher betas than the benchmark. LSV has lower beta for all periods 
considered. The numbers are in line with the standard deviation of returns, which was higher 
Table 11. Sharpe ratios large cap value funds










DFA US Large Cap Value DFLVX 1.30 1.03 0.66 0.59
LSV Value Equity LSVEX 1.15 1.01 0.67 0.59
Benchmarks
Category Large Value LV 1.26 0.98 0.67 0.56
S&P 500 index SPX 1.69 1.36 0.84 0.67
Table 12. Coefficients of determination large cap value funds
Fund Ticker 3-year R² 5-year R² 10-year R² 15-years R²
DFA US Large Cap Value DFLVX 85.18 86.82 94.33 93.16
LSV Value Equity LSVEX 77.66 83.44 93.96 92,74
Benchmark
Category Large Value LV 79.42 83.46 91.35 90.36
Table 13. Betas large cap value funds
Fund Ticker 3-year beta 5-year beta 10-year beta 15-year beta
DFA US Large Cap Value DFLVX 1.09 1.07 1.25 1.22
LSV Value Equity LSVEX 1.03 1.03 1.14 1.13
Benchmark

























for DFA than for LSV. Taken together it appears that DFA takes on a bit more non-systemic, 
idiosyncratic risk than LSV and the benchmark, while still maintaining higher correlation 
with the broad S&P 500 index. In other words, the DFA fund is more “different” from 
the benchmark/ typical large cap value fund than the LSV fund. That can be regarded as 
a surprise. One might expect that the behavioral investor is more inclined to deviate from 
the market proxy than the neoclassical investor since there are presumed to be inefficiencies 
within the market. That appeared to be the case in the examination of the two small cap 
funds. Here the evidence suggests otherwise.
Negative alpha is displayed by both funds as well as the benchmark. Both funds score close 
to the benchmark with one exception: LSV’s 3-year alpha. This is probably attributable to 
the subpar 1-year performance of the fund in terms of returns, that was noticed earlier. In 
the long run these funds seem pretty evenly matched, with perhaps a slight advantage for the 
“neoclassical” fund. There is no indication of “academic” alpha. These are good mutual funds 
but by no means spectacular in their performance. As for size effects, the DFA fund being 
approximately 11,5 times bigger than the LSV fund ($31,2 billion AuM vs. $2,71 billion 
AuM), Chen et al. (2004) found that there is no clear effect of size on performance for large 
cap value funds. None is detectable here as well, except for the differences in expense ratios.
3.5 dIsCussIon of researCh Methodology
Before drawing conclusions some issues need to be addressed: is the methodology used sound 
and are the data representative? Concerning the applied methodology, this is probably not 
an approach that a financial economist trying to publish in a finance journal would employ. 
In that case one would expect a more sophisticated full-blown statistical analysis. However, 
the measures used here are customary ones for investment and asset management appraisal. 
Swedroe in his 2015 short article compared the results of funds of Fuller & Thaler and LSV 
Table 14. Alphas large cap value funds




10-year alpha 15-year alpha
DFA US Large Cap Value DFLVX -2.82 -2.66 -2.90 -0.98
LSV Value Equity LSVEX -3.67 -2.58 -2.38 -0.87
Benchmark







to the broader industry, focusing just on returns though instead of also incorporating risk. 
Wright, Banerjee and Boney (2008) examined sixteen mutual funds over the period 1992-
2005 with either a self-proclaimed or media-identified association to behavioral finance, 
including the Fuller & Thaler and LSV funds discussed here. They first focus on returns 
and flow of funds in order to identify successful funds. Then they examine risk as well as the 
factors where successful performance stems from.
Asset management firms themselves typically market their products by pointing at past 
returns rather than risk-return measures. Some may argue that risk-return measures may be 
flawed because they are to a large extent developed from the traditional building blocks from 
neoclassical finance: Modern Portfolio Theory, Capital Asset Pricing Model. As such these 
measures will suffer from the same troubles that plague these theories such as the question 
if the distribution of returns resembles a lognormal pattern and the question how to define 
the market portfolio (and thus calculate correlation and beta). The former does not pose a 
problem because in the simple mean-variance analysis used here no assumption regarding 
the distribution of returns is necessary and thus the question of whether markets are efficient 
does not enter a priori in the analysis. The latter problem –what is the market portfolio?– is 
also neutral with regard to the analysis. Different conceptions of the contents of the market 
portfolio may alter correlation and beta but again it is impossible to establish a priori if a 
particular notion of the market portfolio skews the analysis one way or the other.
Questions could also be raised about the time intervals used. Do three, five, ten and fifteen 
year intervals provide a balanced enough picture50? Without taking into account investor 
preferences, it would appear that the longest time horizon, i.e. the 15-year interval, presents 
the fairest comparison, smoothing out shorter term fluctuations. The 15-year interval also 
fully incorporates the great financial crisis (2007-2009) and the recovery period from the 
crisis. Grosso modo the 15-year intervals produce the smallest performance differences 
between the funds analysed here, both for small cap value equity funds as for large cap value 
equity funds. On the other hand, the most important differences show up in the 3-year 
intervals, The behavioral small cap equity value fund outperforms the neoclassical one in the 
short term, while in that same timeframe the neoclassical fund does better than its behavioral 
counterpart in the category large cap value equity funds. Whether these short-term differ-
ences in performance are persistent and eventually translate in more significant differences 
on the longer term, remains to be seen. 
With regard to the second issue: is it fair to pass judgment on these asset management opera-
tions (and the people affiliated to those operations) based on the data analysed here? After 
50 Wright et al. (2008) have examined the 1992-2005 period. Since their findings do not dramatically differ from 

























all, the data only consists of two sets of funds, while the firms considered here have many 
more products on offer. There are, however, good reasons to restrict the analysis to the funds 
considered. Most importantly, it wasn’t easy to find comparable funds. While DFA offers an 
broad range of funds in all asset classes, F&T focuses on small and medium caps and doesn’t 
provide large cap offerings. LSV concentrates on value investing. 
The types of offerings by the behavioral asset managers, combined with their performance, 
beg the question if some asset classes are more suited to behavioral investing than other, i.e. 
value stocks and in particular small cap value stocks, given the good performance by the 
F&T Undiscovered Managers Behavioral Value Fund. Put another way: could it be that 
the market for small cap value stocks is less efficient than the market for large cap value 
stocks? The preference for value stocks above growth stocks is explainable. Value stocks are 
in general considered less risky, because future cash flow, dividends, etc. are deemed more 
predictable/less uncertain Over- and underreaction, the basis for behavioral investment deci-
sions, should thus be easier detectable/objective than in the case of growth stocks. Wright et 
al. (2008) find that two of the four behavioral funds they examined and that outperformed 
their defined benchmark (i.e. the Vanguard 500 Fund) focus on value investing. These two 
funds happen to be the exact same F&T and LSV funds examined here. However they add 
that, while UBVLX and LSVEX outperform the broad benchmark in the period 1992-2005, 
this is not the case in comparison to other value-oriented “non-behavioral” mutual funds51. 
In other words, the outperformance might very well stem from well-executed value investing 
in general, rather than behavioral-inspired investing.
One could hypothesize that information on large caps is more abundant, less ambiguous, 
less noisy, than is the case for small caps. If that is the case, the market for small cap value 
stocks is less informationally efficient than the market for large cap value stocks and thus 
may offer more opportunities for excess performance.
Fuller & Thaler originally ran another small cap fund: the Undiscovered Managers Behav-
ioral Growth fund. This particular fund, focused on growth investments rather than value 
investments, closed in 2012. As Swedroe (2015) puts it: “It’s rare, if not unheard of, for a 
fund to close when it has produced good returns.” According to Swedroe the performance 
of the Undiscovered Managers Behavioral Growth fund was indeed lagging, at least up to 
2010.
51  This result matches the findings in my earlier 2010 review which would compare better as far as the investi-







3.6 dIsCussIon of IMPlICatIons
A final point for discussion is what exactly can be inferred from the analysis with regard to 
the ideas of those affiliated with the funds. In other words, to what extent do the results 
credit or discredit their theories about the functioning of financial markets? Some historical 
perspective may be helpful here. For involvement of academics in the practice of financial 
markets is and was nothing new. The list of great economists of the past with more than a 
passing interest in active investing is extensive and enduring. 
For these economists of the past investing was an activity on the side. Professional involve-
ment of academics in investing and financial markets goes one step further. There is a variety 
of such cases, ranging from cooperation between banks and academics to apply investment 
theory such as between Wells Fargo and Fischer Black, Michael Jensen and Myron Scholes, 
to full-fledged professionalism like Black becoming a partner at Goldman Sachs (Mehrling, 
2005). Notorious are the exploits of Nobel laureates Robert C. Merton and Myron Scholes 
who were involved as partners in hedge fund Long Term Capital Management (LTCM). 
After posting stunning results in the first three years of its existence, the demise of the fund 
was equally spectacular. The blow-up of LTCM in 1998 shook the global financial markets to 
its core, mandating massive action from the monetary and supervisory authorities. Popular 
belief has it that hubris and an unbridled belief in quantitative modelling and markets were 
behind the downfall of LTCM, not unlike what many believe happened in the recent finan-
cial crisis. Indeed Merton and Scholes thought that the relentless arbitrage, which LTCM 
engaged in, would drive markets to more efficiency. But that massive arbitrage process made 
LTCM into such an important market participant that one of the basic conditions for an ef-
ficient market—atomistic agents in the market—was violated, resulting in faltering liquidity 
conditions. So the demise of LTCM was not so much a result of markets being inefficient. 
Rather, it was the failure to recognize certain risks, in particular concentration risk, associ-
ated with one of the conditions for the efficient functioning of market not being in place 
that was missed by LTCM (Scholes, 2000, Stulz, 2000). So the historic evidence is mixed, to 
say the least, with regard to the question whether great economists are also great investors.
Likewise in the cases described in this chapter. One behavioral fund (F&T) distinguishes 
itself from its neoclassical rival, the other (LSV) does not. The failure of a particular fund to 
distinguish itself decisively from its rival does not need to discredit or falsify the philosophy 
behind that fund. That notion is especially relevant with regard to the behavioral mutual 
funds. For it’s the behavioral philosophy which claims that markets systematically deviate 
from efficiency because of psychological biases and that these deviations can be profitably 
exploited. This was also remarked by Wright et al. (2008): “If funds visibly associated with 

























of little interest”52. They do find that the flow of funds into behavioral funds is higher, 
suggesting that behavioral mutual funds are effectively attracting capital. They also find that 
the behavioral funds generally beat the S&P 500 Index funds on a raw, net-return basis. 
However, their risk-adjusted returns are neither significantly better nor worse than their 
matched counterparts. Finally they find that most of success of behavioral funds, relative to 
the S&P 500, is explained by loading on the value factor, which actually originates in Fama 
and French’s 1993 model. Thus they conclude that while behavioral investment strategies 
may differ from non-behavioral funds the differences aren’t providing their investors any 
abnormal returns. Going further, however, they suggest that publicizing and presumably 
using “behavioral finance” in a fund’s investment strategy does seem to offer advantages in 
terms of attracting capital and marketing purposes. Given the results presented however, 
something similar could be said with regard to the analysed Dimensional funds: that strong 
academic pedigree advertises well, but isn’t accompanied by superior results. 
Lack of clearly superior results from behavioral mutual funds may shed doubts on market 
wide deviations from efficiency but can be consistent with the finding of psychological biases 
at the level of the individual agent. Indeed, the idea that despite people constantly behaving 
“irrationally”, market outcomes can be pretty efficient has been forcefully argued by many, 
in finance for instance by Merton Miller (1987) and Stephen Ross (2005) and in economics 
at large by Vernon Smith (1989)53 and Deirdre McCloskey. The billion dollar question then 
isn’t any longer whether markets are efficient or not, but how exactly non-rational, non-
optimizing behavior can lead to aggregated efficient outcomes. Various proposals are out 
there that attempt to bridge the gap between the individual level and the aggregated market 
level: Andrew Lo’s Adaptive Market Hypothesis (Lo, 2004 & 2005), Peter Bossaerts’ Effi-
cient Learning Hypothesis (Bossaerts, 2002), Merton and Bodie’s Functional and Structural 
Finance (Merton & Bodie, 2005), and the various literature on noise trading emerging from 
Black (1986) and Kyle (1985) 54.
In the specific behavioral asset pricing literature (See Shefrin, 2008) the aggregation question 
is acknowledged. Shefrin tries to incorporate “sentiment”, i.e. false beliefs held by investors, 
52 The title of Swedroe’s 2015 article “Behavioral finance falls short” doesn’t leave much doubt about his conclu-
sion and opinion.
53 Smith actually appeared to be of the opinion that some assumptions (an infinite number of agents and various 
assets) which are deemed necessary for efficiency and equilibrium in the neoclassical sense, are not indispens-
able for efficient outcomes if there is sufficient communication and information in a market.
54 In the next chapter I propose an account of the arbitrage process that drives markets towards efficiency along 
the lines of Austrian market process theory which accommodates both behavioral and neoclassical perspectives.
in the price kernel-based asset pricing framework described by Cochrane (2005)55. In the 
absence of sentiment the market is efficient. Whether sentiment enters the equation or the 
outcome is efficient then becomes an empirical matter.
The bottom line is that the neoclassical and behavioral perspectives are not rival in the sense 
that one being true necessarily implies that the other is completely false. Indeed these schools 
of thought can be considered as complementary because their main bite is situated on dif-
ferent levels of aggregation. The behavioral viewpoint is based on a strong body of evidence, 
both empirical and experimental, to back up claims about economic agents not behaving 
along the lines of homo economicus. The neoclassical corner has solid arguments, both 
theoretically and empirically, that given certain assumptions and conditions being fulfilled, 
market outcomes tend to efficiency. So it is by no means the case that the debate between 
neoclassical and behavioral finance is decisively finished by the analysis presented here.
3.7 ConClusIon
What then can be concluded from the data? First of all,  while the sample is small, it has 
become clear that academic excellence is no guarantee of real-world investing excellence. 
The mutual funds analyzed here, which share a strong academic pedigree, are by no means 
bad investments. In most cases they do better than the broad market benchmarks, but three 
of the four funds examined fail to distinguish themselves within the community of similar 
mutual funds: a particular academic alpha does not exist in those three cases56. Fuller & 
Thaler’s Undiscovered Managers Behavioral Value Fund then is the exception rather than 
the rule.
Second, there is no conclusive evidence that investment management operations which are 
advertised as based on principles of behavioral finance do provide consistently and persis-
tently superior returns when compared to investment management operations which are 
advertised as inspired by principles of neoclassical finance, or the other way around for that 
55 The price-kernel based asset pricing framework provides an integrated approach to asset pricing. Specific cases 
such as CAPM, the Fama-French multi-factor model and the Black-Scholes option-pricing formula can be 
derived as specific cases. The core idea behind the model is the idea of a stochastic discount factor (SDF), the 
price of an asset being determined by the expected value of the expected discounted cash flows. Specific cases 
give specific SDFs. A SDF can very well be behavioral, or behaviorally influenced (Cochrane, 2005, Shefrin, 
2008).
56 In chapter five the impact of theory on practice in finance is discussed in deep. While it is true that in the area 
of investment and asset pricing theory has profoundly affected practice, the lack of “academic” alpha is interest-
ing in that there appears to be no evidence here of performative or counterperformative effects (see MacKenzie, 
2006 and MacKenzie et al., 2007). In the case considered in this chapter intervention by theoreticians does not 

























matter. The behaviorally oriented small cap fund does perform better than its neoclassical 
rival, but with regard to the large cap funds the opposite can be argued. Differences are 
more pronounced in the short term. In the long term, what differences there are within 
both categories of funds, using the more advanced performance measures such as alpha 
and Sharpe ratio are neither spectacular in size nor persistent enough. At least in the case 
of the funds analyzed here, there is no evidence that a basic tenet of neoclassical finance – 
systematically and persistently beating the market in terms of risk and return is not easy or 
even possible – does not hold.

Chapter 4
The Austrian Middle Ground in Finance 
In this chapter ideas out of Austrian economics, in particular Israel 
Kirzner’s thoughts on the market process, are applied to the workings 
of, and theorizing about financial markets. I argue, both theoretically 
and by using illustrations out of the practice of financial markets, that 
a descriptive causal process approach such as the Austrian viewpoint 
provides, can be regarded as complementary to the more normative claims 
put forward by neoclassical and behavioral finance, actually bridging 
























Austrian economics comes in a range of subschools; opinions can vary widely and disagree-
ments amongst them are significant, and sometimes even acerbic. My aim here is not to 
argue for one subschool or the other or propose an “Austrian” finance theory but rather to 
focus on some thoughts about markets, originating in the Austrian school of economics, 
which I claim are relevant for financial markets.
Despite all the differences of opinion and the disagreements among Austrians, however, one 
of the depictions in mainstream neoclassical economics where almost all Austrian econo-
mists take serious issue with, is the “false and misleading picture of real markets” (Kirzner, 
1997). In particular Kirzner, one of the more moderate Austrians, has gone to great lengths 
to develop an account of the market process, which provides a substantive story of how 
market coordination is achieved, instead of the neoclassical postulation of equilibrium at 
all times. Kirzner, in his own words, offers a middle ground between the neoclassical view 
where coordination is already implied by the assumption of perfect knowledge, and a radical 
subjectivist view57 that states that the amount of ignorance is so great that it puts coordina-
tion beyond reach. “Knowledge is not perfect; but neither is ignorance necessarily invincible. 
Equilibrium is indeed never attained, yet the market does exhibit powerful tendencies toward 
it” (Kirzner, 1992, 5). 
It is my aim here to build upon this concept of a middle ground using Kirzner’s ideas and 
concepts for finance, in particular the fierce debate that is conducted between neoclassical 
and behavioral finance regarding market efficiency.
Kirzner’s criticism on the false and misleading picture of real markets will be taken as a 
starting point of analysis. The central notion in my analysis is arbitrage. Arbitrage is the 
mechanism that should make markets (in general, but in this case specifically financial 
markets) function well. It is a crucial concept in virtually any account of financial markets. 
Theory and practice of financial markets are characterized by a close proximity and entwine-
ment: concepts, methods and tools travel back and forth (see Bernstein, 1992). Likewise 
arbitrage as a theoretical concept has its neighbour in the real realm of the financial markets. 
By means of examples from the practice I will show that what actually goes on in financial 
markets arbitrage displays an uncanny resemblance to the Austrian theory of market process. 
Real-life arbitrage is characterized by alertness, search, discovery, entrepreneurship, group 
interaction, learning and imitation, all in the presence of uncertainty and facilitated but also 
constrained by language.







Having established the descriptive relevance of Austrian market process theory gives rise to 
reconsider some of the hot issues in the neoclassical versus behavioral debate. The first such 
issue is market efficiency. It would make sense to decouple this notion from the concept of 
equilibrium, in the light of a dynamic market process. Equilibrium ultimately means that 
supply and demand meet, leading to markets clearing. Financial markets continuously clear: 
every transaction has a buyer and a seller. Whether it is a trade at the market equilibrium is a 
separate matter. What really matters socially is that financial markets perform their allocative 
function and provide a level playing field, that there is some tendency towards optimality. 
Only then can they perform their function in society.
The second issue is that of rationality. The debate in finance can also be looked upon as a 
question about economic agents. Who prevails in financial markets: the few hyper-rational 
arbitrageurs or the herds of irrational “noise-traders”? In the spirit of Fritz Machlup, we 
should pay attention to semantics here: what do we mean by those typologies? In a world 
where dealing with radical (Knightian) uncertainty is manifest and the possibility of error 
is acknowledged, these are not pictures of actual individuals. I would rather suggest that 
terms like ”arbitrageur”, “noise-trader”, but also “the entrepreneur” and “the labourer” are 
properties of all individuals. Actual people embody all these economic properties, granted 
to varying extents and in combination with varying skills, dispositions, and preferences (see 
also Knight, 1921). That is to say: each one of us all can turn out to be more or less rational 
in various instances in grappling with the uncertain world. 
Thus there is a true middle ground to be established by using the Austrian insights. Neoclas-
sical finance would need to restate its idea about what it means for a market to be efficient. 
The equilibrium can be an excellent concept for theorizing but need not be a relevant actual 
state, is a notion we already know from physics. Moreover, explicitly giving up the concept 
of equilibrium is a thought already entertained by quite a few prominent finance scholars. 
On the other hand, behavioral finance should reconsider to what extent its claims, based to 
a large extent on psychology and experiments, are relevant for the outcomes of the market 
process, especially in a world characterized by radical uncertainty. Methodological individu-
alism need not go so far as to derive market outcomes out of a realistic picture of an actual 
living individual, whatever that may be. Both those in the neoclassical and behavioral corner 
would do well to take into account the insights of Kirzner, Mises and Hayek, of Knight and 
Machlup. At the same time, this discussion, being an applied account of Austrian economics 






















4.2 fInanCe & arbItrage
Several authors (Bernstein, 1992, Varian, 1992) have argued that finance has been one of 
the success stories in post-World War II economics, in particular where it regards quantita-
tive economics This is evidenced by a disproportionate number of  Nobel Prizes and other 
awards obtained for finance endeavours, the large numbers of journals, congresses and the 
like, and in general by the firmly established and significant place it has within departments 
of economics and business sciences in academia. Its success also shows in everyday life: 
financial markets are an inextricable part of modern society. Advances in finance theory 
certainly have played a role in the acceptance and legitimatizing of financial markets58.  
Where does this success stem from? Especially given that finance has only developed into 
a distinct field of research since the 1950s and thus is a relatively young discipline. The 
proximity and entwining of theory and practice is probably important. On the one hand 
financial markets provide scientists with an extraordinary amount of data to work with. On 
the other hand theoretical tools and concepts have found their way, largely unmodified, into 
the equipment box of the practitioners. Option pricing theory, which is used every day by 
derivatives traders and bankers, is probably the best example but only one of many that can 
be given (see Bernstein, 1992; MacKenzie, 2006). 
Another factor in the success of finance could lie in its multidisciplinary background. Up to 
the 1950s finance was hardly recognized and regarded as a subject of economics. And indeed 
many of those who would become leading scholars in finance did not have a background in 
economics; they came for example from mathematics, physics, engineering, French, law, sta-
tistics, and astronomy (ibid.) Also, much of the ground-breaking work was done outside of 
the economics faculties, in business schools, and even outside the university, at think-thanks 
such as the RAND Corporation, consulting firms such as Arthur D. Little, and banks, for 
instance Wells Fargo Bank (ibid.). 
Still, I would deem finance as an economic sub-discipline because its subject matter is eco-
nomic: the coordination of inter-temporal consumption and saving. And indeed academic 
economics has had a profound impact on finance. Finance theory has largely been the result 
of getting the best out of two traditional powerhouses in economics: the empirically inclined 
Chicago School and the theoreticians out of MIT.
58  MacKenzie (2006) goes so far in this respect to claim that some parts of finance theory have had a performative 








Consider the achievements then: the finance theories that have made headlines. Follow-
ing various historical accounts (Bernstein, 1992; Mehrling, 2005; MacKenzie, 2006), five 
strands jump out59. In more or less chronological order:
- The work on portfolio theory by Harry Markowitz (and to some extent James Tobin), 
delivering crucial insights on risk and return, resulting in the now familiar mean-variance 
analysis;
- William Sharpe’s (an others’) contribution resulting in the capital asset pricing model 
(CAPM)60, extending Markowitz’s results to a coherent account of asset prices in relation 
to the market as a whole;
- The propositions of Franco Modigliani and Merton Miller, telling the theoretical story 
that the capital structure of a firm is irrelevant for its market value;
- The efficient market hypothesis, linked to the names of Eugene Fama and Paul Samuel-
son, which states that one cannot beat the market;
- Option pricing theory, conceived by Fischer Black, Myron Scholes, and Robert C. 
Merton, which enables one to put a meaningful value on pretty much any financial asset.
What these theories have in common is that they are about financial instruments and fi-
nancial markets61. They all assume that these markets function well and they do so for one 
reason: the arbitrage principle.
Stephen Ross sets off his 2005 book on neoclassical finance as follows: “(Chapter) One: No 
Arbitrage, The Fundamental Theorem of Finance”. Arbitrage is a crucial concept in finance. 
It is the key assumption which underlies all the various parts of established theory. Arbitrage 
can be defined as “the simultaneous purchase and sale of the same, or essentially similar 
security in two different markets for advantageously different prices” (Sharpe and Alexander, 
1990). The classical illustration of arbitrage is that one doesn’t find $20 bills lying on the 
pavement, because somebody else would have picked them up already. Now arbitrage as 
such is as old as economics itself: one can encounter it in the writings of Adam Smith and 
Alfred Marshall. The Law of One Price, Purchasing Power Parity—these are all variations on 
the same theme (see also Harrison, 1997).
But the treatment of arbitrage in finance is a bit different. As Bernstein (1992) has noted, 
instead of it being a common feature of competitive markets, it has been elevated to the level 
of a driving force. Arbitrage is not absent because markets are competitive. Rather, it is the 
59  As any historian of finance will tell, much of this work was preceded by Louis Bachelier’s dissertation from 
1900 “Theorie de la Speculation”, which contained important pieces of what would later become established 
finance theory. His accomplishments, however would only be recognized some fifty years later. See Jovanovic, 
2008 & 2018.
60  Jack Treynor and John Lintner need mentioning as well, when talking about CAPM.






















other way around: arbitrage enforces competitiveness on the market. Modigliani and Miller 
used this “novel application” (Varian, 1993) to prove their propositions. It has become 
known as the arbitrage-proof, and it has played a critical role in all subsequent theorizing in 
finance (see Varian, 1987, for a more elaborate discussion, including a formal exposition). 
As Harrison (1997) puts it: “The successful application of economic theory in finance must 
be attributed to the notion of arbitrage. Not only could something “scientific” be said about 
speculative market prices, but also the economics theory seemed able to explain reality. This 
made finance all the more palatable to economists. Arbitrage was the theoretical force be-
hind each of the major economics innovations in finance”. And in the words of sociologist of 
science Donald MacKenzie (2003): “Arbitrage is the key theoretical mechanism in financial 
economics. A whole set of central propositions have been demonstrated by ‘arbitrage-proof 
– the demonstration that if the proposition did not hold, then an arbitrage opportunity 
would open up”.
This has certain implications, which makes finance distinct from (neoclassical) economics in 
general62. As Ross (2005) said: “with its emphasis on the absence of arbitrage, neoclassical 
finance takes a step back from the requirement that the markets be in full equilibrium”. The 
No Arbitrage theorem gives an explanation how equilibrium will come about. While that 
may be regarded as a positive, it also raises new questions. Where does arbitrage come from, 
and how does it work?
Ross provided an answer to the first question: the no arbitrage assumption is based on “the 
most basic beliefs about human behavior, namely that there is someone who prefers having 
more wealth to having less” (ibid.). Behavioral finance has challenged this axiom. Not the 
fact that in general there is someone who prefers more to less, but based on insights from 
individual and social psychology, they take offense to the simplistic, rational picture of hu-
man agency is rejected, resulting in doubts about market efficiency.
The second question –how does arbitrage actually take place—is neither answered by neo-
classical finance nor by the behavioral variety. MacKenzie (2003) remarked correctly that 
arbitrage in finance is a black box. I propose a substantive content for that black box by 
using the insights of Austrian Market Process Theory and looking at the practice of financial 
markets.







4.3 Market ProCess theory
Austrians may applaud Ross’s “step back”. In the words of Kirzner (1997): “At the market 
level, Austrians have rebelled against a microeconomics which can find coherence in markets 
and can explain market phenomena only by asserting that markets are, at all times, to be 
treated as if already in the attained state of equilibrium”. But it is a hollow victory if equi-
librium is still the unavoidable outcome of the assumption of no arbitrage, based on such a 
simplistic portrayal of human behavior. Indeed, according to Kirzner (ibid.), the second part 
of Austrian criticism of the unrealistic character of neoclassical economics is that “Austrians 
have taken sharp exception to the manner in which neoclassical theory has portrayed the 
individual decision as a mechanical exercise in constrained maximization. Such portrayal 
robs human choice of its essentially open-ended character, in which imagination and bold-
ness must inevitably play a role”.
The reason for that open-ended character lies in the fundamental uncertain nature of the 
economic domain; a point raised by Frank Knight (1921) that has been acknowledged by 
most of the Austrian economists63. Knight makes a threefold distinction (1921, pp. 224-225). 
First, there exist a priori probabilities: absolute objective chances like those in throwing a fair 
die. Second, there are statistical probabilities: objective, empirical evaluations of frequency of 
association. And third, there are estimates: subjective, more or less educated guesses, liable to 
error. The first two fall under the heading of risk. When we speak of risk, the distribution is 
known, either a priori or through empirical work, and we can obtain objective, measurable 
numbers. The third category is that of true radical, non-measurable uncertainty.
According to Knight, it is this third category which characterizes the economic domain 
in reality (“business” in his own words) and which gives rise to the phenomenon of profit 
(and loss). The reason is imperfect knowledge of the future. Knight also takes issue with the 
omniscient approach to agency in classical economics. What we can say about knowledge 
and behavior is that consciousness or awareness gives us the possibility of anticipating an 
image of the future. This image is always subjective: “We perceive the world before we react 
to it, and we react not to what we perceive, but always to what we infer” (1921, p. 201). 
Given this subjective character, it makes sense that this process is not infallible: “we do not 
perceive as it is, nor do we infer precisely, nor do we act knowing the consequences, nor do 
we execute perfectly” (1921, p. 202).
It is important to stress that acknowledging the existence of Knightian uncertainty does not 
imply that we are constantly subjected to the whims of chance. There is nothing mysterious 
63  Nonetheless Kirzner (2000) has pointed out important differences between Knight and his (“Old”) Chicago 






















or metaphysical about it, nor does it imply some utter wild randomness. Uncertainty simply 
is a consequence of the dynamics of real life, subject to change, disturbances, and surprises, 
and human nature, with its cognitive limitations and non-rational factors such as emotions 
and intuitions. Moreover, there are ways to deal with uncertainty: it can be reduced, which 
is the goal of rational conduct, but not eliminated (Knight, 1921, p. 238). Put differently 
by Kirzner (1992), our future is unpredictable because it is not a simple extrapolation of the 
past, but partially constructed by our present decisions and the decisions of others. In the 
words of Knight: “The existence of the problem of knowledge depends on the future being 
different from the past, but the possibility of the solution depends on the future being like 
the past” (1921 p. 313).
The key to dealing with uncertainty in the economic domain lies in the process of entrepre-
neurial discovery. Kirzner (1997) explicitly roots entrepreneurial discovery in the ideas of 
the great Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Specifically, Mises 
provides the view of the market as an entrepreneurially driven process, while Hayek provides 
insights into the role of knowledge and the coordinating role of the market in spreading and 
enhancing knowledge. Ignorance and discovery are the central characteristics of the market 
process. Ignorance—or differently put a lack of omniscience—will prevent equilibrium, 
while discovery will give rise to a tendency towards equilibrium.
Ignorance is not fully remediable by deliberate search and learning. Ignorance is an essential 
part of a world in which we have to deal with radical uncertainty, in the Knightian sense. 
Often we are hardly aware of our ignorance. Likewise, discovery is not to be equated with 
deliberate search and learning; there is always an element of surprise in it. Moreover, all real 
discovery is unplanned and thus to a large extent unintended. Not only has discovery an 
unpredictable element and is it somehow accidental, the results and consequences of it are 
also not fully predictable. Our future is partly constructed and determined by the choices 
we make. That renders the market process indeterminate and the market certainly not in a 
state of equilibrium at all times. But neither is it entirely directionless, in Kirzner’s opinion, 
because of entrepreneurship64.
Entrepreneurs are constantly on the lookout for potential profit opportunities. Their alert-
ness to such opportunities leads them to action in order to grasp such opportunities. Results 
of such action are by no means assured, as is to be expected in a dynamic context of radical 
uncertainty: fallibility is acknowledged, errors are possible65. If, however, the entrepreneur 
succeeds in grasping a pure profit opportunity, dynamic competition will ensure that it is 
short-lived. Thus the power of the equilibrating process can vary greatly, as does the time 
64  Radical subjectivists argue that uncertainty is so omnipresent that it is in fact directionless.







period it takes for an equilibrating move to appear. Empirically, though, it would seem that 
the equilibrating tendency is somehow there, even in extreme cases such as the 2007-2008 
crisis.
When Peter Bernstein (1992) talked about arbitrage as the driving force of the market, one 
who is familiar with Austrian economics cannot fail to notice the resemblance to Kirzner’s 
work, in particular his 2000 collection of essays, titled “The Driving Force of the Market”. 
Austrians have typically limited their applied work to cases such as welfare economics and 
policy issues. Thinking of the market as a process would seem to be more like a state of mind 
or a broad conceptual frame than an actual description. But in the case of the workings of 
financial markets a quite narrow application seems possible: Austrian market process theory 
as a blueprint for arbitrage in financial markets.
A note of caution is in order here. Kirzner himself has said that “entrepreneurship cannot be 
reduced to any kind of arbitrage, because alertness does not remove all ignorance” (1979). 
That means that unnoticed profit opportunities will remain. It should be obvious that when 
Kirzner mentions “arbitrage” here, he means the academic variety: the instantaneous work-
ing of the universal Law of One Price. My comparison is about the actual arbitrage process 
in financial markets and Austrian market process theory. Indeed, Kirzner later states that 
”alertness is a concept, sufficiently elastic to cover not only the existence of existing arbitrage 
opportunities, but also the perception of inter-temporal speculative opportunities” (quoted 
by Binenbaum, 1995).
4.4 arbItrage In real lIfe
Arbitrage as a theoretical construct is by definition risk free. In reality there is no such thing. 
Practical arbitrage in financial markets always involves some degree of risk or uncertainty in 
the form of inter-temporality and a less than hundred percent similarity between securities. 
To illustrate what the process in financial markets entails, let me provide an example out of 
actual practice, which will bring a number of aspects of arbitrage to the front. The example 
is probably the most risk-free arbitrage opportunity that I have encountered in my own 
experience in the markets66.






















Example 1: real-life arbitrage
EIPE is a huge, publicly traded company, a global player with one of the biggest market 
capitalizations in the world. Its shares are primarily listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Options on EIPE shares are one of the most traded option classes in the United States: 
liquidity is extremely high and the bid-ask spread is minimal.
Securities markets, while widely accessible for people all over the world, are still characterized 
by certain barriers to transactions. For instance, foreigners often have to go through certain 
formalities, and incur costs to be able to trade overseas. With this in mind, the Amsterdam 
Option Exchange in 2000 decides that there might be interest amongst its clients and inves-
tors to trade options on EIPE shares on the Amsterdam exchange. Options on EIPE shares 
are listed in the Netherlands and a market is continually made in the securities67. Attention 
from the investing public, however, turns out being almost non-existent.
In December 2002 a professional trader takes a peek at these options and decides to compare 
the prices with those quoted in the US markets68. She is quite surprised to observe the 
following (all quotes in US $): 69
EIPE NL EIPE US
C apr 45 1.60-1.90 1.20-1.30
C apr 50 1.00-1.30 0.70-0.80
C apr 55 0.60-0.90 0.40-0.50
C jul 45 2.50-3.00 2.00-2.10
C jul 50 1.40-1.90 1.10-1.20
C jul 55 0.90-1.20 0.80-0.90
She could purchase an EIPE C apr 45 in the US for $1.30 and sell it in the Netherlands for 
$1.60, creating an immediate profit of $30 per option contract70. How is this possible: two 
seemingly identical objects having vastly different prices? Perhaps, she pondered, they are 
not identical. A thorough inspection was done, including analysis by the risk management 
67  A market being made means that there are continuous pricing quotes on which one can trade.
68  Overseas arbitrage is common practice in the financial markets: many shares have multiple listings on various 
exchanges in the world and simple algorithms are usually utilized to monitor price differences. In option 
markets this is less common and much more complicated.
69  C apr 45 denotes a call option on 100 shares of EIPE, expiring in April. 1.60-1.90 means that one will have 
to pay $1.90 to purchase the option and one will receive $1.60 to sell the option.








department, but nothing could be found; both securities had exactly the same specifications. 
So, was this a risk-free arbitrage opportunity?
One caveat showed up: exchanges are linked to clearing organizations. A clearing organization 
is essentially the warehouse of an exchange. It facilitates trading, arranging administrative 
matters such as transfers of money and securities between parties. In order to trade securi-
ties one needs to put up capital at the clearing organization, both for transaction purposes 
(liquidity) and as a guarantee against possible losses (solvency). Different exchanges have 
different clearing organizations, which usually are not linked to each other. In this case that 
meant that, even while the trade itself was entirely risk-free, capital had to be deposited at 
both the Dutch and the American clearing organizations until the position would unwind 
on the expiration date of the options. This has an important implication: because costs are 
incurred in setting up the position, certain trades are not profitable enough, given cost of 
capital and return on investment requirements. For instance, the $0.10 gain on EIPE C apr 
55 and the $0.20 gain on EIPE C jul 50 were not enough to offset these constraints71.
But other trades could be executed with enough profitability and so it was done. In three 
days 5000 options were bought and sold for an average net gain of $0.20, resulting in a 
$100,000 profit. After three days the opportunities disappeared; prices in the Netherlands 
and the United States now were in line with each other again.
What does this example tell us about the arbitrage mechanism? First of all, arbitrage op-
portunities are not obvious or easy to spot and execute. One has to be alert on spotting them, 
digging in the vast universe of financial products. Moreover, finding such an opportunity is 
indeed surprising, especially given the extremely high degree of similarity between the two 
securities in the example.
Secondly, arbitrage takes time: time for search and investigating the opportunity, time for 
execution, but also time until the gain is realized72. In fact it is entirely possible that the 
opportunity becomes even more advantageous. So the process is not only dynamic instead of 
static with instantaneous adjustments, but it is also to some extent indeterminate.
Thirdly, capital is required. As in textbook arbitrage—risk-free by definition—nothing needs 
to be said about risk attitudes or preferences in the example. A form of uncertainty presents 
71  July options, because of their later date of expiration, require a higher return in order to produce the same 
annualized return on investment.






















itself in the capital constraint: one might be forced for some reason to prematurely liquidate 
a position before the gain can be realized73.
Fourthly, this is clearly a specialized activity, not accessible to just any economic agent. 
Access to information, means of execution, and capital (see the previous point) make such 
transactions the domain of a relatively small group of experts74.
Fifthly, prices in this case are evidently subjective. It is not about one or the other price being 
too high or too low. Nothing needs to be said about the fair or fundamental value of the two 
securities except that they should be equal to one other.
And finally, in the process, over time, information can be revealed by the transaction. Other 
market participants, in particular the counterparties, will become aware of the differences in 
prices. This will tend to eliminate the arbitrage opportunity.
All in all, this example of real world arbitrage would seem to follow the depiction of the 
market process of entrepreneurial discovery quite closely. We have the trader in the role of 
entrepreneur looking for potential profit opportunities. Discovery of such an opportunity 
indeed lies ”midway between that of the deliberately produced information in standard 
search theory, and that of sheer windfall gain generated by pure chance” (Kirzner, 1997, 
p.72). And finally, in the process, driven by dynamic competition between entrepreneurs/
arbitrageurs, information is revealed and propagated through the market, which leads to 
exhaustion of existing opportunities but perhaps also to the discovery of new ones.
What also becomes apparent is that real arbitrage is not like the story of the $20 bills lying 
on the pavement. There are constraints, the opportunity is clouded by uncertainty, and it is 
not a matter of pure chance that can befall just anyone.
4.5 the PossIbIlIty of a MIddle ground
Now, it is nice to have a descriptive account of the arbitrage mechanism, but what are the 
implications for established finance theory? Does the Austrian perspective change the way we 
should think and theorize about what actually goes on in financial markets and the debate 
between neoclassical finance and behavioral finance? I assert that it can do in an important 
73  Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide an excellent illustration of how capital constraints and a limited number 
of agents can influence arbitrage.
74  MacKenzie has made the point, that, since the actors are a selective community, processes of social interaction, 







way. It alters how we should reflect on market efficiency, the domain where neoclassical 
finance has made its strongest claims. And it also helps to get a better, more realistic picture, 
a deeper insight in what agency in financial markets entails, an issue typically emphasized in 
behavioral finance. Moreover, there is no need to plainly reject the typical neoclassical and 
behavioral claims in full.
But before I foray in the specifics of reconciling the various accounts a question should be 
asked. Aren’t these theories so fundamentally opposed to each other and essentially differ-
ent that they are mutually excluding? Efficient contra inefficient, rational versus irrational/
bounded rational, these appear to be deep and profound differences of opinion. However, if 
we take a close look at the kinds of theories that we are dealing with, and see what essentially 
is claimed, it will become apparent that these apparent rivals can coexist.
Mäki (1992a) has argued that Austrian market process theory has the structure of a causal 
process theory in that it, first, provides an account of a process as a sequence of events, 
and, second, that it depicts the driving forces that set and keep the process in motion, i.e. 
the causes of the motion75. Entrepreneurship represents a form of causal agency. Alertness 
acts as a causal power in that, ignited by the possibility of profit, entrepreneurs perceive 
opportunities (which may or may not turn out to be real) and act with purpose on those 
perceptions76. But that only provides an account of the emergence of a process. We also need 
to specify what is produced and how the process is sustained. Mäki answers that question 
as well. In the Austrian market process the obvious candidate for the stuff that is produced 
and propagated is information –the Hayekian part of the market process in addition to the 
Misean part of entrepreneurship. Information is reflected in disequilibrium market prices 
which function as imperfect signals.
Causal process theories can be distinguished from ideal type theories. The latter are not so 
much concerned with realistic descriptions of the workings of the world but rather take the 
form of what the world would be like if certain conditions are fulfilled. These conditions can 
be axioms, assumptions, theorems and the like. In this regard Mäki contrasts Austrian theory 
with Walrasian general equilibrium theory where the assumption of complete information 
results in one equilibrium price which clears all markets. Neoclassical finance has a similar 
ideal type structure: given the absence of arbitrage, financial markets will turn out to be ef-
ficient. And likewise for behavorial finance: given the cognitive limitations of human agents, 
their behavior will not be in line with what rational choice theory dictates and will display 
systematic biases. But the fact that Austrian market process theory is a different kind of 
75  For Mäki’s writings on Austrian economics in connection to philosophy of science and methodology, see Mäki 
1991a, 1991b, 1992a.






















theory then neoclassical and behavioral finance does not suffice for complementarity of the 
former with the latter two.
To establish complementarity we need another insight on economic theories. Mäki (1992a) 
also argues that Austrian theory is an isolative theory in that it only is concerned with a 
particular slice of economic reality; in this case the essence of the functioning of the market 
as a process of entrepreneurial discovery. It aims to depict “the fundamental driving forces or 
the causal powers and the tendencies they give rise to” (ibid.). Elsewhere Mäki has argued ex-
tensively that the method of isolation is ubiquitous in economics (in particular Mäki1992b) 
and that appears to apply to neoclassical and behavioral finance as well.
The earlier remarks about neoclassical and behavioral finance can serve to formulate an 
essence for both of them. Neoclassical finance is about the (supposedly efficient) equilibrium 
outcome of the market process as the result of the No Arbitrage theorem and the interaction 
of economic agents. It hasn’t any specific claims to make about how that process actually 
takes place, or about the agents that are engaged in the process (cf. Ross, 2005). Similarly 
for behavioral finance where claims are made on the decision making of individual agents in 
financial matters. It is neither about the process which is comprised of multiple agents, nor 
about the aggregate outcomes of the interaction between those agents. These theories focus 
on distinct slices of economic reality. There is a theory about individual agents and there is 
another theory about market outcomes. And, as I propose, there is yet another theory which 
tells us something about how market outcomes come about: Austrian market process theory. 
However, there are tensions which need to be addressed.
4.6 austrIan Versus neoClassICal
The main tension between the neoclassical and Austrian point of view would appear to be 
situated around the concept of equilibrium. Equilibrium is an important aspect in finance: 
it plays an explicit role in a number of theories. It becomes truly apparent in the work of 
Modigliani and Miller on the capital structure of the firm. They use an arbitrage proof 
for their theorem that—under certain assumptions—the choice between debt and equity 
financing is irrelevant to the value of a firm. Profit-seeking investors will ensure that the risk/
return trade-off of debt and equity instruments will be equal: an equilibrium situation. In 
the words of Merton Miller (1999) himself: “The M&M propositions… are about equilib-
rium in capital markets—what equilibrium looks like”. And indeed, given the assumptions 








Where equilibrium really takes centre stage is in asset pricing models, beginning with the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). CAPM tells what asset prices should be in relation to 
the market as a whole, i.e. their equilibrium value, depending only on an asset’s covariance 
with the market (Varian, 1993). That covariance has become known as beta. In its original 
conception CAPM is a so-called partial equilibrium model: it only pertains to one specific 
market77. But a general equilibrium derivation is also possible78.
In later developments more factors besides beta were incorporated leading to the so-called 
multifactor models where more state variables can enter the equation79. Stephen Ross, ex-
plicitly starting from a no-arbitrage argument, developed Arbitrage Pricing Theory, which is 
a partial equilibrium approach. Robert C. Merton at MIT came up with an intertemporal 
capital asset pricing model, using the concepts of continuous time analysis (see Merton, 
1975). His approach has been labelled a full general equilibrium model, having its roots in 
the work of Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu (Bernstein, 1992, Miller, 1999a).
For the purpose of this discussion the difference is best expressed in terms of relative and 
absolute prices. General equilibrium is a form of absolute pricing, while partial equilibrium 
can be interpreted as more of a relative pricing approach80. The latter would clearly sit better 
with the subjectivism of Austrian economics, dating back to the Marginalist revolution and 
Carl Menger. So the semantics, what we mean by equilibrium, matters. A general equilib-
rium portrayal with all markets at all times in a state of equilibrium seems less realistic—and 
even more objectionable for an Austrian—than the assumption of one market being in 
equilibrium.
But even when we look at a single market, say a market for one particular stock, character-
ized by thousands of transactions each day, what does “equilibrium” mean? The only notion 
that makes sense is that each and every one of the single transaction prices is an equilibrium 
price, bringing together supply and demand at that point in time. The formulation makes 
something abundantly clear: there is invariable change, equilibrium is virtually constantly 
shifting. Clearly then an aggregate analysis for the stock market as a whole in terms of static 
equilibrium is problematic.
That is admitted by almost everybody. Yet such a description of capital markets is a keystone 
of finance. The Efficient Market Hypothesis comes in many guises (Lo and MacKinlay, 
1999) but essentially, in Eugene Fama’s own words (1970), it boils down to the idea that 
77  Conform the Marshallian stance of the Chicago School.
78  Much depends on what one comprises under the phrase “market portfolio”.
79  See for instance Cochrane (2001), for an exhaustive survey of asset pricing.
80  Although there are partial equilibrium models which provide absolute prices, like the Consumption Capital 






















“prices fully reflect all available information”. That means that there is no possibility of 
outperforming the market, that there is instantaneous adjustment to new information, that 
there exist no arbitrage opportunities. In other words: a state of equilibrium and the omis-
sion of a process that would lead to such a state.
Finance, in the words of Perry Mehrling (2005), is about time, risk, and uncertainty: match-
ing assets and liabilities to deal with the various hands that we are dealt with in life. The 
distinction between risk (quantifiable) and uncertainty (unquantifiable) is an important one. 
Most finance scholars, and economists in general, seem to be aware of the distinction, if we 
go by some of their words. But after acknowledging the existence of uncertainty, not much 
is said about it anymore. Through simplifying assumptions the emphasis in the analysis 
typically shifts to a quantifiable approach of the problem (see for example Merton, 1975).
The simplification is not a problem per se; in fact, that is part of doing science. But that does 
not make uncertainty disappear. In the social sciences in general, and in financial markets 
in particular, we would be well advised not to forget about it. Bernstein (1996) notes that 
“Knight’s ideas are particularly relevant to financial markets where all decisions reflect a 
forecast of the future and where surprise occurs regularly”. For Austrians the main reason 
for rejecting equilibrium reasoning lies in the recognition of radical, Knightian uncertainty.
Example 2: radical uncertainty within markets
Until approximately fifteen years ago Royal Dutch/Shell and Unilever were so-called Anglo-
Dutch companies. Half of their shares were listed on the London Stock Exchange in the 
United Kingdom and half on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the Netherlands. A naïve 
account would suggest that both stocks represent the same value, of course adjusted for the 
different currencies. After all they represent the same piece of ownership, the same claim on 
future discounted cash flows. But in reality they never trade at the same prices. Now there 
are plenty of good reasons why they don’t: fiscal regimes, market liquidity, institutional 
investment structures all differ between the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Still, 
for trading purposes the dual shares should share a great degree of similarity. And they 
usually do. The way most arbitrageurs would trade on this similarity is by watching the 
spread between the Dutch and the British shares and apply statistics to decide which share 
to buy and which to sell short. The moving average would serve as point of reference and the 
spread would be put on and taken of according to the number of standard deviations that 
the spread was moving away from the mean. Note that use of a moving average provides a 
built-in safeguard for making sure that the position cannot easily get out of hand when the 
spread keeps widening and liquidity constraints force elimination of the position. It implic-







Because of the fundamental relationship and its supposed logical predictability, the position 
could be quite large, using considerable leverage as is usual in arbitrage trading.
Being among the largest companies in the world the Dutch shares of Royal Dutch/Shell and 
Unilever were also included in Standards & Poor’s 500 Index, the leading American index 
for large cap stocks. In July of 2002 Standards & Poor’s decided it wanted the S&P 500 in-
dex to consist only of American companies: the non-US companies Royal Dutch/Shell and 
Unilever would be replaced by domestic ones. The announcement came as a surprise to the 
market and led to mayhem. The share prices of both Dutch shares gapped (a discontinuous 
jump) and this set the spread with the British shares suddenly up to unprecedented levels. 
The S&P 500 was the leading index and as such the leading benchmark for many fund 
managers. Their performance is measured by comparison to the index and in many cases 
their investment policy was, or had to be, investing by following the index. The consequence 
of removal of the Dutch shares was that fund managers had to remove them as well from 
their portfolios: enormous amounts of Dutch shares had to be sold by the mutual funds. 
Moreover, they had to be sold quickly in order to keep tracking the index. While some may 
have gotten lucky by being short Dutch shares and long British ones, many arbitrageurs were 
caught in a trap. Moreover, with the spread getting so far out of line and leverage being used, 
some were forced to liquidate their positions at the most negative of points, exacerbating 
the situation81. A situation arose where at the same time while people were liquidating their 
positions taking huge losses, the profit opportunity was unprecedented. This can hardly be 
regarded as a stable, equilibrium situation. In time, the spread gradually moved back to more 
normal levels (which is only logical if the trading strategy remained somewhat identical)82.
Could the arbitrage traders have foreseen the decision to remove the shares from the S&P 
500, a decision taken by policy makers and which had nothing to do with (beliefs about) the 
underlying performance of the companies? Judging from the market reactions the market 
hadn’t anticipated such an event. So it did neither enter the trading model, nor the risk 
management models.
Acknowledging uncertainty sheds light on various issues in finance. If we accept Knight’s 
claim that economic life, “business”, is characterized by uncertainty, then so should asset 
prices. Market prices are estimates. Covariances of assets with the market portfolio are esti-
mates as well for the simple reason that the market portfolio is not a well-defined concept83. 
Furthermore, covariances are about past behavior and as Harry Markowitz already noted 
81  Along the lines of what Shleifer and Vishny (1997) show.
82  This arbitrage trade is actually still employed by hedge funds.
83  This is the point of the so-called Roll critique: the market portfolio is an ambiguous concept because theoreti-























in the 1950s, past experience is unlikely to be a very good guide to future performance 
(Bernstein, 1992, p.63).
In a sense the Efficient Market Hypothesis does justice to the consequences of uncertainty: 
the current price is the best estimate, rendering prediction useless. The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, also known as the Random Walk, is what has given rise to the big question of 
financial markets: can one, consistently, beat the market? The evidence is mixed, depend-
ing on method, time-frame, data massaging and some insurmountable methodological 
issues84 85. Fama himself acknowledges that “like all models, market efficiency…is a faulty 
description of price information” (1998) and in time he has adjusted and refined his opinion 
somewhat. His claim, however, remains that in general nothing fits better –in terms of 
statistical significance—and that critics, mostly coming from behavioral finance, have not 
been able to come up with a more convincing model.
But in a way the efficient markets argument excludes the possibility of error and denies the 
dynamic character of price formation in financial markets. The point becomes sharply clear 
when a translation is made from the Efficient Market Hypothesis into the assumption of a 
lognormal distribution for asset prices, which is quasi-universal in theorizing in finance. It 
is a perfect example of transforming uncertainty into risk. When the distribution is known, 
either a priori or through empirical results, we speak of risk, just like Knight meant it. But 
the lognormal distribution is not the distribution that is observed empirically (see Bernstein, 
1992). Real distributions typically display so-called fat tails, i.e. a higher frequency of ex-
treme values. These types of distribution are problematic in theorizing and model building, 
which makes it convenient to use the lognormal distribution86. The step of transforming 
uncertainty into risk can be defended and is common in other areas of economics and 
abstraction and idealization are part of doing economics and science in general (see Mäki, 
1992b). But by adding subjective estimates to objective risk, the meaning of “risk” changes 
and is no longer in line with Knight’s definition. In making claims about the real world we 
should keep in mind that we are also dealing with uncertainty, besides objectifiable risk, and 
that what is actually empirically observed is a distribution with fat tails.
84  There is an extensive amount of empirical work on market efficiency, see for example Jensen (1978), Malkiel 
(2003), Shiller (2003).
85  The Efficient Market Hypothesis is a joint hypothesis. Tests of market efficiency always imply simultaneously 
the test of an asset pricing model such as CAPM.
86  “Fat tails” are characteristic of infinite variance distributions. These distributions prohibit the mean-variance 
analysis which is so typical for much economic and econometric work. The possible accuracy of infinite vari-
ance distributions, as put forward by Benoit Mandelbrot, raised widespread concerns amongst economists 
over the validity of their results, which were based on normal distributions. The issue was settled in a rather 








Something similar applies to Option Pricing Theory. Option Pricing Theory is a theory that 
actually deals with the open-endedness which is typical of many situations in the real world. 
Black, Scholes, and Merton developed tools to put a price tag on uncertainty. Derivatives 
derive their value from another asset: they are contingent claims. It is obvious that derivatives 
can only have value if there is uncertainty surrounding the underlying asset. The key to 
Option Pricing Theory is the volatility of the underlying asset, measured by its standard 
deviation. Unfortunately, volatility is an unpredictable entity: we can only determine af-
terwards how much movement has occurred. That means that volatility is uncertain, as has 
been acknowledged by Black: “I am unwilling to write down any definitive model of the 
general process by which volatilities change, and then use statistical methods to estimate the 
numbers that appear in the model” (in Mehrling, 2005). In other words, Black refused to 
transform volatility from an uncertain entity into a risky one and recognized the difference 
between the two.
The problem in finance is also methodological. As was shown in chapter 2, the method of 
argumentation in finance, in both the neoclassical and behavioral varieties is usually a narrow 
statistical treatment of empirical data. Methodologically it is positivist in the particular sense 
of Milton Friedman’s 1953 essay “The Methodology of Positive Economics” (Miller, 1999b). 
Now there is nothing wrong with good empirical work and proper use of statistics therein87. 
But there is a sharp distinction between objective probabilities and subjective estimates. The 
former is not subjected to uncertainty and applies to the future as it does to the present and 
has done to the past. The latter is tentative; an educated guess for present and future, based, 
among others, on past experience but not exclusively so. Most finance research clearly is 
concerned with the domain of subjective estimates, but is not explicitly presented as such.88
In this regard, one may sympathize with the Austrians in their distrust of quantitative 
methods and formal modelling. Because those methods do not justice to the substantive 
content of the market process, and because of the frequent inappropriateness of an exclu-
sively quantitative approach. The Austrian School has been commended for its attention to 
methodology, compared to other strands of economics (see Hands, 2001). Finance never 
has been bothered too much by methodological considerations. In chapter two Merton 
Miller was quoted: “the profession, from the outset, wholeheartedly adopted the Friedman 
positivist view: that what counts is not the literal accuracy of the assumptions but the predic-
tions of the model” (1999b). Predictions are either borne out by the facts or not. But in the 
face of radical uncertainty awareness of this and some modesty about predictions should be 
advisable.
87  see McCloskey, 1994, 1998, and especially 1996 and McCloskey & Ziliak, 2008






















I propose that the Austrian market process account, which tells a story of price discovery, 
knowledge, and information and how people deal with those things, can supplement the 
claim made by the Efficient Market Hypothesis. The equilibrating tendency of the market 
process is a better description of what is going on in actual markets. Indeed, many of the 
finest finance scholars have acknowledged this. Fischer Black again serves as an excellent 
example. Black was a firm admirer and believer of the equilibrium concept as there ever was 
one; reportedly he even tried to apply CAPM to various aspects of his life (Mehrling, 2005). 
But he recognized the difference between value and price and he admitted that what actually 
happens in markets is a different story89:
An efficient market is one in which price is within a factor 2 of value, i.e. the price is 
more than half of value and less than twice value… The factor of 2 is arbitrary, of course. 
Intuitively, though, it seems reasonable to me, in the light of sources of uncertainty 
about value and the strength of the forces tending to cause price to return to value. By 
this definition, I think almost all markets are efficient almost all of the time. ‘Almost all’ 
means at least 90%” (Black, 1986).
And further back in time, for James Tobin it was his discomfort with the highly restric-
tive assumption of complete equilibrium at all times that led him towards the Separation 
Theorem90.
More recently, others have explicitly suggested leaving the equilibrium concept behind us 
(for instance Campbell, 2000). Interesting in this regard from an Austrian point of view is 
the work of Harald Benink et al. (Benink and Bossaerts (2001), Benink, Gordillo, Pardo and 
Stephens, (2010)). They label their approach Neo-Austrian, referring to Hayek’s insight on 
knowledge and learning, and Kirzner’s entrepreneurial discovery process. At the same point 
Benink et al. apply familiar tools of finance theorizing: formal model building, simulation, 
statistics. This might be objectionable to some in the Austrian School, but it does provide an 
illustrative way of comparing an Austrian-type perspective to the neoclassical one: it shows 
what disequilibrium—with an equilibrating tendency—looks like.
What it looks like is a “process…stable yet continuously featuring inefficiencies, keeping the 
market from reaching its fully efficient equilibrium” (2001). Investors are not completely 
ignorant, but their knowledge is limited: “(they) are unable to exploit all inefficiencies be-
cause they cannot make reliable inferences” (2001). Their conclusion is that “if inefficiencies 
89  Fischer Black, of course, was not solely an academic, having spent a considerable part of his career on Wall 
Street at Goldman Sachs.
90  Tobin’s Separation Theorem states that the selection process for a risky efficient portfolio is completely separate 







are of the neo-Austrian kind, not much can be said beyond admitting that inefficiencies 
exist”. Benink and Bossaerts present this as a paradox, but is it really? It is not when one 
acknowledges the existence and presence of radical uncertainty, the kind of uncertainty that 
causes disturbances and forces us to grapple with reality.
That is exactly what an Austrian would argue. Thus the findings of Benink and Bossaerts 
could be regarded as evidence of the validity of Austrian insights in the market process. They 
are also of importance for the debate between neoclassical and behavioral finance in that they 
show that market inefficiency is not necessarily to be equated with opportunities to beat the 
market in a consistent fashion. The keyword here is “consistent”. It is one thing to state that a 
market is not fully efficient and another thing to claim that there exist systematic tendencies 
in that market which can be regularly exploited.
That takes a bite out of some of the behavioral criticism, in particular from Richard Thaler 
and his followers who claim that there is money to be made from the so-called anomalies 
(see for instance DeBondt and Thaler, 1986 and the previous chapter)91. Others, like Robert 
Shiller (1989) and Stephen LeRoy (1989), seem to claim only inefficiency, not opportunities 
to make money. The market displays too much volatility to be deemed efficient, but is also 
too volatile and unpredictable to make easy money. The latter position seems reconcilable 
with the Austrian perspective of disequilibrium.
On the other side one cannot fail to notice the similarities between the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and Hayek’s thought on knowledge and learning. Both are about information 
and price formation, about discovery and dispersal of knowledge through the market. The 
Efficient Market Hypothesis as such is clearly not a realistic proposition. It highlights the 
link between information and price formation but supposes that people translate infor-
mation unambiguously and instantaneously in prices. The Hayekian insights take a step 
back from the idealized and unrealistic picture of efficient markets, but can be regarded as 
complementary, providing content to the process. Hayek and the Austrians give us a handle 
on how actual prices come about, what they accomplish, and in general provide an account 
of the coordinating properties of the market.
Quite a bit has been written on the links between Hayek and neoclassical economics, in 
particular the Chicago School. Recently Colin-Jaeger & Delcey (2019) took this one step 
further towards finance by investigating the similarities between Hayek and Eugene Fama. 
They conclude that, despite methodological differences, the theory of prices, based on infor-
mation, of Fama and Hayek is epistemologically similar, as is their conception of efficiency. 






















In other words, they share common understanding of how markets, competition and prices 
work based on a common understanding of the notion of information. “This common un-
derstanding reveals a common representation of the interaction between individuals and then 
an answer to the problem of coordination” and “rationality is consequently not a hypothesis 
but the result of competition”, according to Colin-Jaeger and Delcey (ibid.). Furthermore, 
they contend that Hayek underlines the entrepreneurial process of the competition, with 
reference to Kirzner and that traders may be seen as (Hayekian) entrepreneurs.
Finally, as was shown in the example, the market process, with its focus on alert entrepreneurs 
looking for potential profit opportunities provides an account of the dynamics that drive 
the market towards efficiency, towards equilibrium. One of the attractions of equilibrium 
theorizing is the identification of optima: states where some criterion is maximized. But not 
much is sacrificed if we take an Austrian non-equilibrium stance. The outcome from the 
preceding analysis is still a preferable one from a social perspective: a fair, reasonably well 
functioning market, tending towards optimality.
Does this render the equilibrium concept entirely useless, as is claimed, for instance, by 
Ludwig Lachmann? I don’t think so, and neither do Kirzner and Hayek (see Kirzner, 1992). 
It is clear that in finance equilibrium theorizing has produced impressive results92. Neoclas-
sical and Austrian analysis, both rooted in the Marginalist Revolution, analysis can coexist, 
depending on the questions asked and what it is that we want to explain –the explananda. 
4.7 austrIan Versus behaVIoral
It would appear that behavioral finance would be in a better position to deal with uncertainty. 
After all, their starting point is decision making under uncertainty. Behavioral economists 
have in common an emphasis on cognitive limitations and the role of perception, intuition, 
reflexivity, and the use of heuristics in complex situations. They do recognize the troubles 
of individuals finding their way in an uncertain world. However, the way behavioral econo-
mists treat decision making does not differ much from their neoclassical colleagues by the 
transformation of (Knightean) uncertainty into risk.
Behavioral finance commonly backs up its claims with experiments. Typically in experiments 
the environment is controlled, the goal being to isolate certain aspects. Which is common 
practice in science. But what is the value of the outcomes of such experiments, done in a 
closed setting, for the open reality? The question, also known as the problem of external 
92  Perhaps we should think of an analogy with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which defines the equilib-







validity, is particularly relevant when uncertainty is considered. After all, it is precisely the 
dynamic, complex character of real life that causes uncertainty in the first place. Experiments 
are typically framed as choices between cut-and-dried alternatives. Let’s suppose it involves 
the choice between receiving $20 today or $25 tomorrow. The idea is that we can infer 
something about time-preference here. It would seem like a good idea to wait for a day and 
receive $5 more. But who is to say that, when I choose the first option of $20 today, I won’t 
receive some other amount tomorrow? Those kinds of possibilities are typically excluded. 
Experiments might not be very appropriate for situations where uncertainty is prevalent, as 
for instance in financial markets.
Another issue is the claim that there exist systematic anomalies in financial markets caused 
by less than rational investor behavior, that there are irrational acts we all commit. For 
instance, in one of the earlier contributions in behavioral finance, “Does the Stock Market 
Overreact?” (1985) DeBondt and Thaler claim that stock prices systematically overshoot 
(both up and down) upon the arrival of new information. This is due to investors updat-
ing their beliefs in a non-Bayesian manner: more recent information is overweighed. From 
an Austrian point of view, that result is perfectly defensible. Kirzner has repeatedly (1992, 
1997, 2000) pointed out that, in the face of the imperfection of knowledge and the element 
of surprise, people are frequently overly optimistic or pessimistic. Such perceptions and 
the resulting mistakes are essential parts of the make-up of human agents, entrepreneurs in 
particular. But “although entrepreneurs make errors, there is no tendency for entrepreneurial 
errors to be made” (Kirzner, 1997). That leaves the behavioral claim just as deficient as the 
standard neoclassical picture of the omniscient rational maximizer. Uncertainty entails that 
every situation is unique and that people’s actions and reactions are not uniform (Knight, 
1921). Any grand claim about systematic behavior therefore denies the indeterminateness of 
life caused by uncertainty.
Still, one of the biggest issues in the debate between neoclassical and behavioral finance 
concerns the rationality of investors. Most of us simply do not behave according to the 
normative model of rational decision-making, as has been made abundantly clear by Daniel 
Kahneman, Amos Tversky, Richard Thaler and others. They take issue with the assumption 
that “only rational behavior can survive in a competitive environment” (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979).
Financial markets are (or are supposed to be) vigorously competitive. So is the irrationality, 
which belongs to our psychological make-up present and visible in the market, as has been 
suggested by Thaler but also much earlier by Keynes (see Raines and Leathers, 2000)? The 
neoclassical reply is the idea of “a few good men”: “neoclassical finance is a theory of sharks 






















arbitrage is the driving force in financial markets and for arbitrage to work there only need 
to be someone who prefers more over less. In other words, there is no need for a universal 
rationality assumption. In the words of Ross: “I, for one, never thought that people—myself 
included—are all that rational in their behavior. To the contrary, I am always amazed at what 
people do. But that was never the point of financial theory” (ibid.).
The point is that in a highly competitive market environment suboptimal behavior should 
be weeded out. Despite people constantly behaving “irrational”, the market outcome can be 
pretty efficient, as has been forcefully argued by many, for instance Merton Miller (1987) 
and Vernon Smith (1989). That is also a conclusion of the Kirznerian Austrians. In general, 
Hayek (1967) notes, “that the systems of rules of individual conduct and the order of ac-
tions which results from the individuals acting in accordance with them are not the same 
thing”. For Austrians the economic issue par excellence is the aggregation and coordination 
question. Despite the method of praxeology, their focus lies not so much on the actions of 
individuals, but on the consequences of the interaction between individuals.
One important question remains: who are these arbitrageurs/entrepreneurs who make it 
right? What is this “smart money”? If we are all subject to uncertainty and an open-ended 
future with which we have to deal with our cognitive limitations and “irrational” inhibitions, 
how can we expect that there are people who constantly make optimal decisions? I believe 
it rather unlikely to encounter such people; in fact I’ll posit that there aren’t any such living 
persons.
The answer to the question lies in separating real human individuals from agents in financial 
markets. There is no such thing as someone being a one hundred percent entrepreneur or a 
one hundred percent speculator. Both aspects are present in real people. Heterogeneity of 
agents resides within actors, not between them. Mises has said it correctly: “in any real and 
living economy, every actor is always an entrepreneur and a speculator” (quoted by Wubben, 
1995). In finance a similar distinction has been made between informed traders, arbitrageurs 
who make the most out of information, and noise traders, who might believe they act on 
genuine information but are actually not doing so (see Black, 1986). 
Noise can actually be regarded as the main reason why we observe so much trading in 
financial markets: people having different opinions and acting on those varying opinions. 
However, it is not so easy to distinguish between noise and “true” information. It is only 
ex-post that we can determine who had it right. In fact, an investor can be both noise trader 
and informed trader at the same time: he can be right about one investment idea while being 
wrong on another count. He can be noisy one day, informed the next. We simply cannot tell 







noise is filtered out and that we can determine whether one has been a successful entrepre-
neur or a speculator. 
The actual practice of professional investing is an effective illustration of this. There aren’t 
any investment managers with a track record of consistent outperformance. Even highly 
successful and well-known names, such as George Soros and Warren Buffett, have taken 
their lumps occasionally. In fact, there is evidence that the performance of money managers 
is mean-reverting: outperformance in one time period increases the likelihood of underper-
formance in the next period (Bernstein, 1992).
That does shred some doubt on the behavioral claim. If investment performance is not 
traceable to individual human behavior, but rather the result of “pervasive market forces” 
(Miller, 1987), how much do individual characteristics matter? Moreover, if all our behavior 
is tentative, while still being deliberate and purposeful, an element of randomness enters 
the equation inevitably. In this way speculation, so often considered as undesirable and 
damaging to society, loses that negative connotation, as it also does in the writings of Mises 
and Knight. Speculation is an inextinguishable part of the discovery process.
Methodological individualism and attention for so-called microfoundations are hallmarks 
of the great majority of approaches in economics, including the Austrian School with Mises 
at the forefront (Hands, 2001). But Mises was aware that entrepreneurship is a property 
of individuals, not a typology or class of individuals. There is no use or need for a fully 
reductionist account of what goes on in financial markets.
4.8 ConClusIon
Austrian market process theory can bridge some of the schism in finance between neo-
classical and behavioral finance. It shouldn’t come as a surprise that the Austrian School 
has interesting things to say about finance and financial markets. On the neoclassical side, 
Hayek, whose influence goes far beyond Austrian thinking (or economics) alone, spent a 
substantial part of his academic life in Chicago. Fritz Machlup, himself a student of Mises, 
was the teacher at Johns Hopkins of Merton Miller who has had a profound influence on 
later scholars of neoclassical finance. Mehrling (2005), while dismissing it in the end, en-
tertains the idea that Fischer Black somehow belonged to the Austrian School. Black’s view 
that financial markets may not be fully economically efficient, but that they are to a large 






















Austrian and Chicago School share a preference for, and belief in, markets as coordinating 
institutions93.
With the more Keynesian oriented programs Austrians share, among other things, the ac-
knowledgement of uncertainty; in the case of the post-Keynesians even very explicitly. What 
they do not share, however, is the Keynesian scepticism on the working of markets. Keynes, 
despite being an avid investor and speculator himself, considered the stock market a beauty 
contest: “a game of Snap, of Old Maid, of Musical Chairs” (quoted in Bernstein, 1992). 
But that scepticism doesn’t seem fully warranted, it appears. “The dark forces of time and 
uncertainty” are not so sinister through Austrian eyes. With behavioral school the Austrians 
share recognition of error and the faltering nature of human behavior, despite differences 
about how these affect aggregated outcomes.
Some Austrians may have issues with the foregoing analysis. They may object to the use of 
quantitative and statistical methods by Benink et al. And, as pointed out by Colin-Jaeger 
& Delcey (2019), despite the epistemological similarities between the ideas of Fama and 
Hayek, their methods were profoundly different: the analytical quantitative rigor of neoclas-
sical finance versus the descriptive causal process approach of the Austrians. They may also 
object to the real world examples, used as illustrations here. But the empirical material does 
fit in with Hayek’s more permissive methodological stance of discovering patterns.
Austrian economics can provide a bridge between the behavioral and neoclassical approaches 
to finance. What is more, it also provides a descriptive bridge between practice and theory, 
between academic finance and the real events in financial markets. That is important because 
it would seem that the various roles of theory and models are frequently conflated94. One 
can often encounter the idea that finance, following Milton Friedman’s adage, is about 
meaningful predictions. At the same time, the Efficient Market Hypothesis can be inter-
preted as stating that there is no meaningful prediction possible. Finance theory, despite that 
most academic work has been and is empirical (see chapter two), is essentially a normative, 
prescriptive theory; not how it actually is but how it ought to be. The practical value of a de-
scriptive account, such as proposed here, resides in identification of deeper causal processes, 
finding potentially relevant tendencies. Austrian market process theory can deliver those for 
financial markets.
The dangers of indiscriminately applying normative theory in the practice have become 
painfully obvious in the notorious demise of LTCM, a hedge fund that pursued an extreme 
93  Quite a few prominent Chicago School economists appear to have been labeled “Hayekian” by certain authors 
(Colin-Jaeger & Delcey, 2019).







arbitrage strategy (see Lowenstein, 2000; Mehrling, 2005; MacKenzie, 2006). Nobel Prize 
winners Scholes and Merton were actively involved in LTCM, somehow believing that the 
world had started resembling their model world more and more, implicitly assuming that 
uncertainty had become negligible or that it was transformed correctly into quantifiable risk.
It is precisely that uncertainty that has become one of the main concerns of regulators and 
policy makers with regard to financial markets, and rightfully so after the events of 2007-
2009. Today’s financial system is a global sphere with uncountable links and connections. 
Capital is, together with information, the fastest moving resource in modern society. It is 
practically impossible to attach meaningful, objective probabilities on potential dangers. 
But that doesn’t mean that we should forget about those dangers: a system is as strong as its 
weakest link.
Even when the weakest link seems to give way the Austrian account of the market process 
provides explanation –and perhaps consolation. “Crashes” seem a lot less formidable when 
one regards the market as a dynamic process. It is not simply that “what goes up, must come 
down”. Rather financial markets are a dynamic environment where, through trial and error, 
participants learn and discover while at the same time being put on the wrong foot again by 
a new sequence of events. In a way financial markets, despite all the turmoil, have proven to 
be quite robust and resilient institutions of society, even after the events of 2007 and 2008; 




 The Cash Value of Performativity in Finance95
Performativity is a concept that relates to the idea that theory and 
practice interact and influence each other, a theme which runs 
throughout this dissertation. Performativity can be described as 
the idea that a theory or an aspect of a theory such as a model in 
some form enacts the reality it is intended to describe. This chapter 
scrutinizes the arguments brought forward on the performativity of 
finance theory, in particular as presented by Donald MacKenzie. 
95  This chapter is an extension of and builds on Daemen, 2008: Review of Donald MacKenzie An Engine, Not 

























Since the beginning of the millennium there has been renewed strong interest in finance 
from sociological circles. In Knorr-Cetina and Preda (2005) one can find a collection of 
contributions and Preda (2007) provides a systematic categorization of various strands of 
work in what has been labelled “the social studies of finance”97. That is to be commended 
since finance has emerged and developed as the pluralist product of a variety of disciplines 
(see chapter 1). It would do well, even having grown into a distinct field of its own, to keep 
an eye out for what is said about its subject matter outside of its own narrow scientific 
community.
Out of the various sociological approaches to finance, quite a bit of attention was caught by 
work on so-called performativity, originating in the more general performative turn in eco-
nomics. Performativity of economic theory –a concept introduced by Michel Callon—has 
drawn considerable attention in various academic conversations (see MacKenzie, Muniesa 
and Siu, 2007, for a collection of thoughts on the topic). It implies that “(e)conomics per-
forms, shapes and formats the economy rather than observing how it functions” (Callon, 
1998).
Donald MacKenzie took Callon’s idea to heart and attempted to apply it in an empirical way 
to the case of finance and financial markets. In collaboration with others, he has produced a 
series of papers (MacKenzie, 2003a, 2003b, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2006b, 2007; MacKenzie 
and Millo 2003, MacKenzie, Buenza and Hardie 2006) culminating in his 2006 book “An 
Engine, Not A Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets”. His work has received quite 
a bit of attention from various corners (see for instance Merton and Bodie (2004), Guala 
(2007), Mirowski and Nik-Khah (2007), Callon (2007), Mäki (2013), Bernstein (2007), 
Daemen (2008), Teira (2009)). 
That attention was well deserved: “An Engine, Not A Camera” was a wonderful book: simply 
a good read for anyone with an interest in finance and financial markets. But it also provides 
a different perspective on finance: a sociological perspective, using the concepts, tools and 
methods of sociology, whilst not shying away from treating the dominating concepts of the 
discipline of finance itself. 
His analysis is also of philosophical interest as an example of actually looking at “science in 
action” highlighting the Kuhnian notion of science as socially shaped and influenced. But 
the most waves have been made by the performativity claim: theory shaping and altering its 







subject matter: the practice it is intending to describe. Judging by the received attention, it 
would seem that MacKenzie c.s. in examining the development of option pricing theory in 
combination with the rise of option markets had produced a veritable Kuhnian exemplar 
for performativity in economics. Indeed, performativity with regard to finance and financial 
markets, in particular option theory and the Black-Scholes model, is still considered as one 
of the landmark cases of the program.
While the initial hype surrounding performativity appears to have disappeared somewhat98, 
a couple of more recent publications (Muniesa, 2014, Boldyrev & Svetlova, 2016) have 
shown that there is still interest in the concept99. Muniesa’s contribution being more concep-
tual, for instance dealing with the discussions that have emerged about what performativity 
in economics exactly means, while Boldyrev & Svetlova provide a collection of essays which 
essentially is an update on the status of the performativity program and how it could be 
used. Both Muniesa and Boldyrev & Svetlova explicitly point out the work of MacKenzie, in 
particular the 2006 and 2007 books, as seminal with regard to performativity in economics.
It should be obvious from the earlier chapters that I share MacKenzie’s attention for the 
important, interactive role that finance theory has played in the evolving practice of the fi-
nancial markets. He argues persuasively that the theory has had a deep and profound impact 
on the practice, a performative impact, by which he means that the theory has helped shape 
the reality it refers too. However it is worthwhile to scrutinize his claims more closely, both 
from the angle of finance theory and from a philosophical angle with regard to his arguments 
for performativity of finance theories.
MacKenzie’s most remarkable, and probably most controversial, claim was that the Black-
Scholes-Merton option pricing model may have been performative in a very strong, so-called 
Barnesian, sense. Barnesian performativity entails that practical use of a model or theory 
shapes the process to which the theory/model refers along the lines of the theory/model. 
While being careful in his assertion, Barnesian performativity was where, in his own words, 
his main interest lied. In the 2006 book MacKenzie already admits that it might be hard 
to make a compelling case for Barnesian performativity. In a recent contribution (Bamford 
& MacKenzie, 2018) his stance appears to be modified somewhat: the phrase “Barnesian” 
performativity does not feature at all in the 2018 paper. Instead the focus has shifted to 
the opposite of Barnesian performativity: counterperformativity100. Counterperformativity 
98  Brisset (2017a) remarks that “The two main architects of a performativist sociology, Michel Callon and Don-
ald MacKenzie, seem to have moved on to other subjects, while the critical power attached to performativity is 
now firmly rejectedby several heterodox economists precisely because of its lack of a critical spirit with respect 
to economic theories”.
99  See for instance Braun (2017), Breljak & Kersting (2017), Brisset (2017a), Kuchař (2017), Nørholm (2018).























entails that the practice develops contrary to what the theory or model posits. In both cases 
theory operates as a constitutive mechanism: it creates practice.
I urge caution on making the strong, Barnesian en counterperformativity, claims, especially 
in the way they were presented in the, still influential, 2006 book. In what follows I will 
provide two objections. The first one is based on the epistemic content of option pricing 
theory. Second, some methodological clarification and precision is in order about when 
talking about theories, models, and formulas and their truth in relation to the nature of 
economic phenomena.
5.2 Callon’s PerforMatIVIty
The concept of performativity as such is not novel. It stems from speech-act theory and was 
conceived in the 1950s by the philosopher of language J.L. Austin. In brief, a “performative 
utterance” implies not just saying something, but also performing an action, a so-called 
illocutionary act. Classic examples are the naming of a ship and the phrases used in wedding 
ceremonies. By using certain words in a particular context something is accomplished: the 
ship becomes S.S. Queen Elizabeth; Tom and Jen become husband and wife.
Performativity applied to economics is of much more recent date. Michel Callon introduced 
it in 1998. As far as I understand it, economic theory being performative implies that it 
shapes and alters its subject matter: the practice it is intending to describe. Economics is 
embedded in the economy; they constitute a hybrid forum. That provides a reason why 
economics is relevant. On the other hand it also implies that it makes no sense to regard 
economics as a positivist discipline separate from the constructed reality of the economy 
(Callon, 1998). Which indicates that performativity has affinity with what has been called 
social constructivism or constructionism (see Hacking, 1999).
What about performativity in economics though: what does it mean for an economic theory, 
or a theory in general, to be performative? Callon himself sets out to answer that question 
in “Do Economists Make Markets? On the Performativity of Economics” (2007), edited 
by MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu. Callon’s starting point is clearly connected to his work in 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) where one of the core ideas is that of the opposing epistemo-
logical views of, on the one hand, science as a mirror of reality, versus, on the other hand, 
science as an intervening and transforming participant in reality (p. 314)101. For economics 
that translates in seeing economists either as describers and analyzers who produce concepts, 







theories and tools but stand outside the real economy, or seeing them as inventors and 
innovators who are immersed in the economy (p. 313).
Callon clearly subscribes to the latter view, while acknowledging that the separation between 
representation and intervention is difficult and ambiguous. He claims that performativity 
can deal with both. It can do so because in the performativity view the question of truth 
and non-truth is displaced by the matter of success and failure (p. 320). What is observed 
in reality is not so much an irrevocable essence, but that what has been actualized as the 
outcome of a process that is highly contextual in time and place. History and setting matter, 
results are temporary, fluctuating and constantly under pressure to change (p. 335).
While Callon’s ideas have drawn various criticisms (see for instance Miller, 2002; Fine, 2003), 
it is not my immediate concern here to address the problematic issues of the performativity 
thesis in general. My interest lies in the practical applications of the concept with regard to 
finance and financial markets. Callon himself does not really operationalize the performativ-
ity concept in an empirical way, but others have made the attempts to do so. In the 2007 
book two efforts stand out: the work done by various researchers on the use of game theory 
in the FCC auctions, and Donald MacKenzie’s work on finance theory in relation to finan-
cial markets. The former has primarily drawn attention from the directly involved scientific 
communities such as (economic) sociology, science studies and philosophy of science (see 
Guala, 2001, 2007; Nik-Khah, 2006; Mirowski & Nik-Khah, 2007).
MacKenzie’s work has managed to attract attention outside of the immediate environment 
of the performativity conversation as well (see for instance Bernstein, 2007). That could be 
due to his reputation: MacKenzie has long been recognized as an eminent historian and 
sociologist of scientific knowledge dating back to his earlier work on statistics and technol-
ogy. Furthermore, MacKenzie explores a whole body of knowledge containing a number of 
theories instead of a singular isolated case such as the FCC auctions102. He knows what he is 
talking about and he knows how to talk about it. That may explain why his arguments are 
regarded as persuasive enough to serve as a reference example for performativity (see Guala, 
2007, Brisset 2017)103.
102  Similar singular isolated case can be found in MacKenzie, Muniesa and Siu (2007), such as the case of the 
strawberry auctions (Garcia-Parpet, 2007) and the fishery quotas (Holm, 2007).
103  Brisset (2017b) labels MacKenzie & Millo, 2003, and MacKenzie, 2006b, “The two most frequently quoted 
articles in the literature on performativity“; MacKenzie (2006) is among the most innovative and influential in 
























In taking financial economics and financial markets as his case in point to demonstrate the 
entanglement of theory and practice, MacKenzie chose well. Finance theory and the practice 
of financial markets display a remarkable proximity in that many theoretical concepts are, 
in some form, used in practice. The insight that academic theory has deeply influenced the 
practice of financial markets is not new by any means. Peter Bernstein already stressed this 
aspect of finance in his classic 1992 historical account of finance and financial markets. It is 
also reflected in this quote from Stephen Ross (2005) on option pricing theory: “Judged by 
its ability to explain the empirical data, option pricing theory is the most successful theory 
not only in finance but in all of economics”. Finance theory is part of the practice of financial 
markets.
A traditional view on science is that theory describes, and refers to, reality, much like traffic 
in a one-way direction. But the suggestion here is that we find two-way traffic, running in 
both directions between theory and practice. “The market provided financial economics 
with their subject matter, with data against which to test their models and with some of at 
least the more elementary concepts. Financial economics did more than analyze markets, it 
altered them” (MacKenzie, 2006a, p. 12). This leads MacKenzie to his claim that important 
parts of theory in finance have a performative trait. That would present an important chal-
lenge to traditional ideas about the relation of theory and practice.
Callon’s definition is the starting point for MacKenzie: economic theory being performative 
implies that it shapes and alters its subject matter: the practice it is intending to describe. But 
then he chooses his own course. MacKenzie distinguishes three different types or degrees of 
performativity in “An Engine, Not A Camera”. First there is the generic form which implies 
that an aspect (model, theory, data) of economics is used in an economic process: theory is 
used as a tool or instrument. Second, effective performativity involves practical, difference-
making use of such an aspect: theory acts as an engine of change. The strongest variety he 
distinguishes is Barnesian performativity: practical use shapes the process along the lines of 
the theory/model. Finally, there also is the possibility of counterperformativity which is the 
opposite of the Barnesian kind: the practice develops contrary to what the theory or model 
posits. In the latter two, theory operates as a constitutive mechanism: it creates practice.
According to MacKenzie finance theory has become incorporated in the infrastructure of the 
financial markets in three ways (2006, pp.250-251):
- Technically, as evidenced by the use of models in trading software. For example, the use 
of option pricing models is ubiquitous in derivatives markets: in trading and investing 







- Linguistically, as seen in the use of originally theoretical terminology as “beta” and 
“volatility” becoming standard;
- Legitimatizing: (financial) economists actively helped, for example, in the advent of 
derivatives markets, when options and the like were still very much seen as gambling 
devices104. 
It would seem that the first two qualifications of performativity clearly apply here. Finance 
models and vocabulary weren’t only used as tools, they also changed the entire setting of 
financial markets. And this change of setting wasn’t restricted to the narrow environment of 
the market itself, it stretched toward the institutionalization of financial markets in modern 
society. The incorporation of finance theory in the financial markets was consequential 
or effectively performative. Generic and effective performativity might thus not be really 
controversial concepts. As mentioned above, the entwining of finance theory and the prac-
tice of financial markets has been noticed by others. MacKenzie provides another excellent 
illustration of this.
5.4 barnesIan PerforMatIVIty and 
CounterPerforMatIVIty
While MacKenzie’s analysis of generic and effective performativity is interesting in itself, 
his self-professed main interest lied with the investigation of performativity in the strongest 
sense (MacKenzie, 2006 pp. 18-21). He dubbed this type “Barnesian” referring to sociologist 
of science Barry Barnes. MacKenzie’s interest in Barnesian performativity is not surprising 
given his affiliation with the sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and the so-called Ed-
inburgh Strong Program in particular. The concept of performativity can be regarded as an 
expression of the reflexivity thesis which is one of the characteristics of this line of thinking 
(Hands, 2001). SSK and the Edinburgh Strong Program, spearheaded by Barry Barnes and 
David Bloor (see for example Barnes, Bloor and Henry, 1996), are part of what is called 
the social constructivist approach to science (see Hands, 2001)105. In very general terms the 
social constructivist agenda posits that facts and events are not fixed and inevitable, that they 
are a product of history, social forces and ideology (Hacking, 1999 p. 2). Contingency and 
contextuality are emphasized. For science that translates into the idea that, contrary to the 
traditional view of science as independently describing and analyzing the phenomena in the 
104  Another example would be the Efficient Market Hypothesis which was crucial in establishing the stock market 
as a credible and stable institution of modern society. Half a century ago stock markets were seen as an unfair 
playing field full of insider trading and speculation.
105  The before mentioned Actor Network Theory (ANT), spearheaded by Bruno Latour and where Michel Callon 























world out there, science and scientists are very much part of that world: that science and 
scientists intervene and partly construct that world.
Social constructivism has led to intense debates in the philosophy of science. Constructivist 
arguments comes in various guises and degrees (see Hacking, 1999 p. 20) not all of which 
are controversial but the idea of Barnesian performativity is precisely the type of claim that 
Hacking would call “unmasking”: the extra-theoretical function takes centre stage, under-
mining and partially stripping an idea of its authority. The traditional view of science is put 
upside down. Instead of an independent reality which is described by science and scientists, 
we encounter the idea that it is science and the community of scientists which enact and 
create reality.
Let’s take a closer look at MacKenzie’s case for Barnesian performativity. In his journey 
through finance theory and the financial markets, he considers the performative aspects of 
the main strands of finance theory (see also chapter two): the Modigliani-Miller proposi-
tions, the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Efficient Market Hypothesis. But the best 
case, in his opinion (2006a, p.256), is made by Option Pricing Theory, for the purpose of 
his analysis labelled the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model106.
MacKenzie’s argument starts with two observations. First of all, option prices became more 
like those postulated by the Black-Scholes model107: “The fit between the Black-Scholes-
Merton model and empirical patterns of option prices was originally only approximate, but 
it improved rapidly after the model was published and adopted by market practitioners”. 
The value of this observation is limited though, as MacKenzie himself remarks, because the 
Chicago options market started in the same year as the publication of the Black-Scholes 
and Merton papers. But what also happened was that, as the derivatives markets started to 
flourish, the market conditions started resembling those assumed in the model more and 
more. Those assumptions were a well-functioning market, i.e. including the possibility of 
unlimited short selling and the absence of transaction costs. Indeed, what happened was 
that liquidity got better and better, and trading costs became lower and lower. The originally 
rather stringent assumptions became less unrealistic as the derivatives business thrived.
106  Strictly speaking this is not correct terminology. Option Pricing Theory is built on the two seminal but separate 
contributions of, on the one hand, Fischer Black and Myron Scholes (1973) and on the other hand Robert C. 
Merton (1973). Although “Black-Scholes-Merton” has become somewhat commonplace terminology, Black 
& Scholes on the one hand, Merton on the other hand, had quite distinct approaches towards tackling the 
problem of option valuation. This is also acknowledged in Bamford & MacKenzie (2018).
107  It was the Black-Scholes formulation that actually reached the marketplace by means of Black’s “sheets” with 







So far one could deem this process simply as that of a significant discovery, a genuine 
breakthrough as MacKenzie himself noted (2006a, p.258), providing a crucial impetus for 
the derivatives industry which subsequently gathers steam . But he makes a crucial step 
that leads him to consider this a case of Barnesian performativity. After the 1987 crash, the 
empirical fit of option prices with the Black-Scholes model deteriorated.
What happened was that the prices of various options on the same underlying asset began 
to deviate, relative to each other. Each option price contains an implied volatility (i.e. the 
expected standard deviation of the underlying asset). In the original Black-Scholes model the 
implied volatility was assumed constant for the various options on the same underlying asset. 
The price of volatility started to vary with the strike price; options with lower strike prices, 
which become valuable when the asset price goes down, demanded a relatively higher price 
than options with higher strike prices. This phenomenon has become known as the volatility 
skew and is at odds with the original Black-Scholes model which assumes constant volatility.
So now the world of the option markets started resembling the model less, a counterper-
formative move in MacKenzie’s terminology. The emergence of skew tells us one of two 
things, according to MacKenzie: “if Black-Scholes is the “right” way to price options, then 
the market has been wrong since 1987; on the other hand, if a pronounced volatility skew in 
options is “correct”, then the market was wrong before 1987”. The latter is more plausible, 
as a case of rational learning, and that makes the Black-Scholes model not a “true” “discovery 
of what was already there” (2006a, pp. 258-259). What happened in the reality of option 
pricing, in other words, was a historically contingent process in which the model played a 
constitutive role.
At some spots in the 2006 book MacKenzie is rather cautious in assigning the label of 
Barnesian performativity (see for instance p.21). Regarding the BSM model, however, in the 
end he is quite adamant: “the model was a theoretical innovation, not simply an empirical 
observation; the relation to the market was not always passive but sometimes active, not 
always descriptive but sometimes performative, even in the Barnesian sense” (p.259).
In Bamford & MacKenzie (2018) there is no more explicit mentioning of Barnesian perfor-
mativity, but rather the focus lies on the counterperformative move. The “Barnesian” move 
is still there though:
Despite the many necessary caveats, we think that it is justifiable to talk of the use of the 
Black–Scholes model having effects on markets, among which were processes that changed 
the world in ways that, to put it very crudely, made the world ‘more like’ the model. A 























one, and our argument in this article is that it is necessary to give at least equal weight to 
processes that have the opposite effect, that change the world to make it less like the model’s 
postulates—in other words, counterperformative processes (ibid.).
5.5 Contra barnesIan PerforMatIVIty
Summarizing MacKenzie, we have a theory which is used by practioners. Empirical prices 
started resembling those postulated by the models derived from that theory. But then, after 
a major event, empirical prices start deviating from the model’s prices. This final –counter-
performative—move is vital in the argument for Barnesian performativity; the model is not 
as correct as it was previously thought. Now, in 2018 (Bamford & MacKenzie, 2018) the 
argument for the counterperformative move is still there, however it is no longer used as a 
claim for the strongest, Barnesian kind of performativity, but rather as evidence for perfor-
mativity in general. In addition in terms of appreciation of the model the qualifications are 
less adamant in the 2018 version. 
While that may be a signal of a step back in MacKenzie’s ambition, as I see it, there remain 
problems with his arguments. First, was the model indeed incorrect? Second, and in connec-
tion to this, what can we say about models? Does for instance the failure or inappropriate-
ness of an application of theory falsify the entire theory? Third, what do the labels “right” 
and “wrong” amount to in this context, i.e. the context of finance, economics and the social 
sciences in general? Finally, if a counterperformative move is evidence for performativity in 
the strongest sense, doesn’t that mean that the claim for Barnesian performativity is still on 
the table?
Before addressing these issues, a qualification is necessary: MacKenzie’s argument is mainly 
based on the performativity of option pricing theory in the Chicago options markets where 
mainly stock and stock index options are traded. But option pricing theory is about valuing 
contingent claims in the broadest sense; stock and stock index options are only examples of 
the many, many instances of contingent claims. So we need to rephrase the first question 
slightly: was the Black-Scholes-Merton analysis wrong with regard to the trading of stock 
and index options; does it matter if the behavior of volatility of those particular assets in the 
practice differs from what was posited in theory?
The answer is negative because option pricing theory is not a theory which claims to predict, 
explain, or understand volatility. Six factors affect the price of an option: the current price 
of the underlying object, the exercise price of the option (i.e. the price where an option 







est, dividends (if applicable) and the volatility of the underlying object (Hull, 2000). The 
first five are usually quite readily observable. The sixth one –volatility—quite often is not. 
That is why volatility is what ultimately determines the value of a contingent claim, since it 
is the only unobservable variable in the equation: it is the explanans, the explaining variable, 
not the explanandum, the variable to be explained. The core insight of option pricing theory 
à la Black-Scholes-Merton is the fact that the value of a contingent claim depends on the 
variability of the underlying object, i.e. its volatility.
What can we say about volatility? There is an enormous literature on the subject. It is a 
measure of movement, defined as the standard deviation of returns over a certain period, 
actual returns that is. As such, actual volatility can only be determined ex-post; it is impos-
sible to observe directly. That means that the unambiguously correct price of a derivative at 
some point in the past can only be ascertained after the contract has expired. Volatility is the 
only variable in option pricing theory which is unobservable, which makes its estimation the 
core problem of derivatives pricing, i.e. the application of option pricing theory.
Any meaningful discussion about volatility is about estimated volatility, not actual volatility. 
For that is what is entered when calculating the price of a current option in the market. 
What can be inferred from empirical option prices is the market consensus about those 
estimates. If one adheres to some form of randomness in the returns on assets, it should 
become evident how difficult it is to make those estimates or model them.
Fischer Black flat-out refused to postulate or accept any model of volatility: he considered this 
simply impossible (Mehrling, 2005). And this opinion is widely shared and acknowledged 
by both academics and practitioners. We can find it in John Hull’s classic academic text 
book “Options, Futures, and Other Derivative Securities” (2000) which is used throughout 
academia: “one assumption that is clearly not true, is the assumption that the volatility is 
constant” (p. 446). But we also find it in a book like Sheldon Natenberg’s “Option Volatility 
& Pricing” (1994) with which thousands of derivatives traders, amongst whom myself, have 
been trained.
Studies have shown that in the long run historical volatility seems to be mean-reverting and 
displays tendencies of serial correlation, but it is certainly not constant over time as is the 
assumption in the Black-Scholes-Merton analysis. The biggest problem lies in an enigma 
that MacKenzie is treating extensively: the shape of the distribution of returns. While in 
mainstream finance that distribution is assumed to be a normal, Gaussian bell curve, there 
is ample evidence, that this is not an accurate description (see for example Bernstein, 1992, 
and more extensively Lo & MacKinlay, 1999). Empirical data suggests that so-called fat-























indices. However fat-tailed distributions can raise particular modelling problems because 
they can display infinite variance108. The (log)normal assumption is made for reasons of 
simplicity and tractability.
The skew phenomenon, i.e. varying implied volatilities being the market estimate of volatil-
ity in various options, is in part a reflection of the actual distribution being different from 
the distribution assumed in the model. For example, when a market crashes, it tends to start 
moving more violently; this is reflected in relatively higher prices for options which become 
valuable when a market falls. Another factor is that demand for such “insurance-type” op-
tions by institutional investors is typically higher, especially when expectations of significant 
events play a role, for example global turmoil or the millennium change. Moreover, in times 
of turbulence and increased uncertainty liquidity tends to deteriorate, resulting in higher op-
tion premiums. Sellers of option, who basically take over the risk from buyers, will demand 
a higher price; a simple matter of supply and demand109. There exists substantial evidence 
that not all volatility arises from moves in the underlying fundamentals or expectations 
about such moves. Trading activity itself appears to affect volatility, further complicating a 
meaningful analysis of it.
Finally, why then that the skew phenomenon only emerged after the 1987 crash? MacKenzie 
partially provides the answer when he talks about the empirical success of the Black-Scholes-
Merton model being a historically contingent process. I agree. It took an event of considerable 
proportions to bring volatility skew on stage. The market simply wasn’t aware before; indeed 
a process of rational learning as MacKenzie suggests. The preeminent problem of trading 
options is what volatility to plug into whatever pricing model is used. Any observable option 
price is thus a product of market consensus (built on the estimates of the various market 
participants), not from an objective form of statistical inference110. People’s perceptions 
change by such momentous events. If a market has crashed, it is likely that their perceived 
uncertainty, their risk aversion and sense of urgency rise, even in “normal” times. This can 
108  The possible accuracy of infinite variance distributions, as put forward by Benoit Mandelbrot, raised wide-
spread concerns amongst economists over the validity of their results, which were based on normal distribu-
tions. The issue was settled in a rather pragmatic way by deciding that the assumption of normality was the 
best workable hypothesis (Mehrling, 2005; MacKenzie, 2006a; Bamford & MacKenzie 2018). The abolition 
of wild randomness, infinite variance models and the like in favor of the random-walk assumption/lognormal 
distribution is one of the great and often forgotten stories in economics/econometrics.
109  While skew is usually most visible in out-of-the-money put options which offer protection against a downturn 
in the market, one can occasionally also witness it in out-of-the-money call options which become more 
valuable when prices rise sharply. By the end of 1999 in the heyday of the dotcom era certain stocks shot up 
so violently day after day that each day all call options ended up being in-the-money. New out-of-the-money 
options would be introduced each day. Driven by huge demand and limited hedging possibilities by spreading, 
these options were relatively more expensive than in-the money options.
110  Although market participants may, and often do, use historical data to estimate volatility, in the belief—or 







result in a higher price for insurance, hence a higher implied volatility in option prices111. So 
what did change after the 1987 crash was the method of estimation. It only makes sense that 
people try to anticipate such events in a way, hence the volatility skew. If they were right to 
do so can only be determined afterwards; that is the nature of volatility. 
The previous paragraphs aim to show that volatility is by no means a straightforward 
concept. The ambiguity of the distribution of returns is due to an old economic concept, 
most prominently treated in the 1920s by John Maynard Keynes and Frank Knight: radical 
uncertainty. As mentioned in chapter four Knight (1921) makes a threefold distinction. 
First, there exist a priori probabilities: absolute objective chances like those in throwing a fair 
die. Second, there are statistical probabilities: objective, empirical evaluations of frequency of 
association. And third, there are estimates: subjective, more or less educated guesses, liable to 
error. The first two fall under the heading of risk. When we speak of risk, the distribution is 
known, either a priori or through empirical work, and we can obtain objective, measurable 
numbers. The third category is that of true radical, non-measurable uncertainty. According 
to Knight, it is this third category which characterizes the economic domain, or “business” 
as he calls it, in reality. It is only logical then that financial assets, which are basically claims 
on “business”, display the same characteristic112.
The consequence is that the familiar mean-variance approach to asset returns can be seriously 
unrealistic. The economist’s way to deal with this problem is making simplifying assump-
tions. In the case of the original Black-Scholes-Merton analysis an assumption was made 
regarding volatility: that it was constant. This assumption followed logically from the log-
normal distribution assumed in other dominant models in finance, in particular the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis and the Capital Asset Pricing Model. The assumption was unrealistic 
and turned out to be even more unrealistic than perhaps initially thought. But unrealistic 
assumptions are part and parcel of economic theorizing. As Harrison (1997) notes: “Thus 
we have an interesting (ongoing) tension between reality and the abstract theoretical ideal. In 
economics, this tension is not unique to finance, and it may well be an inevitable by-product 
of modelling”.  
The scholars involved in the development of Option Pricing Theory seem to have been aware 
of this (see also Brisset, 2017b). One can find it for instance in Merton (1975) where he 
writes about the shortcomings of finance and the “ivory tower nature” of the assumptions. 
And in 1988 Black published a paper with the telling title “The Holes in Black-Scholes”. 
111  This is only a brief, simplistic account of volatility skew. The point is that skew is not a complete mystery. See 
Brisset, 2017b, for a more detailed treatment of the skew phenomenon and the intricacies of the distribution 
of returns, which results in a similar conclusion.
112  2006 Nobel laureate Edmund Phelps made the same observation in a op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal in 























But even in the two seminal contributions, Black & Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973), one 
can already find awareness of the problematic nature of the constant volatility assumption. 
In Black and Scholes for example: “The valuation formula assumes that the variance rate 
of the return on the optioned asset is constant. But the variance of return on an option is 
certainly not constant: it depends on the price of the stock and the maturity of the option” 
(1973, p.652). Likewise, Merton writes in a footnote that “the expected return is not directly 
observable” (1973, p. 161) and later remarks that if investors do not agree on the particular 
variance, they will arrive at different values for the derivative security (1973, p.169).
Recapping the argument: constant, linear volatility is an assumption, not a hypothesis or 
truth claim in itself. The Black-Scholes-Merton analysis was aimed at explaining option 
pricing, not the behavior of volatility.113.
5.6 theorIes, Models and forMulas
If a particular model fails in the wake of unexpected events like the 1987 crash or the 
2007-2008 crisis, does that discredit the epistemic value of the entire theory to which that 
model belongs? Cartwright (1999) sees the difference between a theory and a model as resid-
ing in the degree of articulation: theory is a large-scale, not necessarily formalized outline, 
whereas a model gives a more specified formalized depiction. In this case, option pricing 
theory is the body of knowledge concerned with the valuation of contingent claims in the 
broadest sense. This includes the familiar options, traded on exchanges or Over-the-counter, 
on various securities but also for example the valuation of stocks and bonds as contingent 
claims on a firm, and the valuation of investment opportunities which have a fixed initial 
price but whose potential payoff is uncertain, the so-called real options. Models then are 
used to construct a representation of a specific category of contingent claims: for instance 
the Black-Scholes model for valuation of stock options. Assumptions about the behavior of 
the underlying entity need to be spelled out here. Finally, a formula provides a formal recipe 
which can be applied to a particular contingent claim: for example the Black-Scholes pric-
ing formula for a European call option on a non-dividend paying stock. Specific boundary 
conditions are entered in the model to end up with an unambiguous number: the supposed 
price of that option.
113  See also Brisset, 2017b, for a similar analysis of the linear volatility assumption in relation tot he supposed 
Barnesian performativity of the Black-Scholes-Merton model. Brisset adds that market prices of options al-
ready deviated from the prices which the BSM model would calculate even before the BSM model was actually 







What MacKenzie shows is that a pricing formula which at first seemed to be substantiated 
by empirical observation, later on did not to fit so well. This failure can be traced to a specific 
assumption in the model. By no means is the whole theory rendered void and the model 
meaningless. Scientific knowledge is and never has been static. It is not at all unusual for 
theory to grow and develop, especially theory that is part and parcel of the reality it refers to 
and even more so in the social sciences. The original findings of Black, Scholes and Merton 
are not so much about the exact price of options, but they have delivered a mechanism 
of contingency, key insights on risk, uncertainty and time. Moore and Juh (2006), using 
data from the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in the period 1908-1922 give evidence that 
investors had an intuitive notion of derivative pricing, long before the emergence of BSM-
style derivatives pricing. Considering this, the results of Black, Scholes and Merton can be 
regarded as formalization, rather than a discovery of something entirely new. Their findings 
have been the take-off point for a “revolution”, as Merton Miller (1999a, 1999b) calls it. 
Miller talks about the original Black-Scholes-Merton analysis as a model-T Ford: outdated 
and primitive. “Financial engineers have already reduced the original Black-Scholes-Merton 
formula to Model-T status”. Indeed I am not aware of any derivatives trader today that 
employs the formula in its original form.
But it has been the take-off point for a research program, in which many various applications 
have been initiated, and many of the unrealistic assumptions and weak points, the “holes 
in Black & Scholes”, so to speak, have been tackled and improved upon. The old-timer 
has turned into a multi-purpose, all-terrain hybrid vehicle, able to deal with all kinds of 
contingent claims and different boundary conditions114. However, there would not have 
been such a vehicle, had there not been a Model-T Ford. Odds are that something must 
have been “right” about it.
Typical of economic models is that they often isolate and idealize a feature (see Mäki, 1992, 
2009, 2018). This doesn’t need to be a problem if the isolation has an essentialist character: 
the theory captures a primordial causal mechanism, the model reveals something crucial. 
As such unrealistic assumptions can be (and often are) part of economic theorizing. But 
the truth of a model doesn’t necessarily reside in the assumptions being realistic, rather it 
resides in capturing something meaningful. Mäki (2006, 2011) calls this central aspect a 
truthbearer: the core assertion, given various assumptions, which states a claim to (possible) 
truth. I have argued that in option pricing theory as conceived by Black, Scholes and Merton 
this claim to fame is the –somewhat counterintuitive—insight that the price of a derivative 
crucially depends on the variability of the underlying, its volatility. The fact that volatility 























is assumed linear and constant in the model, which it is most often not in reality, does not 
make the model wrong.
While it can be argued that isolation and idealization are present in any scientific endeavour, 
their presence in economic theorizing is particularly relevant. That is because economic 
phenomena do not behave according to universal, iron laws of nature but often appear to be 
rather more like tendencies. In economics and the social sciences in general typically many 
causal factors are simultaneously at work instead of one or a few which can be singled out115. 
Dan Hausman, for instance, has argued that economics is a “separate and inexact science” 
(1992, 2001). In the case of economics, the multiplicity of causes and their interaction gives 
rise to what he calls inexact laws. This applies to finance as well, I believe. Asset prices reflect 
certain “objective” fundamentals, but they also reflect subjective expectations and intuitions 
of a more tentative nature. Despite the ubiquitous presence of formal modelling and quan-
titative approaches, and boatloads of empirical data to back up claims, finance is still a social 
science, as is economics. Dating back to Adam Smith’s invisible hand, at the heart of the 
matter are the unintended consequences of human action and their interactions. Often the 
outcome of this process is uncertain. This is illustrated in the financial markets where there 
are no fixed recipes for success: even the best and brightest occasionally take their lumps116.
Making assertions about right and wrong in such a setting is a perilous affair. Yet that is what 
MacKenzie did in 2006 in making his argument for Barnesian performativity: “if Black-
Scholes is the “right” way to price options, then the market has been wrong since 1987; on 
the other hand, if a pronounced volatility skew in options is “correct”, then the market was 
wrong before 1987”. That was somewhat surprising for someone with strong affiliation to 
the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge (SSK) program which devotes much attention on the 
complicated and reflexive relation between science and reality. MacKenzie 2018 appears to 
be more nuanced, though the counterperformativty arguments still appear to hinge on some 
form of truth appreciation. 
That the BSM-model is not simply wrong was argued extensively above (see also Brisset, 
2017b). As far as it concerns the market being right or wrong it might be fitting to paraphrase 
a quote from John Maynard Keynes: “markets can remain wrong longer than you can remain 
solvent”117. It only makes sense that, if “business”, i.e. economic activity, is characterized by 
115  This idea traces back to the work of John Stuart Mill (1844) which has had significant impact on many who 
are active in the field of methodology and philosophy of economics.
116  The case of Long Term Capital Management, mentioned in chapter three and also treated by MacKenzie 
(2003a, 2006a), remains an excellent illustration of this. See also Lowenstein (2000), Scholes (2000), Stulz 
(2000), Mehrling (2005).







uncertainty like Knight argued (see chapter four), financial markets where claims on these 
businesses are traded, are also characterized by that same uncertainty. The upshot is that we 
can only truly assess “right” and “wrong” in the market a posteriori.
5.7 PERFoRmativity: PRagmaticS and PERSuaSion
Where does that leave performativity in finance; is it a straw man? I think not: performativ-
ity is an interesting and useful concept as long as we stay away from the strongest varieties. 
Those strong claims are ill-advised because attributing right and wrong is ill-suited for the 
domain of finance where theory and practice intermingle. Bruno Latour has stressed the 
pointlessness of all kinds of bipolar distinctions such as theory and practice: “The difference 
between theory and practice is no more a given than the difference between content and 
context…it is a made divide, unity that has been fractured” (1999). The classic view of 
science describing and referring to an objective reality, “the world out there” so to speak, has 
been found lacking. But the strong, Barnesian performativity claim does exactly the same, 
only in the opposite direction: science creating a beforehand non-existing reality118. The 
relation between science and the world is not one-way traffic in either direction but rather 
two-way traffic.
What performativity in its less extreme versions does, is precisely recognize that two-way 
traffic. It provides us with a viewpoint to deal with the blurred complex reality, in which 
finance theory and the practice of the financial markets both are located. More specifically, 
it points at two important aspects of theory: what we can do with it and how that is ac-
complished.
What we can do with theory is a matter of pragmatic value. That value has been extremely 
high. There is no theory in finance which has had a bigger practical impact than option 
pricing theory: “A few academic scribblers have created a huge and still-growing industry” 
(Miller, 1999b). The trillion dollar derivatives industry hardly existed before Black-Scholes-
Merton. But the products did already exist: options, contingent claims have existed for 
centuries in formal and less formal appearances. And agents using them had some intuitive 
grasp on their valuation (see Moore and Juh, 2006). If we want to use the performativ-
ity vocabulary, then we should talk about effective performativity here. Moreover, such a 
118  In additon, Mäki (2013) adds that the expansive use of performativity blurs the difference between constitu-
tive and causal relationships, both of which actually are involved in economics and the economy. MacKenzie 
clarified his position in 2018: “We are dealing here not with matters of the philosophy of language, not with 























pragmatic reading would seem to be in accordance with Callon’s idea of truth and non-truth 
being displaced by success and failure.
How that practical success is accomplished is above all a matter of persuasion. A theory or 
model as such, doesn’t do anything by itself; it is people who do something with it. And while 
they may be involved in some capacity, it isn’t always the scientists who do something with 
it. The involvement of scientists can range from mechanism design, as in the FCC auction, 
to lobbying, as in the case of the Chicago derivatives markets, to active participation. The 
latter ranges from the various professional money management activities of finance scholars 
(see chapter three) to Fischer Black selling sheets with option prices to market makers. But 
it is hardly ever the case that economists actually make markets themselves, to answer the 
suggestion of the book title of MacKenzie, Muniesa & Siu (2007): “Do Economists make 
Markets?” A more apt description would be that they are involved in spreading the news. 
Deirdre McCloskey (2008) has extensively argued for the role of persuasion in economics, 
including the role of talk, linguistics and communication in the marketplace, in economic 
life. Theories, models, ideas are used because a sufficient number of people are convinced of 
their adequacy or usefulness. As Mäki (2013) notices:
Literally speaking, economic theories do not shape the economy. Nor does economic 
inquiry. People do. In their various roles (as policymakers, students, investors, entrepre-
neurs, workers, consumers) people are exposed to the results of economic inquiry and 
they learn, directly or indirectly, about the contents of economic theories, explanations 
and predictions, and are inspired by them, perhaps by being persuaded by the propo-
nents, so as to modify their beliefs and perhaps their motives. These modified beliefs and 
motives make a difference to their behavior, and this has consequences for the economy. 
The flow of these complex connections is a matter of indirect causal influence rather than 
direct constitution.
To some extent MacKenzie appears to agree with the above when he quotes Judith Butler 
as saying that “financial theories . . . do not function as sovereign powers or as authoritative 
actors who make things happen by saying them” (Bamford & MacKenzie, 2018).
The cash value of performativity, I believe, resides in its emphasis on the pragmatic and 
persuasive roles that theory and models can possess. Those roles are particularly relevant in a 
situation where theory and practice are entwined, as is the case for finance and financial mar-
kets. But the pragmatic and persuasive functions stressed by the performativity approach, are 









The impact of finance theory on financial markets has been used as a premier example 
of what has become known as the performativity thesis. This case, as most prominently 
brought forward by Donald MacKenzie, has been scrutinized from two angles. First, from an 
epistemic viewpoint by looking at the contents of the particular theory itself. Second, from 
an methodological stance by reflecting on the distinctions between theories, models, and 
formulas, and their truth content and the nature of economic phenomena. 
While MacKenzie provides an excellent illustration of performative aspects of finance 
theory, he does not present a convincing case for the strongest instances of performativity. 
The empirical observation of the emergence of volatility skew does not refute option pricing 
theory, as conceived by Black, Scholes and Merton. It is only proof of one assumption being 
false and/or unrealistic, an assumption which is and was well-known to be problematic and 
not to be accurate.
More in general it was argued that the bonds between reality and knowledge of that reality are 
complex in this case; at the least too complex to simply dish out labels of “wrong” and “right”. 
Alternatively it was suggested to consider performativity as highlighting pragmatic and persuasive 
functions that models and theory can have, while at the same time acknowledging that these are 
not the only, or a priori most important, roles. Such a reading would also appear to be in accor-
dance with the broader literature on performativity, in particular with Michel Callon’s writings.
Perhaps the metaphor of maps can serve to illustrate. Almost all world maps we use are false 
and/or wrong and/or unrealistic in a great number of aspects. The world is portrayed as 
flat while it is not. The sizes of the continents, counties, oceans, etc. are often not accurate. 
Countries and terrains are usually represented in some color scheme just for the sake of 
distinction. And so on, and so on. Yet we all use these maps. We use them because there are 
also important things right about them. Ergo, they even affect our actions and enterprises, a 
performative effect. They capture something that apparently is of great use to us and that we 
are convinced of that it is of use. I suggest that likewise is the case for option pricing theory.
The performativity thesis can be regarded as an interesting way of looking at science in its 
workings and its effects on our daily lives. But it should not be regarded as a full-blown, 
universal statement about finance and economics119.
119  MacKenzie appears to have come to the somewhat the same insight when he discusses the place of performativ-
ity and counterperformativity in the analysis of finance in the 2018 paper: “Neither concept is a panacea; both 





The Great Financial Crisis and a Pluralistic Way 
Forward in Thinking about Financial Markets
This research project first began to take shape in 2005, i.e. before 
the 2007-2008 crisis broke loose. Since 2007 financial markets and 
the thinking about financial markets have profoundly changed. One 
may think that because of these changes, parts of the analysis in this 
dissertation have become obsolete. This is not the case. Rather, the 
relevance of many of the points made, is emphasized by the events that 
have unrolled since the ignition by the subprime crisis in 2007.
This chapter is by no means an exhaustive and comprehensive 
account of the crisis and its consequences for theory and practice of 
financial markets, but deals with some aspects of the crisis which 
relate to the preceding chapters. Subsequently suggestions are made 
which could improve the conversation on financial markets120.
120  And there are even more alternative approaches such as fractal finance, evolutionary finance, bubble theory 
and so forth. See Pistorius (2015).

6.1 IntroduCtIon
“Of all the economic bubbles that have been pricked, few have burst more spectacularly 
than the reputation of economics itself ”121.
As a result of the crisis much criticism has been hurled towards the science of economics, 
both from inside the profession122 as from outside. Economists haven’t been able to soundly 
analyse fundamental developments. Their theories and the assumption used were lacking. 
Like the bankers themselves and their supervisors and regulators, economists have missed 
what prolific dangers and risks were creeping into the financial system.
The criticisms concern both academic economic knowledge as well as the use of that knowl-
edge by policymakers and practitioners in the financial sector. Critical analysis has been done 
both by academics and non-academics such as journalists and policy makers. The fact that 
a broader audience has raised an interest in financial markets may actually be a positive to 
take away from the crisis, but the general perspective from the general public on finance as a 
business, but also as an academic discipline has undoubtedly deteriorated (Zingales, 2015).
Lo (2012) provides a useful overview of 21 books by academics, journalists and others where 
various aspects of the crisis are highlighted. And since then many more analyses have ap-
peared. Examining the various narratives and the evidence presented, he concludes there is 
not one comprehensive account and that one should be careful and precise in analysing the 
stories presented.
6.2 VarIous CrItICIsMs
It is useful to distinguish between various criticisms. Saying that macroeconomic models 
do not predict well is a very different claim from stating that pricing in financial markets 
is not proper. Roughly speaking, a distinction can be made between criticisms aimed at 
macroeconomics and critiques on financial economics. Regarding the former, it is a well-
known fact that most macroeconomic models that were used for policy purposes were 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) type models. These models focus on 
the real economy and leave out what happens in the financial sector. Implicitly it is either 
assumed that financial markets work so perfectly that fall-out to the real economy is not an 
issue, or that events in financial markets are inherently irrelevant and have no bearing on the 
real economy. For instance so-called asset inflation – rising prices in asset categories, think 
121  The Economist, July 18 2009, section titled “What went wrong with economics”.







stocks, commodities or real estate– did not enter as a factor in most policy models. Generally 
price stability in the real economy, of goods and services, was the core target for policy 
makers. As long as expansive monetary policy, which has characterized most of the time 
period leading up to the crisis, did not translate in inflation in the real economy, it was not 
considered a problem. Thus a situation with moderate economic growth and stable inflation, 
once known as the ”Goldilocks” scenario, was deemed possible. In such a situation there 
is no reason or incentive for policymakers to consider a more restrictive course of action. 
Rising prices of financial assets and the accompanying rise of debts to finance those assets did 
not enter the policymaking equation. Thus speculative bubbles could develop unimpeded. 
This was precisely what happened in the US housing market. The flood of funds resulted in 
diminishing returns and rising asset prices. In the quest for profitable opportunities credit 
standards were loosened, in particular for mortgages. In combination with rising housing 
prices this ultimately resulted in the subprime crisis in 2007, which proved to be the catalyst 
for the great financial crisis in 2008.
Parallel to the barrier in policy making between the real economy and the financial sector, 
there has been a growing disjunction between economics and finance, as discussed and il-
lustrated in chapter two. The crisis has painfully revealed the undesirability of this situation, 
both in the area of theorizing and where it policy making concerns, and only underscores the 
need for a broader, more inclusive approach to financial markets.
Financial economics has received its share of critique as well. Advances in finance have 
enabled certain markets to develop, a point examined in chapter five. The prolific rise of 
derivatives markets and markets for complex structured products has been fuelled to a large 
extent by theoretical progress in valuation models for such products.
These models, and/or the assumptions in those models are wrong, is the critique. Through-
out the preceding chapters (in particular chapters four and five) the issue and peculiarities 
of models and theories being “right” and “wrong”, of truth and falsehood, were extensively 
discussed. Concluded was that one should be careful and precise in what exactly the truth 
claim is. Regarding assumptions, it is accepted that assumptions are made for reasons and 
that false assumptions do not necessarily invalidate a model or theory. Nevertheless suspi-
cion and criticisms persist. A prominent example is the assumption used in many pricing 
models that markets function properly. In other words, some form of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis is assumed. In the eyes of many this assumption has been clearly proven false: 
how else to explain the colossal bubbles that developed? Indeed the crisis has shown that 
financial markets and participants in those markets can err spectacularly in their valuation 
assessments. It is beyond doubt that speculative bubbles have formed, for instance in the 















































not necessarily imply that these markets do not function properly: it has been shown that 
bubbles can develop in a framework where rationality is assumed (Blanchard and Watson, 
1982). Also, the degree of (ir)rationality that agents exhibit or information asymmetry does 
not necessarily explain the formation of bubbles, as suggested by Shiller and Akerlof (2009). 
In conclusion and in line with the preceding chapter: the problem is not so much that the 
models and theories have failed but rather but that the truth claims of these models has too 
easily been taken for granted. Rather, the limitations of these models, in particular some key 
assumptions were neglected.
In chapter four it was discussed that the market process is a tentative process where various 
opinions, based on discovery and learning, come together. The result of that process is a price. 
That price, the market price, is an estimate of future events. These future events are shrouded 
in uncertainty (of the Knightian kind) because economic processes remain in essence social 
processes which are not subject to iron laws, unlike phenomena studied by natural sciences. 
So markets can get it massively wrong, but it will correct itself at some point by discovery 
and learning, or so it is assumed. That appears to be what indeed happened in the market for 
structured products, consisting of securitized mortgages (CDO’s, etc.) according to Gorton 
(2010): the market was slow in catching up with reality. The market’s inability to correctly 
assess developments may have been due to the complex nature of the products involved, 
resulting in a lack of transparency to market participants, supervisory bodies and regulators. 
When the market finally got it in 2007 the landing would be hard and painful.
This lack of transparency is a different issue than a question which has also been raised: 
whether certain financial products and practices in financial markets have any usefulness and 
legitimacy at all. Some have suggested that the whole process of packaging mortgages into 
securities and subsequent slicing up and repackaging of these securities into products such 
as CDO’s (called the originate-to-distribute model) is kind of a Ponzi scheme designed to 
con less sophisticated investors and arising from information asymmetry (Akerlof & Shiller, 
2009). One should keep in mind, however that the securitization process (and the products 
resulting from it) is actually a device which helps both buyers and sellers accomplish their 
desired risk-return profiles. If anything, it is the pricing and risk perception of these products 
that went wrong. Structured products such as CDO’s offered a significantly higher projected 
return than other bonds with similar credit ratings. However, the losses arising from these 
products were not only incurred by buyers but also by sellers, typically investment banks, 
who kept parts of these products on their own balance sheets and held a stock of loans to be 
repackaged later. This so-called warehousing was responsible for some of the most staggering 







imply a general lack of knowledge, unawareness, ignorance and transparency on both sides 
of the market, rather than information asymmetry that is exploited by one side123.
This also raises the question who within the practice of the markets truly believed in market 
efficiency. Lo (2011) makes the interesting remark that those who adhere to market ef-
ficiency should have been less likely misled by this pricing inconsistency. Lo’s point is that 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis does not imply that any price in the market is right. Rather, 
it is deemed unlikely or impossible that similar products, such as bonds with similar credit 
ratings, consistently display very different prices. 
The key question then becomes, not if we should get rid of certain markets or products, but 
how to improve the market process and limit the damage of corrections. An example is the 
existence of so-called Over-the-counter (OTC) markets where parties deal directly with each 
other instead of trading on a regulated marketplace like a stock exchange with central clear-
ing and settlement. OTC markets are less transparent and more susceptible to counterparty 
and concentration risks124125.
The danger surrounding the Efficient Market Hypothesis is not so much if it is true or false 
but rather its indiscriminate and careless use as an assumption. The EMH pertains to a 
different degree to the market for mutual funds than to a market in some OTC tailor-made 
exotic structured product. The former is a market which is transparent, liquid and filled 
with plenty of agents on both the supply and demand sides so market power is fragmented. 
Valuation is relatively straightforward and the pricing process is transparent. The latter is a 
market where information is complex, therefore pricing is not easily comprehensible. Only 
a few can provide such a product. Moreover, it is not a uniform product which can make it 
harder to trade away or hedge when conditions should warrant that. In the latter case the 
conditions required for an efficient market are clearly less satisfied than in the former case: 
more market concentration, more complexity and therefore less transparency and a lesser 
degree of atomistic agents.
123  One could include stupidity. In July 2007, when the liquidity crisis was already underway. former Citicorp 
CEO Chuck Prince told the Financial Times that global liquidity was enormous and only a significant disrup-
tive event could create difficulty: “As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and dance,” he said. At 
that time he added: “We’re still dancing”. Those words would come back to haunt Prince: in the aftermath of 
the fall of Lehman Brothers, Citicorp needed two capital injections from the government totaling $45 billion 
and received government backing for loans and securities, worth more than $300 billion at the time. 
124  The market for Credit Default Swaps (CDS) was such an OTC market. It turned out that an enormous 
amount of the risk in the CDS market was concentrated within one party, the US insurer AIG. This made 
AIG too big to fail: if AIG would not have been rescued, it would have caused potentially fatal damage to a 
number of other institutions which had entered into deals with AIG as counterparty and may have triggered 
chain reactions in other markets.















































In chapter 1 three basic principles for a proper market were identified. Legitimacy: what 
is traded on a market should be acceptable to society and have some kind of usefulness. 
Transparency: the process of price formation should be transparent and the information 
equally accessible to all participants. Liquidity: a market needs sufficient potential supply 
and demand interest to function properly. In the crisis the lack of transparency led to stalling 
liquidity in some parts of the markets in August 2007 which subsequently infected the entire 
financial system, culminating in the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Already in 
August 2007 Caballero and Krishnamurty wrote:
Uncertainty –that is, a rise in unknown and immeasurable risk rather than the measur-
able risk that the financial sector specializes in managing– is at the heart of the recent 
liquidity crisis. The financial instruments and derivative structures underpinning the 
recent growth in credit markets are complex. Because of the rapid proliferation of these 
instruments, market participants cannot refer to a historical record to measure how these 
financial structures will behave during a time of stress. These two factors, complexity and 
lack of history, are the preconditions for rampant uncertainty.
In such a situation, the principles for a proper market are violated and the chances of market 
failure become higher. In the Austrian terms, discussed in chapter four: the market process of 
entrepreneurial discovery is more complicated and hindered in the latter case. Entrepreneurs 
have difficulty in choosing their actions, will become more tentative in an uncertain environ-
ment and an equilibrating move will take more time. The focus should then be on how to 
improve the functioning of that market because the degree of efficiency is the result of the 
particular market process and not a given in itself126.
Criticism has also been directed at valuation models and risk management tools which 
have their origins in mainstream financial economics. For instance the Value-at-Risk (VaR) 
methodology that was and is widely used in risk management. VaR-models use historical 
data to calculate profit and loss projections for particular statistical significance intervals. 
If an improbable event takes place that falls outside the statistical range, the impact can be 
devastating if risk managers have uniquely relied on VaR analysis. Some of the happenings 
during the great financial crisis were clearly such so-called tail events where risk manag-
ers ignored uncertainty of the Knightian kind. The fall of Lehman Brothers is the prime 
example. In the past there always had been an orderly solution when an important financial 
institution ran into trouble, for example Bear Stearns in the spring of 2008 and hedge fund 
126  “Improving the market process” is by no means unambiguous. For instance, when physical floor trading of 
securities is replaced by screen-based electronic trading, in general pricing improves and transaction costs go 
down. However, trading algorithms are typically top-secret so transparency may be deemed less. In addition, 







LTCM in 1998. It was deemed inconceivable that an institution like Lehman would be 
allowed to go bankrupt.
Another example of the impossible happening was the stalling and drying-up of certain 
markets. For instance the repo market, a crucial marketplace for bank funding, had always 
been extremely liquid. It was beyond belief for the players in those markets that such a 
market simply stopped functioning. When it did, a number of banks ran into big troubles. 
The danger of a tail event is not so much the event itself but its surprise effect. If no one 
expects such an event or everyone deems it too improbable, no one will be prepared when it 
comes and the impact can be devastating. Quality stress testing can help to identify the type 
of low probability-high impact events that escape regular (statistical) analysis but need to be 
addressed anyway. If dykes are designed to contain floods in 99.99% of all cases, the impact 
of the 0.01% chance may justify even higher dykes.
If we follow the idea of the market as a process, outlined in chapter four, it would be recom-
mendable if more attention would be paid on the robustness of the system: how a system 
copes with a shock/crisis is perhaps an even more vital question than the all-out preven-
tion of all possible shocks and crises. For if radical uncertainty is acknowledged as part of 
the economic world, it becomes simply impossible to foresee all possible potential major 
disturbances. 
In chapter two it was shown that much of current finance research consists of empirical 
analysis of historical data. While this type of analysis may yield valuable insights, there are 
dangers in focusing too much on the facts of the past. A statistical relation is not the same 
as a causal relation. The tag “past results are no guarantee for future performance” is usually 
attached to any advertisement for a financial investment. In 1998 LTCM ran into trouble 
when prices of various assets started deviating from their statistically solid historical relations 
as a result from turbulence in the markets stemming from the Asia and Russia crises. The 
correlations that were crucial for LTCM’s arbitrage strategies changed, resulting in huge 
losses. Something similar played a role in the great financial crisis. Valuation and risk of 
complex structured products such as CDO’s depend to a large extent on the correlations 
between the various parts that comprise such a structured product. Estimates of these cor-
relations were based on rather limited historical data and turned out to be quite different in 
both number and nature127. 
Again the question can be asked if these models were wrong then? In chapter five this issue 
of “false” theories and models was directly dealt with in regard to option pricing theory. It 
127  See Salmon, F., Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street, Wired Magazine 17-03, 2009. See 















































is argued there that it is not the theory itself but rather an important assumption that is the 
cause for the anomaly. It is similar here: the value of a structured product depends on the 
correlations of its comprising parts. The determination and nature of that correlation is a 
whole different story. If particular assumptions surrounding a theory fail, the theory using 
those assumptions can become inappropriate though not necessarily wrong.
Perhaps the most fundamental disappointment for the general public is that economists have 
not been able to predict the great storm that would descend upon the world. Somehow it 
appears to be expected from economists to warn the public in time. The public might have 
been led astray by Milton Friedman’s famous article (Friedman, 1953) which can be read as 
to say that economic theories should be judged by their ability to predict128. But prediction 
is not be equated with forecasting. Prediction is claiming that if x happens, y (and perhaps z) 
will happen. If we raise the money supply above production growth, inflation will pop up, 
perhaps later translating in unemployment. Forecasting is saying what stocks are going to 
perform well; a complex issue depending on many variables129. As evidenced by the analysis 
in chapter three, economists, even the very best and most highly respected, are not extraor-
dinarily good at this. At least they do not appear to fare better than others in the investment 
industry who may not have an economic background or a fantastic academic resume. So in 
a sense the predictive powers of economists should not be overestimated.
Of course there have been economists who saw the crisis coming or who claim to have seen 
it coming. But that raises an additional question: why were these visionaries not heard? Ap-
parently their stories were not persuasive enough to convince colleagues, policy makers and 
politicians, supervisors and regulators, bankers or the public at large. How credible would 
such claims be anyway? It would appear almost impossible to perfectly predict timing and 
scale of a highly complex phenomenon like the great financial crisis. That is not to say that 
economists are useless in this regard. Rather than predicting events they can point out pos-
sible outcomes and consequences of actions. They can signal important developments and 
potential risks. The challenge then becomes getting these signals taken seriously, in particular 
when they come from beyond one’s own particular economic conversation or school of 
thought. Above all, economist can learn from the past, from the crisis, and perhaps open up 
a bit beyond their own niche area of expertise. For instance by paying more attention to the 
practice of the real world, but also to other approaches and disciplines. 
The crisis has indeed ignited discussion within the discipline of economics. All too often 
these discussions take the shape of an ideological battle between various schools of thought, 
128  How Friedman’s article should be or can be interpreted, see Mäki, 2009.








in particular so-called “saltwater” versus “freshwater” economists130. All the differences of 
opinion on the working of markets, rational behavior of agents, effectiveness of economic 
policy and the like are raised. In truth both camps share some of the deficiencies that have 
played a role. As Dow (2012) remarks, both the New Classical and the New Keynesian 
school treated the real economy and money-and-prices separately, thus neglecting asset infla-
tion and leaving the formation of speculative bubbles unimpeded131. Instead of fighting wars 
of the past, a constructive future-oriented approach aimed at dealing with a globalized and 
financialized world might serve better. This is especially true for macroeconomics where for 
a long time both sides have underestimated and misjudged the importance and impact of 
financial markets, both in itself and in relation to the real economy. In finance some of the 
most ground-breaking advances have actually been combined saltwater-freshwater products: 
Merton Miller from Chicago and Francesco Modigliani from MIT on capital structure, 
Eugene Fama from Chicago and Paul Samuelson from MIT on efficient markets, William 
Sharpe and John Lintner on asset pricing, Myron Scholes from Chicago, Robert C. Merton 
from MIT and Fischer Black who worked at both institutions, on derivatives pricing.
Finance has room for some critical reflection of its own as well. Financial economist Andrew 
Lo (2012) points out that the crisis has touched upon basic tenets of financial economics. 
That doesn’t so much concern particular theories but rather the general self-image of the 
field:
Many of us like to think of financial economics as a science, but complex events like the 
financial crisis suggest that this conceit may be more wishful thinking than reality.
Lo mentions complexity and human behavior as crucial factors why analyzing a financial 
crisis is different from analyzing an airplane crash. The causal chain is not as clearly identifi-
able. Whereas the number of potential factors is limited in a plane crash (say: weather, pilot 
skill/human error, material defects), financial markets are thoroughly global and influenced 
by an abundance of factors. The point is that finance may very well be a science, but that it is 
in any case a social science. The outcomes are the result of complex interactions on all kinds 
of levels and may not always be predictable.
Chicago economist Luigi Zingales, in his capacity as president of the American Finance 
Association (AFA), has weighed in on finance in relation to society in his 2015 presidential 
address. Essentially being pro-markets but not pro-business in its current inception132, 
130  See for instance The Economist, Economists debates: Keynesian principles, March 18, 2009 and the feud 
between Paul Krugman and John Cochrane.
131  Although the Post Keynesian ideas of Hyman P. Minsky, in particular his Financial Instability Hypothesis, 
have attracted considerable renewed attention in macroeconomics.















































Zingales is very critical on both the practice of finance and banking and the academic field 
in his confronting article titled “Presidential Address: Does finance benefit society?”. While 
he basically is of the opinion that finance “fosters growth, promotes entrepreneurship, favors 
education, alleviates poverty and reduces inequality”, defending finance as contributing to 
general welfare has lost credibility, he warns. Moreover, this loss of credibility has provoked 
not only legislation and regulation (well-intended but often misguided) but also even more 
lobbying from the financial sector with more undesirable consequences. Academic scholars 
have a role to play in preventing escalation of a vicious circle. Listing a host of excesses in 
the financial sector (mis-selling, manipulation, fraud), academics should be less agnostic 
and more critical about what benefits society and what does not. In addition, they should 
be more careful in advertendly or inadvertendly aligning themselves with other stakeholders 
in the financial sector: not only with businesses but also with regulators as well as policy-
makers. Instead they have a duty to publicly voice and educate what is good and what is bad 
in terms of products, market structure, regulation, policy, etc., according to Zingales.
What could be other ways forward then for thinking and dealing with the phenomenon 
of financial markets? In chapter four it was argued that explanations from different schools 
of thought that may appear irreconcilable at first sight need not always be rival but can be 
complimentary if one examines the particular claims carefully enough. That leaves room 
for a more pluralistic approach. The crisis actually has spawned initiatives in that direction.
6.3 gEoRgE SoRoS: REFlExivity and thE inStitutE FoR nEw 
eConoMIC thInkIng
The crisis has brought attention to the ideas of investment billionaire, philanthropist and 
philosopher George Soros. Fueled by his rich experience in the markets and inspired by his 
LSE education with Karl Popper as his tutor, Soros (1997, 2013) has developed a framework 
which, he believes, not only applies to financial markets but also to the social sciences in 
general and economics in particular. The framework hinges on two concepts: fallibility and 
reflexivity:
My conceptual framework is built on two relatively simple propositions. The first is that 
in situations that have thinking participants, the participants’ views of the world never 
perfectly correspond to the actual state of affairs. People can gain knowledge of indi-
vidual facts, but when it comes to formulating theories or forming an overall view, their 








The second proposition is that these imperfect views can influence the situation to which 
they relate through the actions of the participants. For example, if investors believe that 
markets are efficient then that belief will change the way they invest, which in turn will 
change the nature of the markets in which they are participating (though not necessarily 
making them more efficient). That is the principle of reflexivity (ibid.).
Both concepts share familiarity with concepts and ideas which have been treated in earlier 
chapters, in particular chapters four and five. Soros explicitly espouses Frank Knight’s distinc-
tion between calculable risk and (radical) uncertainty (see also Frydman & Goldberg, 2013). 
According to Soros (2013) “it is fallibility that is the key source of Knightian uncertainty in 
human affairs”133. 
Regarding reflexivity Soros distinguishes between a cognitive and a manipulative function 
in the thinking of agents. The cognitive function is a passive one, observing the world while 
the manipulative function is active, intervening in the world. When both function are active 
they interfere with each other and the outcome becomes sketchy:
Consequently, the cognitive function cannot produce all the knowledge agents need 
to make decisions; they have to act on the basis of imperfect understanding. While 
the manipulative function can make an impact on the world, outcomes are unlikely 
to correspond to expectations. There is bound to be some slippage between intentions 
and actions, and further slippage between actions and outcomes. Since agents base 
their decisions on inadequate knowledge, their actions are liable to have unintended 
consequences. This means that reflexivity introduces an element of uncertainty both into 
the agents’ view of the world and into the world in which they participate (Soros, 2013).
The way Soros looks at agency, based on fallibility and reflexivity and explicitly including 
Knightian uncertainty, clearly shares affinity with the picture of agency that was painted in 
chapter four, inspired by Austrian market process theory. Indeed several authors have noted 
similarities between the ideas of Soros and members of the Austrian school, in particular 
Hayek (Caldwell, 2014, Bronk, 2014).
But there are also links with the concept of performativity, as treated in chapter five. Soros 
(2013) writes that “in social systems fallible human beings are not merely scientific observers 
but also active participants in the system themselves. That is what makes social systems 
reflexive”. Bronk (2013), referring to Soros (1997), comes to the conclusion that reflexivity 
amongst other things also implies that there is two-way interaction between science and real-
















































ity. Put differently: there are feedback loops between science and reality. Which is precisely 
the point of the performativity thesis (see also Hands, 2014). 
So far so good but what is the upshot of Soros’ ideas? In his own words: “What makes 
my propositions interesting is that they contradict some of the basic tenets of economic 
theory” (2013). Soros thinks that reflexivity, in combination with fallibility, gives rise to 
self-reinforcing feedback loops which lead to disequilibrium. For Soros market prices do 
not accurately reflect fundamental value and agents’ views of the world are never perfectly 
aligned. Equilibrium is the exception rather than the rule; Soros sees this standard economic 
assumption as an extreme and limiting case (Bronk 2013). Because neoclassical economics, 
in particular Rational Expectations and the Efficient Market Hypothesis, cannot deal with 
reflexivity, there is a need for a new economic paradigm, according to Soros.
Implicitly, and maybe fueled by the 2007-2008 crisis, Soros appears to have either the 
opinion that disequilibrium is undesirable or he shares some form of the radical subjectivist 
view of Lachmann and Schackle which were mentioned in chapter four. That is the idea that 
the amount of ignorance is so great that it puts coordination beyond reach, which renders 
the concept of equilibrium useless. Soros indeed appears to hold that fallibility is quite 
omnipresent and universal.
With regard to equilibrium in chapter four it was suggested to take a step back from it 
because it is somewhat of a disputable concept in the context of financial markets where 
supply and demand continuously clear. It was also suggested to decouple the notion of 
market efficiency from the concept of equilibrium, in the light of the dynamic market 
process which actually takes place in the market. In other words, disequilibrium need 
not be an insurmountable problem. Like myself, other authors, while being interested in 
the concept of reflexivity have also questioned Soros’ conclusion about equilibrium and 
neoclassical economics. Guala (2014) agrees the importance of reflexivity, but think that 
his critique of mainstream economics is mistaken. Features of reflexivity can be built into 
neoclassical models. The challenge is practical, rather than conceptual. There is no deep 
flaw in economic theory that prevents it from capturing the essential features of “negative” 
and “positive feedback loops”, he concludes. Bronk (2013) reaches a similar conclusion. He 
finds Soros’ view of (nearly) universal fallibility similarly unconvincing as the rational utility 
maximizer from neoclassical economics. Bronk also takes issue with the stance he perceives 
in Soros that performative effects have a priori negative effects. He concludes that Soros 
should acknowledge that both neoclassical economics and his own theory capture certain 







The perceived need for a new economic paradigm, led Soros to co-founding the Institute for 
New Economic Thinking (INET). The goal of INET is:
Founded in the wake of the financial crisis in 2009, the Institute for New Economic 
Thinking (INET) is a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization devoted to developing and 
sharing the ideas that can repair our broken economy and create a more equal, prosper-
ous, and just society.
The advisory and governing boards are composed of a blend of economists and other social 
scientists, bankers, investment managers and journalists.
The idea behind INET is interesting and the reasons for its inception are valid. However, the 
assumptions underlying the idea do not appear to be free of preconceptions:
We have seen all too clearly how free market fundamentalism, fiscal austerity, financial-
ization and corporate influence in politics have endangered economies, communities, 
and the planet as a whole.
Left to their own devices, academic, governmental, and corporate institutions will 
continue to cling to outmoded economic models, out of fear that new ideas would 
undermine their own financial advantage.
We work to guide the field away from economic orthodoxy so that it can free itself of 
inertia and past failures.
Mentioned as one of the key principles is that heterodox models that pose alternatives to the 
neoclassical orthodoxy are essential to understanding the economy and promoting a vibrant 
intellectual pluralism134. As such it would appear that INET is more of a thinktank which 
advocates heterodoxy rather than a champion of pluralism. Where it concerns the value of 
alternative explanations, be it orthodox or heterodox, the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating. In chapter three this was somewhat tested for behavioral and neoclassical finance. 
And in chapter five it was shown that the sociological angle is valuable, but not so much as to 
fully discredit the orthodoxy. When a plurality of theories applies to a subject matter, there is 
no reason why orthodoxy should or could not be one of those. In addition, as Davis (2012) 
has pointed out, the orthodoxy in economics is not necessary static:
134  Other key principles mentioned are that economists and their ideas should be independent from powerful 
















































This core-periphery framework, however, is a dynamic one, and as the history of 
economic thought demonstrates what counts as core and periphery research programs 
has changed over the history of the discipline, thus implying that the identity of the 
discipline as associated with its core research programs also changes over time.
That applies to finance as well, I believe. As I argued in chapter two, finance has changed and 
evolved dramatically over time. The core being qualitative, institutionalist just after the war. 
The development of the major finance theories, which can be considered as originally work 
in the periphery, gave rise to a new formalistic quantitative core. And behavioral finance is 
a prime example of research development in the periphery culminating in becoming part of 
the core.
6.4 CrItICal fInanCe reVIeW
In chapter two the methodology of finance was analysed by means of categorizing subject 
and approach in the two leading finance journals: the Journal of Finance and the Journal of 
Financial Economics. One of the findings was the dominance of empirical contributions, in 
particular statistical data analysis. However, it was noted that since the crisis there appeared 
to be some signs of more variety within the empirical work. An interesting development in 
this regard has been the inception in 2012 of a new journal: the Critical Finance Review 
(CFR). Founder and editor-in chief, UCLA finance scholar Ivo Welch, wanted to create a 
journal unlike others: with room for controversy and critique (Welch, 2012). In the CFR 
typically some well-known, established part of knowledge is critically reviewed while the 
original authors get the opportunity to reply in that same issue. Another form of critique 
is that in the CFR regularly replication checks of older papers are done to see if the results 
still hold up.
In addition, Welch wants to create space for less usual but important topics, such as social 
issues, climate change and demographics. Examples are “The Housing Wealth Effect: The 
Crucial Roles of Demographics, Wealth Distribution and Wealth Shares” (Charles Calomiris, 
Longhofer and Miles, 2013) and “Obesity and Household Financial Distress” (Guthrie and 
Sokolovsky, 2017).
While the CFR is still a very young journal, it is already well-regarded within the field 
and it has a top ten position amongst finance journals where it concerns impact. Top-level 
scholars, such as Fama and French, Shiller, Campbell, Lo, Roll and many others have written 







of Finance and the Journal of Financial Economics135. Welch himself has said that one of 
his goals is to change the incentives for finance writers. By creating his new outlet he wants 
to offer an alternative for the established journals in which scholars do not have to follow 
the traditional mould of the particular established journal. But we could also speak of an 
attempt to change and add to the conversation in finance. The conversation is changed 
because the critique and reply model (a conversation in itself ) provides a much more direct 
dialogue than can be accomplished by the traditional leading journals with lengthy processes 
and time periods to publish. And the conversation can be augmented if scholars take the 
opportunity to publish about less usual subjects which, in the words of Welch (2012), are 
critical in the meaning of importance.
6.5 InstItutIonalIsM In fInanCe
In chapter two the transition from finance as a descriptive, non-mathematic endeavor to a 
quantitative, formalistic discipline was described. The former being labelled “institutional 
finance”. In his 2007 book Peter Bernstein (2007) identified a group of scholars within the 
orthodoxy of finance whom he labels “institutionalists”. By using the phrase “institutionalist” 
he meant a focus on the end-users of financial markets: firms seeking capital, pension funds, 
insurers, social security agencies and individuals who need to manage their consumption 
and savings over time. In the context of financial markets I would add that an institutional 
perspective also entails dealing with a variety of aspects which impinge on the functioning 
of financial markets. Financial markets do not exist just for the sake of playing the game 
of making and losing money. They do exist to deal with the problem of inter-temporal 
consumption decisions, or in other words: to cope with time, risk, and uncertainty. In a 
financial marketplace which is increasingly globally connected and high-tech this ultimate 
raison d’état should not be forgotten.
For markets to function properly, the institutional structure needs to be right, either by 
design or by evolution. To repeat Rajan and Zingales (2003: “markets cannot flourish with-
out the very visible hand of the government, which is needed to set up and maintain the 
infrastructure”. In other words, unregulated markets are by no means always preferable to 
regulated markets, and vice versa. Rajan, Zingales and others with a Chicago School back-
ground have also always been quite critical on lobbying and other efforts by special interests 
to influence policy makers and thus alter the competitive environment. They share this 
viewpoint with institutionalists like J.K. Galbraith. The extensive and successful lobbying by 
135  Only a limited number of issues has been published so far. An analysis, as was performed in chapter 2 for the 















































the financial sector for deregulation in the years  leading up to the crisis is well-documented 
and mentioned as one of the underlying causes for the 2007-2008 crisis.
While regulation is an obvious part of the story, the Austrian perspective on the market 
process, treated in chapter four, can be regarded as institutional as well. To acknowledge that 
institutions matter, implies that the well-functioning of capital markets is not solely a matter 
of letting market forces run wild. The interests of the end-users of financial markets need to 
be taken into account and safeguarded. This may be done in a number of ways: regulation 
obviously springs to mind, but we can also think about, for instance, education and the 
creation of stimuli to use the full spectrum of products that financial markets have to offer.
Agency theory, which can be regarded as partly neoclassical, partly (new) institutional 
economics, is also relevant, most notably where it concerns the problem of moral hazard. 
During the crisis failing banks were bailed out by central banks and governments for the 
sake of stability of the financial system and the economy in general, effectively creating a put 
option under the activities of those banks, which was largely ultimately paid for with the tax-
payer’s money. No banker will admit that they counted on the guarantees that governments 
provided at the peak of the crisis to bail them out. Or that they advertently or inadvertently 
took on more risk than they would have without counting on some kind of safety net. But 
many of them were bailed out in a collaboration of the sector itself with government and 
regulators with the taxpayers largely footing the bill. Another consequence of the crisis and 
bail-out was a reshuffle of the sector where a few dominant market participants got even 
more dominant, thus reducing competition in the market and perhaps increasing lobbying 
strength.
There has also been a lot of attention for the compensation of executives: performance-related 
compensation can misalign the interests of executives and shareholders (and other stakehold-
ers). Finally, in the context of financial markets a similar problem within organizations pops 
up: payment of professional traders and money managers is also highly performance-linked 
and usually based on a short time horizon. In all these cases incentives are present to take on 
extra risk, which might not be prudent. These are all agency-related issues.
According to Bernstein (2007) finance scholars such as Robert Shiller, Andrew Lo and 
Robert Merton belong to the institutionalist category. The common denominator of their 
work is that they take financial markets beyond the narrow realm of the markets themselves 
to real-world problems such as pensions and retirement and housing. Shiller, for instance, 
has occupied himself with the housing market in the 2005 version of his bestseller “Irrational 
Exuberance”. This has led to construction of the Case-Shiller index: an indicator for the 







deal with the risks and uncertainties that are presented in that context. In his 2012 book 
“Finance and the Good Society” Shiller expands his argumentation further to use finance 
and financial markets for the good of society with regard to insurance, pensions, college 
savings, and so forth.
Likewise Merton, with Fischer Black and Myron Scholes one of the originators of option 
pricing theory, has occupied himself with lifecycle finance and products and markets that re-
late to pensions and retirement (Merton and Bodie, 2005). Financial innovation for Merton 
means better solutions for the end-users of financial markets. Merton and Bodie point out 
that transaction costs are extremely relevant to actual financial markets and products. That 
is another typical institutional notion, expressing the idea that the existence of these markets 
and products hinges on trying to minimize transaction costs.
Lo is concerned with a variety of issues that surround financial markets, such as market 
structure, regulation and risk management. One could add the late Stephen Ross who 
consulted on smart compensation schemes for executives, based on his expertise in agency 
theory and options. What is interesting is that the reputation of these scholars originates in 
their work in the narrow realm of financial markets: market efficiency and asset pricing. Also 
note that the “institutionalist” label runs across the behavioral-neoclassical demarcation: 
Ross was a champion of neoclassical finance while Shiller is considered a premier behavioral/
Keynesian economist in the first place.
6.6 neW InstItutIonal fInanCe
If we accept that a plurality of partial explanations applies to financial markets, rather than 
one grand theory, some kind of umbrella concept might be useful. Perhaps we could speak 
of new institutional finance.
The obvious similarity of this phrase with new institutional economics is no coincidence. In 
his 2000 discussion article on new institutional economics Oliver Williamson recommends 
that, by lack of or awaiting a unified grand theory, we should accept pluralism. Furthermore, 
Williamson situates new institutional economics closer to the orthodoxy than old institu-
tional economics. New institutional economics adds to the orthodoxy rather than replacing 
it. That corresponds to the ideas which have been suggested in the previous chapters, in 
















































Finance remains essentially and above all a social science. Williamson (2000) identifies four 
levels of social analysis: 
- Level 1: informal institutions  , such as customs, traditions, norms, religion, ethics;
- Level 2: formal institutions, such as property rights and other macro legal and political 
arrangements;
- Level 3: governance, such as firms and other forms of organization;
- Level 4: resource allocation, e.g. the market.
Higher levels pose constraints on the lower levels, while there is also feedback from lower 
levels to higher levels. Perhaps the spirit and inspiration of Williamson’s scheme (though 
certainly not identical) can be useful for framing a new institutional finance. The emer-
gence, and existence of financial markets and the basic functions these markets perform 
can be regarded as a level 1 issues. Level 2 is about market structure. It is constituted by the 
conditions which affect and influence  the well-functioning of financial markets: legitimacy, 
transparency, liquidity and the according legal boundaries and relevant policy-making, 
governance and supervision. Level 3 is the market itself, primarily but not exclusively the 
domain of neoclassical finance. The behavioral and psychological angle constitutes level 4: 
the micro motives of individual agents. The Austrian market process theory is an example 
of a feedback loop, in this case between level 4 to level 3. Reflexive and performative aspects 
can play on all levels.
6.7 fInally
I have argued that it can be worthwhile to employ various perspectives when studying and 
analyzing phenomena in financial markets: social-institutional, economical, psychological, 
and so forth. Within the economic frame neoclassical finance is the dominant approach, 
though not the only one. As has been shown finance has pluralistic characteristics. It has 
evolved from a field with a descriptive, qualitative approach into a quantitative discipline 
that emphasizes rigor and (mostly statistical) testing. Finance became one of the poster boys 
of neoclassical economics, a testing ground for its methods and theories. But it would be 
well served to not forget about those pluralistic origins and keep an open stance to novel 
approaches. Even while the neoclassical core still forms a solid fundament, new ideas may 
be profitable. Not in the monetary sense, because making money in the markets is not easy, 
but there can be value in, for instance, an enhanced picture of agency in financial markets 
(using behavioral insights amongst others), in descriptive accounts of how arbitrage works 
(using Austrian market processes and other approaches emphasizing discovery, learning, evo-
lution and adaptation). And there may be much more to gain in a more heterodox finance 







Keynesian inspired finance, as well as innovations from the practice. Most of these ideas 
can be empirically tested. Financial markets have been the proving ground for a number 
of neoclassical concepts (Harrison, 1997) but they can function in a similar way for other 
approaches, as has happened already for behavioral economics.
Earlier the possibilities of reconciliation of seemingly rival economic schools of thought 
and disciplines, on a methodological level  but perhaps also on an ideological level, were 
discussed (see also Davis, 2019a). I suggested that the differences and disagreements, polar-
ized as they may appear at first sight, could actually be bridged to some extent, at least in 
finance. The result is a realist-grounded pluralism: a plurality of theories (and methods) 
which deliver partial and approximate explanations (see Mäki, 2005, Marchionni, 2005). 
These explanations are not universal, but work local and contextual, on particular aspects of 
and in specific cases within the broader phenomenon of financial markets. 
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The aim of this dissertation is twofold:
1) To add to a meaningful conversation on financial markets by using less conventional, yet 
empirical, methods, which differ from the dominant statistical empirical methods;
2) To provide a case study of what methodological pluralism can look like: applying various 
methods and perspectives to one and the same subject or phenomenon.
While the various chapters may appear somewhat unrelated, the thread throughout is the 
interplay of theory and practice in financial markets. 
In chapter 1 the key concepts are introduced: the basics of financial markets and what role 
they have in the social-economic realm. Various notions of pluralism are discussed as well.
The second chapter contains an empirical investigation of the methodology of finance. An 
extensive sample, covering the entire history of the two leading journals in the field, the 
Journal of Finance and the Journal of Financial Economics, has been investigated in order 
to sketch:
1) The development of subjects of research;
2) The approach used in tackling those subjects.
Important changes through time were found and possible explanations for these changes are 
provided. The major findings are:
1) A shift in the subjects of the writings over time: a narrowing of the scope of analysis from 
broader (macro-)economic policy-oriented issues, first towards analysis of market and 
firm behavior and later increasingly towards behavior of agents and singular events;
2) Two major changes in approach from chiefly empirical qualitative research first towards 
predominantly theoretical analysis and subsequently back to mainly empirical, but now 
quantitative-statistical, research. 
Both appear to be facilitated and fueled by:
1) The development of ground-breaking theory in the 1960s and 1970s, which in turn is 
part a general wave of formalization and quantification in economics in the 1950s and 
1960s;
2) The technological advances of the middle 1980s that propelled the rise of ever more 
precise and detailed empirical data analysis.
The third chapter explores one of the main divides in thinking about financial markets, 







efficient manner, which would imply that excess returns are unachievable in the long run, 
or are there systematic and enduring deviations which can be exploited to provide superior 
returns? Some of the leading protagonists on both sides of this debate happen to be involved 
in professional asset management operations. The real-world performance of these opera-
tions is compared in terms of risk and return in order to provide a new perspective on the 
neoclassical versus behavioral debate in finance. While the sample is small, the upshot is 
twofold. First, there is no conclusive evidence that investment management operations with 
strong academic ties consistently and persistently produce better than average returns. No 
more and no less, when compared to other professional mutual funds, at least based on the 
funds analyzed here. Second, there is no conclusive evidence that investment management 
operations which are advertised as based on principles of behavioral finance do provide 
consistently and persistently superior returns when compared to investment management 
operations which are advertised as inspired by principles of neoclassical finance, or the other 
way around for that matter.
In the fourth chapter ideas out of Austrian economics, in particular Israel Kirzner’s thoughts 
on the market process, are applied to the workings of, and theorizing about financial mar-
kets. I argue, both theoretically and by using illustrations out of the practice of financial 
markets, that a descriptive causal process approach such as the Austrian viewpoint provides, 
can be regarded as complementary to the more normative claims put forward by neoclassical 
and behavioral finance, actually capable of bridging the divide between these two dominant 
strands of thought in finance.
Performativity is a concept that relates to the idea that theory and practice interact and 
influence each other, a theme which runs throughout this dissertation. Performativity can 
be described as the idea that a theory or an aspect of a theory such as a model in some form 
enacts the reality it is intended to describe. Chapter five scrutinizes the arguments brought 
forward on the performativity of finance theory, in particular as presented by Donald 
MacKenzie. It will be argued that, while MacKenzie has made a valuable and meaningful 
contribution, his strongest claims—that option pricing theory shows traits of what he calls 
Barnesian performativity—do not hold up. This is due to a faulty reading of the Black-
Scholes-Merton model and option pricing theory in general and a questionable appreciation 
of the nature of economic phenomena and models and theories used in economics. It is 
argued, however, that the less extreme version, so-called effective performativity is a sensible 
and interesting concept,.
This research project first began to take shape in 2005, i.e. before the 2007-2008 crisis 
broke loose. Since 2007 financial markets and the thinking about financial markets have 







as some new interesting developments within finance which can be regarded as offspring 
of the crisis. Subsequently suggestions are made which could improve the conversation on 
financial markets. An attempt is made to sketch the outlines of what a pluralistic finance 
would look like, which I have labelled new institutional finance. 

saMenVattIng
Het doel van deze dissertatie is tweeledig:
1) Een bijdrage leveren aan de academische conversatie over financiële markten door 
gebruik te maken van minder conventionele empirische methoden die afwijken van de 
traditionele statistische aanpak;
2) Een illustratie geven van methodologisch pluralisme: het toepassen van verschillende 
methoden en perspectieven op een en hetzelfde onderwerp of fenomeen.
Hoewel de verschillende hoofdstukken op het eerste gezicht losstaand van elkaar mogen 
lijken, is de rode draad de interactie van de theorieën over en de praktijk van financiële 
markten. 
In het eerste hoofdstuk worden de kernconcepten geïntroduceerd: wat financiële markten 
eigenlijk zijn en welke functie ze vervullen binnen de maatschappij. Daarnaast worden 
verschillende betekenissen van het begrip pluralisme besproken.
Hoofdstuk twee bevat een empirisch onderzoek naar de gebruikte methodologie binnen 
het vakgebied financiële economie. Een uitgebreide steekproef van de twee leidende weten-
schappelijke publicaties binnen het vakgebied financiële economie, Journal of Finance en 
Journal of Financial Economics, is onderzocht op twee aspecten:
1) De ontwikkeling van de onderwerpen van onderzoek;
2) De gebruikte benadering om die onderwerpen te onderzoeken.
Belangwekkende veranderingen in de tijd worden zichtbaar waarvoor verklaringen zijn. De 
belangrijkste bevindingen zijn:
1) Een verschuiving in de behandelde onderwerpen in de vorm van een vernauwing van de 
reikwijdte van de analyse van brede (macro-)economische beleidsgeoriënteerde kwesties 
naar eerst analyse op het niveau van markten en organisaties en vervolgens onderzoek 
naar individuele agenten en gebeurtenissen;
2) Twee majeure veranderingen in de aanpak en methoden: van eerst voornamelijk kwali-
tatief empirisch onderzoek naar hoofdzakelijk theoretische analyse en vervolgens weer 
terug naar empirisch, maar nu kwantitatief-statistisch, onderzoek. 
Deze ontwikkelingen lijken gefaciliteerd en gevoed te zijn door:
1) De ontwikkeling van baanbrekende theorieën in de Jaren zestig en zeventig van de vorige 
eeuw, welke op zijn beurt weer onderdeel is van een bredere golf van formalisering en 








2) De technologische vooruitgang sinds de jaren tachtig, die steeds preciezer en gedetailleer-
dere empirische data-analyse mogelijk maakte.
Hoofdstuk drie gaat in op een van de belangrijkste meningsverschillen in het denken over 
financiële markten, namelijk die tussen de neoklassieke school en de gedragseconomen. 
Het meningsverschil draait om markefficiëntie: gedragen financiële markten zich op een 
min of meer efficiënte wijze zodat het op lange termijn niet mogelijk is om de markt te 
verslaan of zijn er systematische en aanhoudende afwijkingen waardoor dat wel degelijk 
mogelijk? Enkele van de academische hoofdrolspelers zijn ook betrokken bij professionele 
vermogensbeheeractiviteiten en de prestaties van die activiteiten in termen van risico en 
rendement zijn met elkaar vergeleken. Hoewel de steekproef klein is, kunnen er wel twee 
conclusies worden getrokken. Ten eerste is er geen doorslaggevend bewijs te vinden in de 
data dat beleggingsfondsen met sterke academische banden bovengemiddeld presteren in 
vergelijking met andere professionele fondsen. Ten tweede is er geen doorslaggevend bewijs 
dat gedragseconomisch geïnspireerde fondsen beter presteren dan neoklassiek geïnspireerde 
fondsen. Andersom geldt overigens hetzelfde.
In het vierde hoofdstuk worden ideeën uit de Oostenrijkse school, in het bijzonder het ge-
dachtengoed van Israel Kirzner over het marktproces, toegepast op de theorie en praktijk van 
financiële markten. Ik beargumenteer theoretisch en geïllustreerd door praktijkvoorbeelden 
dat een beschrijvende causale procesbenadering, zoals Kirzner die geeft, gezien kan worden 
als complementair aan de meer normatieve claims, zoals die door de neoklassieke economie 
en gedragseconomie te berde worden gebracht aangaande financiële markten. Ergo, dat deze 
Oostenrijks benadering een brug kan slaan tussen deze twee dominante gedachtestromen.
Performativiteit is een concept dat gerelateerd is aan het idee dat theorie en praktijk inter-
actie hebben en elkaar beïnvloeden. Het kan beschreven worden als het idee dat een theorie 
(of een aspect van een theorie zoals een model) op enigerlei wijze de realiteit beïnvloedt waar 
op die theorie betrekking heeft. Hoofdstuk vijf onderzoekt de argumentatie zoals die door 
Donald MacKenzie naar voren is gebracht met betrekking tot de performativiteit van finan-
ciële economie. Ik beargumenteer dat, hoewel de ideeën van MacKenzie nuttig en waardevol 
zijn, zijn meest vergaande claim dat optietheorie zeer sterk (“Barnesian”) performatief is, te 
ver gaat. De redenen daarvoor zijn dat MacKenzie optietheorie in zijn algemeenheid en het 
Black-Scholes-Merton model in het bijzonder onjuist interpreteert. In zijn algemeenheid is 
zijn perceptie van economische fenomenen en de aard van theorieën en modellen die bin-
nen de economische wetenschap gebruikt worden betwistbaar. Desalniettemin is zijn idee 








Dit onderzoeksproject is gestart in 2005, dus voordat de grote financiële crisis van 2007-
2008 uitbrak. Sindsdien zijn zowel de financiële markten zelf als de gedachtenvorming daar-
over ingrijpend veranderd. In het slothoofdstuk worden enige crisis-gerelateerde aspecten 
behandeld evenals nieuwe ontwikkelingen die gezien kunnen worden als het product van 
die crisis. Tenslotte doe ik suggesties hoe de conversatie over financiële markten verbeterd 
kan worden en probeer ik te schetsen hoe een pluralistische financiële economie, die ik 
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